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Abstract
Interactions between the federal courts and agencies are an important but often overlooked part
of the policy process. This study is an attempt to explore this area of the law by examining how
the U.S. Supreme Court evaluates the actions taken by federal agencies. From a practical
standpoint, such evaluation has a real impact on the means available to agencies and the
outcomes they bring about. Normatively, how the Court does (or does not) go about holding
agencies accountable to rules and procedures created by elected officials and the agencies
themselves has serious implications for notions of democratic control of government in an
increasingly administration-driven age. After reviewing the relevant scholarly literature and case
law, the author identifies and describes a novel body of cases unified by their administrative
nature. Examining these cases using the integrated model of Supreme Court decision making
developed by Pacelle, Curry, and Marshal, the author finds support for the idea that the identified
body of cases is both coherent and distinct from the full set of Supreme Court cases. Using a
novel analytical model, support is found for the importance of agency rulemaking in agencies
receiving deference from the Court. Additionally, legal factors are found to strongly influence
outcomes in the identified set of cases.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Research Design
When thinking about the federal government, our focus often turns to Congress and the
president. This is a reasonable pattern, as these elected officials are responsible for initiating the
formal aspects of policy change and expend considerable resources to gain and keep our
collective attention. However, there are a great many actors in the federal policy process whose
names never appear on a ballot. Employees and leaders of federal agencies are responsible for
implementing the policies that elected officials initiate. Federal judges exercise the power of
review over actions taken by Congress, the president, and agencies.
At first glance, it may appear that unelected actors are simply following the lead of their
elected cousins, mechanically and predictably working through the tasks set before them. While
this view is not entirely fictitious, it is woefully simplistic and incomplete. Judges and
administrators are important and powerful actors in the policy process. While elected officials
may sketch the outlines of policy, it is quite often these unelected actors that fill in the details.
Understanding how judges and administrators contribute to the policy process is essential to the
formation of an accurate and complete view of what government in the U.S. does and is likely to
do. Furthermore, understanding how the judiciary and the bureaucracy interact with one another
is an important but often overlooked aspect of the practical functioning of these vital actors. This
brings me to my central question: how does the Supreme Court evaluate the actions of federal
agencies?
Three Example Cases
In 1967, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) began construction of a dam on the Little
Tennessee River (TVA v. Hill 1978). The building of the Tellico Dam, as it was called, was
1

funded through Congressional appropriations made in that same year. As was the case with many
similar TVA projects, the building of the dam was intended to generate electricity, provide
recreational water space, and help enhance the economic development of the area in which it was
being built. In 1973, before the Tellico Dam was made operational, Congress passed the
Endangered Species Act. Among other things, the Act empowered the Secretary of the Interior to
identify certain species of animals as endangered. The Secretary was also given the charge to
ensure the safety of the habitat of animals so identified and other federal agencies were required
to work with the Department of the Interior to ensure that their activities did not harm the
habitats of endangered species.
Four months prior to the passage of the Endangered Species Act, a researcher from the
University of Tennessee discovered a new species of perch in a section of the Little Tennessee
River. The fish, now commonly known as the snail darter, would have been supremely ill-suited
to the changes to the waters it inhabited were the Tellico Dam to be finished. At the time of this
discovery the Little Tennessee was the fish’s only known habitat, and early in 1975 opponents of
the dam’s construction and others petitioned for the Secretary of the Interior to declare the
species endangered. In October of that year, the Secretary did just that. In addition to declaring
the snail darter endangered, the Secretary of the Interior determined that the Little Tennessee was
the species’ critical habitat, thus shielding the river and interfering with TVA’s plans to complete
the dam.
TVA argued for an attempt at relocating the species and proceeding with construction of
the dam. The Department of the Interior held that the Authority’s study of the snail darter’s
environment was insufficient and the dam should not be completed. Congress continued to
appropriate funds for the completion of the dam as it had since 1967.
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A suit was brought against TVA in a federal district court in 1976 arguing that the
completion of the Tellico Dam would constitute a violation of the Endangered Species Act and
seeking an injunction preventing this. TVA’s position was that continuing Congressional
appropriations for the project, construction of the dam itself predating the Endangered Species
Act, and substantial progress towards the completion of the dam before the snail darter was listed
as endangered all came together to indicate that completion of the project was not barred by the
Act. The district court agreed with TVA and declined to grant the injunction. However, the U. S.
Court of Appeals rejected the district court’s decision, holding that the intent of the Endangered
Species Act was clear and that work that had already occurred on the Tellico Dam had no
bearing on the matter.1
In 1973, Congress also passed the Rehabilitation Act (Bowen v. American Hospital
Association 1986). A portion of this Act required that no disabled individual should be denied
the benefits of or participation in any program that received federal moneys solely on the basis of
that disability, provided that individual was otherwise qualified to benefit or participate. Almost
a decade later, the parents of an infant with a variety of disabilities refused to give consent for
“surgery to remove an esophageal obstruction that prevented oral feeding” (Id at p.617). The
hospital where the infant was born brought suit in an attempt to undertake the life-saving
procedure, but the court denied relief and the infant died. In response to this and citing the
Rehabilitation Act, the Department of Health and Human Services published a Final Rule that,
among other things, required
(1) health care providers receiving federal funds to post notices that,
because of § 504's prohibition against discrimination on the basis of
handicap, health care should not be withheld from infants on the
1

All discussion of the events of TVA v. Hill (1978) is based on information contained in the syllabus and majority
opinion of that case.
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basis of their mental or physical impairments; (2) state child protective
services agencies to establish procedures to prevent unlawful medical
neglect of handicapped infants, and when considered necessary, in the
judgment of the responsible official of the Department of Health and
Human Services, to protect a handicapped infant's life or health; (3)
immediate access to patient records;2 and (4) expedited compliance
actions (Id. at p.610).3
The American Hospital Association challenged these four provisions of the rule on the
basis that they exceeded the bounds of the Rehabilitation Act. The Association sought an
injunction preventing the enforcement of the rule in a federal district court. The district court
agreed with the Association and prevented the rule from being enforced. This decision was
affirmed on appeal.4
Harold and Enid Davis were5 members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
(Davis v. United States 1990). As part of its operations, the Church maintains a global network
of twenty-five thousand missionaries. This network is made up largely of young men from the
Church that receive direct financial support from their parents, members of local Church
congregations, or from funds maintained by the Church specifically for this purpose. The Davis’
sons Benjamin and Cecil were called by the Church into missionary service in 1979 and 1980
respectively. At the instruction of the Church, the Davises transferred amounts of money
specified by the Church into their sons’ checking accounts to financially support their work in
the mission field. Benjamin and Cecil, like all Church missionaries, were instructed to use the
funds only for necessary expenses and to keep careful records of all uses of the designated funds.
These records were then submitted to Church representatives at regular intervals.
Tax law in the United States allows contributions to qualifying charitable organizations to
2

Patient record access was included in the rule to facilitate the actions required by the rule of state child protective
services agencies.
3
Expedited compliance in this instance refers to compliance with the requirements of points 1, 2, and 3.
4
All discussion of the events of Bowen v. American Hospital Association (1986) is based on information contained
in the syllabus and majority opinion of that case.
5
And presumably still are.
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be deducted from an individual’s or household’s annual income for purposes of calculating the
total amount of income tax owed. On their 1980 and 1981 tax returns, the Davises claimed
Benjamin and Cecil as dependents but indicated no charitable contributions. However, on an
amended return filed in 1984 that included changes to the returns filed for 1980 and 1981,
Harold and Enid listed the money transferred to their sons’ checking accounts as charitable
contributions, thus reducing their overall tax burden.
In reviewing the amended returns, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) disallowed the
refunds that would have resulted from these amendments. The Davises filed a suit for a refund of
taxes paid in 1985 and submitted another amended return in 1986, modifying the number of
dependents claimed and reducing the listed charitable deductions to amounts confirmed by the
Church as used in pursuit of mission activities. The Davises contended that the funds given to
their sons were “unreimbursed expenditures made incident to the rendition of services to an
organization contributions to which are deductible,” (Davis v. United States 1990, p.477) thus
qualifying as a deduction to taxable income under 26 CFR §1.170A-1(g)(1989). The district
court ruled that the Church’s lack of direct control over the funds meant that the IRS was correct
in disallowing the deduction. The Court of Appeals affirmed.6
These three cases are very different in a number of ways. The subject matter of each is
quite dissimilar. In TVA, the application of environmental protection regulations to a federal
agency that would rather not follow them is on display. In Bowen, regulations regarding the
health and welfare of disabled infants are being challenged for overstepping statutory
boundaries. In Davis, the application of the tax code in a manner that might seem overly
restrictive to the taxpayers involved is at question. What is most directly at stake in each case
6

All discussion of the events of Davis v. United States (1990) is based on information contained in the syllabus and
majority opinion of that case.
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also varies greatly. Davis involves a matter of the applicable taxes on a few thousand dollars of
income.7 In TVA, the fate of a multimillion-dollar federal project is on the line. In Bowen, the
matters addressed are quite literally life and death.
There are, however, commonalities among these cases as well. After working their
respective ways through the federal judiciary, each of these three cases found itself in the highly
unlikely position of being reviewed by the Supreme Court. Each case also involved questions of
whether or not federal agencies were acting in accordance with the law. The answers to these
questions are mixed. The Court rendered decisions that went against the wishes of the Tennessee
Valley Authority and the Department of Health and Human Services but upheld the decision of
the Internal Revenue Service to disallow the Davises’ deduction of the money sent to their sons
to serve as missionaries for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
This brings me back to the central question of this work: how, exactly, does the Supreme
Court evaluate the actions of federal agencies? The answer to this question remains elusive. A
great deal is known about how both sets of actors behave independently, and this gives us some
insight into how the interactions between them might play out. Still, little large scale empirical
work has been dedicated to understanding the ways that courts and agencies work with or against
one another.
This is unfortunate for three primary reasons. From a purely practical standpoint, both
courts and agencies play a substantial role in the public policy process. As I will discuss at
greater length in a moment, modern administrative agencies are powerful and important actors in
determining what government does and does not do. They are, of course, responsible for carrying
out the will of Congress as manifested through statutory law. As has ever been the case, the

7

As with any case, a complete conception of the stakes must include the downstream effects from any resulting
precedent.
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responsibility for execution of even the most well defined duties brings with it the opportunity to
influence their shape and outcome. However, the bureaucrats who staff federal agencies8 are
much more than mere functionaries carrying out a set of mechanically simplistic and closely
constrained tasks set forth by their elected superiors. For a variety of reasons of both design and
circumstance, agencies typically wield a great deal of discretion in the way they carry out their
duties. For a variety of reasons both practical and political, Congress has made a habit of giving
agencies broad authority to set their own goals and select the strategies to pursue them inside of
often hazy statutory bounds. The legislature may set the targets in the most general sense, but it
is the bureaucrats that make many, and perhaps even most, of the substantive policy decisions
within a given issue area. As for the policy influence of the courts, and the Supreme Court in
particular, one need look no further than decisions such as Brown v. Board or Obergefell v.
Hodges or briefly consider the impact of an alternative outcome in National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius to understand the impact the least dangerous branch can have.9
From a philosophical standpoint, it is potentially troubling that judicial and bureaucratic
actors with so little direct accountability to the public would hold so much power over what
government will or will not, can or cannot do. Such an arrangement does not necessarily pose a
problem for democratic government, as the simple reality of being unelected does not prevent
actors from acting in accordance with public opinion or, perhaps, in the public interest.10 Still, to

8

And my focus in this work is restricted to actors at the national rather than the state level of government.
In Brown, the Court found the racial segregation of public schools to be unconstitutional. In Obergefell, the Court
found that the 14th Amendment required states to both issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples and to recognize
such marriages that were legally performed in other states. Federation of Independent Business was the first major
challenge to the legality of the Affordable Care Act to make its way to the Court
10
It should be remembered that while democratic principles are foundational to the U.S. system of government,
especially as it exists in the modern era, they are not the only principles of importance. The Constitutional order and
the American public can generally be seen to also find some value in both producing technically sound solutions to
policy problems and protecting fundamental rights. While neither of these goals is inherently at odds with popular
sovereignty, both can find themselves in such opposition from time to time. In Federalist 78, Hamilton even goes so
9
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say that a problem might not exist is quite different from saying that one does not exist. If, as
some commentators have claimed, Congress is in the habit of giving significant amounts of
power to agencies with little in the way of meaningful guidance or significant restraint (Lowi
1986), there might very well exist reasons to be concerned about the state of democracy in our
nation. If these claims ring false, the question remains of how, precisely, the courts monitor the
limits set by the elected branches. If claims of Congressional dereliction have merit, the courts
would, due to the role in the larger government structure, play an even more important part in the
policy process than would otherwise be the case. Either way, understanding the manner that the
judicial branch as a whole and the Supreme Court specifically decide administrative cases is
necessary to gain a better understanding of the U. S. policy process. As matters currently stand,
there is precious little evidence that allows us to speak to the matter in an informed way.
From a structural standpoint, it might be said that the elected branches deal more with the
formulation of policy than the other components of the federal government. They choose, to an
extent, the goals and the means that agencies will pursue and employ. While both Congress and
the president have important roles to play in the supervision of agencies in carrying out these
goals, the capacity of those in the Capital and the White House are limited in some important
ways that I will discuss later at greater length. The agencies themselves will carry the policy out
after putting their own often substantial stamp on its formulation. As a part of this process,
agencies will engage in a great deal of interpretation of their enabling statutes and the rules and
regulations they have made themselves. If an agency oversteps its bounds or misinterprets a legal
provision in a major and broadly unpopular way, it might be expected that elected actors would
sometimes respond. However, what if the overstep is minor in nature? What if it is

far as to cite the potential for the judiciary to stand as an obstacle to majority rule quashing minority rights as a
major justifications for their non-elected status.
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particularized in its impact? What if it is unclear whether or not the action represents an overstep
at all? These sorts of potential issue might be less likely to grab the attention of elected
officials.11 Who, then, is the adversely affected individual to turn? This is a role traditionally
filled by the courts, and it is essential to ensuring that government is serving its people. While
the tools the judiciary has at its disposal to oversee agency actions are as deeply imperfect as
those of its elected counterparts, the nature of its functioning and its assigned role within the
larger structure of government means that it is at least well positioned and equipped to provide a
different form of oversight than Congress or the president may be able or willing to.
Understanding the mechanisms and limits of this oversight is vital to providing answers to larger
questions of agency accountability.
Before I begin, I should take a moment to define more clearly my goals here. The
question of court-agency interaction could be handled in two basic ways. The first is to examine
how the courts evaluate agency activity, while the second is to examine how agencies present
their positions to and react to the decisions of the courts. While both would, I believe, provide
interesting and important insight into this set of interactions, I will employ the first approach
here. Additionally, the federal judiciary is itself made up of a variety of individual courts across
three distinct levels.12 Each level and even each specific court can have a different and important
impact on the cases that come before it. District courts are the proverbial front lines of the
judiciary. The Circuits are the first, and often last, appellate courts that will hear a federal case
and each may produce decisions independent of the others. The Supreme Court reviews a tiny
fraction of the total cases dealt with by the Circuits as well as some cases from state Supreme
Courts and a handful of cases of original jurisdiction each term. It also has the final say in any
11

The capacity of and incentives for elected actors to intervene in these matters can also be limited in some
important ways that I will also discuss at greater length later.
12
Assuming, of course, that the discussion is confined to Article III courts.
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legal matter over which it can exercise jurisdiction and its decisions are binding on all lower
federal courts and, in some matters, on state courts. My focus here will be on the Supreme Court.
Finally, as noted in a previous footnote, I will restrict my discussion of bureaucratic agencies to
federal agencies.
Oversight of Administrative Agencies
The administrative institutions that are so central to this endeavor are an integral part of
modern governance and, arguably, modern life. Arguing for a deeper study in the U. S. of the
methods of professional administration, Woodrow Wilson (1887, p.200-201) observed that:
There is scarcely a single duty of government which was once
simple which is not now complex; government once had but a few
masters; it now has scores of masters. Majorities formerly only
underwent government; they now conduct government. Where
government once might follow the whims of a court, it must now
follow the views of a nation.
And those views are steadily widening to new conceptions of state
duty; so that, at the same time that the functions of government are
every day becoming more complex and difficult, they are also
vastly multiplying in number. Administration is everywhere
putting its hands to new undertakings.
Though written in the closing years of the nineteenth century, Wilson’s words do not seem out of
place in the opening years of the twenty-first. The world is more technologically complex and
interconnected than it has ever been. This creates a wide variety of new opportunities but also
gives rise to many new challenges while sometimes amplifying old ones. To adapt to these
challenges and make the most of these opportunities, a veritable army of technical experts from a
wide range of disciplines with the capability to adapt policy in intelligent and productive ways is
needed. In short, the bureaucracy is essential. This being said, it is important to remember that no
tool is free of limitations, nor any solution free from its own set of problems and limitations.
10

The U. S. Constitution is built on, among other things, the idea of separated powers
popularized by Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu. Montesquieu identifies three
primary forms of governmental power: legislative (the power to make and change laws),
executive (the enacting of the business of the state, such engaging in diplomacy), and judicial
(the interpretation and application of the law as it relates to civil and criminal matters)
(Montesquieu 2002). He argues that the separation of these powers is essential for the presence
of liberty,13 as the combination of any two create either a ruler or a body of rulers upon which it
is impossible to place meaningful restrictions.
Yet regulatory agencies are organs of government that possess all three types of power.
This is hardly an original observation. Theodore Lowi (1986, p.295) holds that “the delegation of
broad and undefined discretionary power from the legislature to the executive branch deranges
virtually all constitutional relationships and prevents attainment of the constitutional goals of
limitation on power, substantive calculability, and procedural calculability.” Ronald Pestrito
(2007, p.16) has noted that “The administrative state in America today—both its legal
framework and the manner in which it makes policy—coexists uneasily and often incoherently
with the principles of constitutional government upon which the nation was founded and under
which, at least in form, it continues to operate.” Gary Lawson (1994, p.1231) has stated that
“The post-New Deal administrative state is unconstitutional, and its validation by the legal
system amounts to nothing less than a bloodless constitutional revolution.” Looking back to the
early days of the administrative state, Cass Sunstein (1987, p.447) has observed that “what the
New Deal administrators celebrated as a virtue – the combination of functions – is now often
regarded as a vice, precisely because of the problems that gave rise to the original distribution of
13

Montesquieu states that “Liberty is a right of doing whatever the laws permit, and if a citizen could do what they
forbid he would no longer be possessed of liberty, because all his fellow-citizens would have the same power”
(2002, p.150). In this view, liberty is equated to the rule of law.
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national powers.”
Even though they represent a fusion of governmental powers, agencies are limited in a
number of ways. The scope of actions each is empowered to take is relatively limited.
Additionally, Congress, the president, and the courts each have tools at their disposal to set and
alter the bounds inside and the manner in which agencies exercise authority. Congress has
arguably the greatest measure of power in controlling agencies. The statutes that lay out an
agency’s powers and boundaries are creations of Congress, and the money that allows an agency
to pursue its objectives is allocated by Congress. Congress holds the purse strings and has the
power to make, unmake, or remake agencies as it sees fit, and as such it might be expected that
the preferences of Congress would never go ignored by agencies.
Despite the potential that Congress has to exert control over agencies,14 it is important to
keep a few things in mind about the relationship between the legislature and the bureaucracy.
While Congress may carefully direct and restrict the actions of agencies, setting clear goals and
laying out a specific set of mechanisms to pursue these, it often does not (Lowi 1986). Even if
the legislative branch were to put in place a carefully designed and thoroughly explained set of
goals, means, and limits through legislation, its actual capacity to see that such a plan is
faithfully executed is limited at best. To say that the modern bureaucracy is vast in scope, scale,
and function is uncontroversial. In order to monitor the various agencies, offices, and programs it
authorizes, Congress has at its disposal, as McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) famously argued,
two basic strategies. The first is police patrol oversight, which amounts to examining “a sample
of executive-agency activities, with the aim of detecting and remedying any violations of
legislative goals and, by its surveillance, discouraging such violations” (McCubbins and
Schwartz 1984, p.166). This method is resource intensive, requiring Congress to spend time
14

Assuming, of course, that members perceive such activity to be worthwhile in the first place.
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actively examining the actions of a variety of actors engaged in a diverse array of highly
technical endeavors, all of which share an information advantage over members of Congress.
The second option McCubbins and Schwartz (1984, p.166) identify is fire alarm oversight, which
they describe as establishing “a system of rules, procedures, and informal practices that enable
individual citizens and organized interest groups to examine administrative decisions (sometimes
in prospect), to charge administrative agencies with violating congressional goals, and to seek
remedies from agencies, courts, and Congress itself.” Rather than focusing on seeking out
problems, the fire alarm approach to oversight allows other actors to notify government about
problems as it sees them. While hardly a comprehensive approach, it is certainly the more
resource efficient of the two and has the potential to allow Congress to step in when an
especially egregious abuse of power or neglect of duty takes place.
Unsurprisingly, McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) hold that Congress is likely to prefer
fire alarms to police patrols. While there is some empirical evidence that Congress engages in
quite a bit of police patrol oversight (Balla and Deering 2013), it seems prudent to question the
effectiveness of such measures in uncovering less-than-faithful execution of authority delegated
by Congress, especially since that authority is often not delegated in wholly unambiguous ways.
Fire alarm mechanisms, such as recourse to the federal courts, the opportunity to respond to
agency intent provided by notice-and-comment rulemaking, and Congressional oversight
hearings triggered by events are all certainly present in the administrative system.
However, even when Congress is made aware of potential problems with or misuse of
delegated power, there is no certainty that it will act. The preferences of Congress are a vast and
perhaps nebulous thing. As a few minutes of the nightly news is likely to inform anyone,
Congress is not always (and perhaps not often, for that matter) in one accord. As a robust agenda

13

setting literature will attest (e. g. Downs 1972, Cobb, et al. 1976; Walker 1977; Nelson 1986),
public attention is fleeting, there are few guarantees about which items are likely to make it to
the Congressional agenda, and there is a great deal of competition for the limited space to
consider, discuss, debate, and perhaps even act on the near infinite number of potential public
issues that exist. Earning the ire of a few members of Congress is unlikely to be sufficient to
rouse the collective will required to censure an agency actively, particularly if other members are
happy with, indifferent to, or simply unaware of the agency’s actions.
If there is some degree of validity to Mayhew’s (2004) assumption that members of
Congress are primarily interested in reelection, this should come as little surprise. Such a focus
seems likely to lead individual members15 to spend their time primarily on those activities that
have the greatest chance of garnering positive attention from their constituents. Actively
monitoring and managing agencies might fall into this category in instances when a program is
remarkably well received or, perhaps more likely to have the desired result, when there is a truly
momentous and highly visible administrative blunder. While these opportunities and assorted
others will present themselves from time to time, they will probably not be the norm. Congress
as a whole is probably not presented with much of an incentive to actively watch what agencies
do. While individual members or small groups might take an interest in such activities, either as
a result of their constituents’ particular interests or as the result of personal initiative, it seems
unlikely that the critical mass required to take action could be assembled with any regularity. As
James Wilson (2000, p.237) observed,
No agency is free to ignore the views of Congress. An agency may,
however, defer to the views of one part of Congress (say, one
committee) instead of another, or balance the competing demands
15

And it is important to remember that Congress is simultaneously 1 branch of government, 2 distinct chambers,
and 535 individuals with their own constituencies and personal preferences.
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of the White House with those of some parts of Congress in ways
that other parts may not like. The bureaucracy cannot evade
political control… But it can maneuver among its many political
masters in ways that displease some of them and can define its
tasks for internal reasons and not simply in response to external
demands
Organizationally, federal agencies are a part of the executive branch. The president has
the authority to appoint leaders who serve solely at his pleasure to many agencies,16 to make
executive orders, to make organizational changes to the broader executive branch, and to review
proposed regulations using the Office of Management and Budget. Each of these methods has its
merits. The appointment of agency leaders has been found to have a significant impact on agency
policy outputs (Wood and Waterman 1991). Executive orders allow the president to make
limited but unilateral policy changes through issuing instructions to executive agencies, and their
impact can be seen in historical examples ranging from the racial integration of the armed forces
and requirements that agencies engage in cost-benefit analysis when proposing new rules (Mayer
1999) to more recent ones such as the travel restrictions put in place by President Trump.17
Organizational changes may help reframe and redirect agencies, though in the modern era major
changes to organizational structure require cooperation from Congress to enact (Pika, et al. 2017,
Ch.6). Review of proposed rules through OMB gives the president significant input on the
content of final rules, changing, slowing, and even stopping rules that are viewed unfavorably
(Croley 2003).
Each method also bears some important limitations. While political appointees can have
significant impact on agencies, the expected or intended impact may not always emerge. James
Wilson (2000, p.261-261) notes that
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Though it should be noted that many agencies that exist primarily for purposes of promulgating and enforcing
regulatory law are constructed with leadership structures that are more insulated from direct presidential influence.
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The judicial system has also demonstrated its role in the policy process in this example.
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A remarkable transformation occurs at the very moment a
president administers the oath of office to cabinet secretaries or
bureau chiefs. Just before the appointees place their hands on the
Bible they are committed followers of the president’s principles
and policies. The oaths uttered, the hands are lifted from the Bible;
almost immediately, the oath takers begin to experience a soulchanging conversion. Suddenly they see the world through the eyes
of their agencies- their unmet needs, their unfulfilled agendas, their
loyal and hardworking employees.
Executive orders still have to conform in some manner to the authority vested in the president or
the agency or agencies to which it is directed. The substantive impacts of reorganization can
often be modest at best (Pika, et al. 2017, Ch.6). While OMB is a powerful tool for influencing
rulemaking activity, the number of rules that can be reviewed in a meaningful way is, and one
would imagine must be, severely limited (Croley 2003). To return to an idea discussed earlier, it
might also be expected that the nature of presidential oversight would, by virtue of necessity, fall
primarily into the fire alarm category. There is simply too great a volume of administrative
activity for the White House to be able to actively monitor all, or even a majority, of it. While
police patrols are possible and, I suspect, do occur with some regularity, the same questions of
substantive impact that apply to Congress’s patrols should hold for the president as well.
The courts play a limited but important role in monitoring the bureaucracy. The judicial
system, taken as a whole, can be described as a relatively passive actor. Judges must wait for
problems to come to them before they can take any action. Undertaking the process of bringing a
problem to the courts will almost assuredly be a long and expensive ordeal, limiting the number
of individuals or groups that choose to use the legal system or, for that matter, have the means to
make use of it in the first place (Pacelle 2015, Ch.6). Judges are at an information disadvantage
relative to agencies and generally lack direct lines of communication with agencies. All in all,
the courts are probably ill-suited to oversee agencies. This being said, “due to electoral
motivations, a diminished capacity to make coherent public policy, or simply a lack of political
16

will, Congress and the president have been less than vigilant. As in numerous areas of law, the
courts have been thrown into the breach” (Id. at.108). The question before us, then, is how do the
courts, and the Supreme Court more specifically, go about filling the role into which they have
been cast?
In order to answer this question, information from a variety of studies within the realm of
public law is needed. Naturally, the law itself must feature prominently in this discussion. Each
federal agency exists inside of an interconnected web of law created by multiple actors that
simultaneously empowers and restrains it. While the ultimate power of legal interpretation rests
with the Court, agencies actively engage in legal interpretation as they seek to carry out the
duties given to them by the elected branches. Congress says through a statute that an agency
must do this thing and that thing, but not some other, similar thing. The president says through an
executive order that the same agency should do this thing first and most, and make sure to do
that other thing in a particular way. The Constitution, largely in the voice of the Supreme Court,
says that these particular things cannot be done. The agency has itself said through rules and
rulings that certain procedures must be followed for certain kinds of action, and that particular
terms are defined in specific ways. The courts more directly append, annotate, and expound on
each of these kinds of law as they hear cases. As agencies navigate this legal web, they must
reconcile this set of directives, licenses, and prohibitions and act in a manner that faithfully
incorporates each in a way that can be applied to the circumstances of an often messy reality.
What the law says about any specific action an agency may take or decline to take is likely to be
highly particularized. As such, it is somewhat difficult to speak comprehensively about the
relevant law when dealing with, for example, the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of
Health and Human Services, and the National Security Administration simultaneously.
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For good or ill, the courts will be called on to resolve the issue when people or
organizations disagree with agencies about the proper application of the law. Both the courts
(and the Supreme Court in particular) and federal agencies can be viewed as experts in their very
different fields (Pacelle 2015). The courts are, of course, experts in the law and its interpretation.
Agencies and the bureaucrats that staff them can, by working day in and day out inside of
specifically defined areas of public policy, be viewed as technical experts within their respective
domains. While it is probably safe to assume that the courts possess a greater mastery of the law,
or at the very least have the final say in the matter, than their bureaucratic cousins, their mastery
of the technical complexities and practical realities of constantly evolving bodies of policy can
likely be seen as somewhat lacking in comparison to those filling the ranks of the civil service.
What, then, happens when the policy generalist Court is called upon to assess the actions and
rules of policy specialist agencies? Should the justices insert their legally-based reasoning into
often hyper-technical problems and accompanying solutions that they are likely less than
optimally equipped to navigate, or should they simply leave matters to the technical experts?
This question is further complicated by the fact that, despite whatever technical knowledge
advantages agencies might have relative to the courts, the goals they are given and the means
they are empowered to pursue those goals through are rooted in statutory interpretation that
exists firmly in the judiciary’s domain.
Whatever answer to this dilemma might seem most normatively appealing, a study of
currently controlling precedent in the form of United States v. Mead Corp. (2001)18 tells us that,
in the current era, there are certain conditions under which the Court is more likely to defer to an
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Mead is the most relevant decision to examine for those interested in deference at the time of writing. However,
the legal standard can and does change. Mead itself represents the latest development in a line of jurisprudence that
stretches back to the New Deal era. It should also be noted that some cases that might be candidates for evaluation
under Mead are sometimes evaluated under other standards. I discuss this in greater detail in Chapter 2.
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agencies actions and other sets of conditions where it is likely to employ greater scrutiny to those
actions. I leave the full discussion of deference for the second chapter, but I am fortunate for its
existence given my goals for this study. The concept of deference provides us with an avenue
that can be used to put some order to the wide variety of statutes, regulations, and case law at
play in administrative jurisprudence.
Understanding the law, though, is not enough to understand how the Court goes about its
business. While there is reason to believe that the law does matter to the justices and to the
Court, the law is seldom a simple equation to be mechanically solved. Each individual justice has
his or her own views on what the law is and what the law should be. These views can and, it
seems, are often likely to influence the way that each justice reaches her or his own conclusion in
a given case. That being said, the Court is still ultimately a majoritarian institution. Regardless of
how a particular justice may think a particular case should be decided, she or he must convince
four19 other justices that a given answer is the best one, whatever the evaluative criteria may be,
in order to reach a decision. The dynamics of small group voting do seem to play a part in the
content of the decisions that the justices ultimately reach, and these dynamics often involve
bargains and accommodations (Epstein and Knight 1998). Finally, the Court is no island. It is
one part of a system of government designed to foster interdependence between multiple actors,
and it can and should be expected that the other actors will, to some extent, influence the Court’s
decisions. The degree to which these factors come together to shape majority opinions can and
does vary, but understanding how these forces interact to shape outcomes is critical to answering
the question I set forth here.
Before the justices render a decision or hear arguments, they must decide which cases
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The votes of five justices would typically be required to form a majority coalition, though the number may be
smaller if two or more justices have recused themselves from a particular case.
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they will actually accept for review. The Supreme Court’s docket is chosen at the discretion of
the justices, and the number of writs of certiorari granted is a scant fraction of the number of
petitions received. To choose the 80 or so20 cases that will be accepted in a term from the
thousands of requests for review that are submitted, the Court applies a varied and shifting set of
criteria. This agenda setting process is an integral part of the Court’s role in the judicial system
and in the greater policy process.
To discuss interactions between the Court and federal agencies in an informed manner,
the part played by the Office of the Solicitor General must also be considered. The Solicitor
General, often referred to as the SG, represents the government’s interests and position before
the Supreme Court.21 The Office of the Solicitor General is organized as a part of the
Department of Justice, and the SG is chosen by and serves at the pleasure of the president. The
SG plays an important role in shaping the Supreme Court’s agenda, particularly where agencies
are concerned. Whether or not an agency loss at the circuit level is appealed to the Supreme
Court is a decision that rests with the Solicitor General. The office is also one of the, if not the
single, most successful litigants to appear before the Court, winning far more cases than it loses.
The reasons for this success are complex, and I will examine them in the following chapter. For
now, I will simply say that the Solicitor General is a pivotal player in the ongoing development
of administrative law.
This work will proceed in five additional sections. In Chapter Two, I will review the
extant literature relevant to my topic. The existing political science research that directly
examines the subject of my question is somewhat more limited than the literature that addresses
other aspects of public law, but there are many areas of scholarship that can provide information
20

In the current era. The Court heard a larger number of cases in the average term in the past.
The SG is responsible for the vast majority of the actual litigation that federal agencies engage in before the
Supreme Court, but not every single case that an agency is party to. More on this later.
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relevant to that question. In Chapter Three, I will discuss the process I used to identify the cases
that form the basis of this study. I will also provide a variety of descriptive information about my
cases. This information should place the analytical chapters in proper context and provide insight
into a body of cases that has received little direct attention from political scientists. In Chapter
Four, I will attempt to find support for the idea that the set of cases I discuss in Chapter Three
represents a coherent area of Court decision making that is distinct from other jurisprudential
domains that have received greater scholarly attention. In Chapter Five, I will test my own set of
hypotheses about the nature of Supreme Court evaluation of administrative agency action using
the set of cases described in Chapter Three and analyzed in Chapter Four. In Chapter Six, I will
summarize my findings and offer suggestions for future work in this area of public law research.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
I would like briefly to return to the three cases discussed at the opening of Chapter 1. The
government lost its case in both TVA v. Hill and Bowen v. American Hospital Association while
finding success in Davis v. United States. Why is this? Did the Tennessee Valley Authority and
Department of Health and Human Services flagrantly exceed the boundaries of their authority
while the Internal Revenue Service behaved in a more scrupulous manner? A closer examination
shows that the TVA and Bowen decisions were fairly contentious, both finding 3 justices in
dissent, while Davis was unanimous. While it might be somewhat safe to assume from this
information that the IRS was pretty clearly operating within the limits of its mandate, it is
probably not so easy to say that the TVA and DHHS definitively were not. The litigators for both
agencies were, after all, able to convince three judges on the highest court in the nation that their
actions were justifiable at some level.
Unsurprisingly, the “clear legal boundaries” hypothesis put forth a moment ago is almost
certainly too simplistic to offer any real insight into what is driving the outcomes in all 3 of these
cases. The question of why these cases were decided in the manner they were remains.
Unfortunately, little of the existing political science literature directly addresses the specific way
in which the Supreme Court evaluates the actions of federal agencies. However, there is extant
research that casts a great deal of light on how the courts and agencies interact with one another.
The Supreme Court has near complete control over the set of cases it hears, and scholarly work
on how the Court exercises this control can provide important information about the context in
which these cases are taken up. The legal underpinnings of judicial deference to agencies are
relatively clear and represent an important piece of the larger puzzle. However, these legal
factors must themselves be considered within the larger discussion of the Court’s decision
22

making processes. Work addressing both of these subjects has important bearing on the question
I wish to answer. A good deal is known about the role and function of the Office of the Solicitor
General whose attorneys serve as a bridge between the executive and judicial branches. While
none of these areas of study will tell us everything that is needed, each can tell us something
important.
There is also a body of existing scholarship that, while not speaking to the exact question
framed in Chapter One, examines the relationship between federal agencies and the federal
judiciary. Epstein and O’Halloran (1998) suggest that the courts have traditionally served and
can continue to serve three primary functions in providing oversight of agencies: (1) making sure
that Congressional delegations of authority are issued in conjunction with some manner of policy
goal that specific delegation is intended to serve; (2) ensuring that agencies follow the
procedures and guidelines set out by Congress and holding agencies to task when they fail to do
so; and (3) “continuing to enfranchise any and all affected interests into the policymaking
process, so that bureaucratic malfeasance will be less likely to go unnoticed” (Id. at 987).
Furthermore, there is evidence that agencies are responsive to the behavior of the judiciary.
Separate studies involving the Internal Revenue Service and the Army Corps of Engineers have
shown that both agencies tend to shift the way that they carry out their duties within a given
geographic area in response to the preferences of the court of appeals for that area (Howard and
Nixon 2002; Canes‐Wrone 2003).
Of course, the cases heard by the circuits are, as a population, different in some important
ways from those that are heard by the Supreme Court. The Office of the Solicitor General, whose
role I will discuss in greater detail momentarily, is not involved at the intermediate appellate
level. Due to the justices’ ability to set their own docket and their collective perception of their
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role in the judicial system, the cases that the Supreme Court hears are likely to be legally difficult
and substantively important to not only the individuals and/or groups involved, but to the
functioning of the government as a whole (Perry 1991). Aside from the nature of the cases, the
context in which the circuits and the Supreme Court function is quite different. Review by a
panel from the appropriate circuit court is highly likely for all cases that originate in the federal
judiciary. Supreme Court review is rare and entirely at the discretion of the justices. While the
Supreme Court hears a relative handful of cases each term, circuit court judges still must
consider the possibility of the review of their decisions either by the Court or by an en banc
panel of their peers on that circuit. The Supreme Court is the proverbial last stop for any case in
the U. S. legal system. The precedential impact of circuit court decisions is limited to the circuit
in which a case is decided. A Supreme Court decision can, depending on the broadness or
narrowness in which the majority opinion is written, influence the law across the entirety of the
country.
While important distinctions do exist between the circuit courts and the Supreme Court,
there is evidence that agencies respond to the decisions of the Court as well as the circuits.
Examining 229 cases involving Court review of agency actions between 1953 and 1990, Spriggs
(1997) determined that there were no instances of an agency, in various recorded responses to
Court decisions, openly defying the will of the Court. In fact, he found that agencies only
narrowly complied, tailoring their responses in a manner that would limit the overall impact of
the Court’s decision, in less than seven percent of observed cases.22
As an explanation of this broad trend of compliance, Spriggs (1997) offers up two main
contributing factors. First, those individuals or groups who prevailed against federal agencies
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Supreme Court, the way that agencies react to these two levels of the judiciary could very well be different.
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would almost certainly bring suit again if the agency failed to act as directed by the Court.
Second, the repeat-player nature of federal agencies means that agencies will rightly be
concerned that failure to comply now may result in further, possibly more severe censure in
future interactions with the Court. I find these arguments to be convincing, but I would add
something further. While I believe that censure by the Court (or the courts, for that matter) is
something that agencies want to avoid, it must be kept in mind that the judiciary lacks both
Congress’s purse and the president’s sword. Without actions taken by the other branches, a Court
opinion is only, in practical terms, so many words on paper. However, judicial censure or
evidence of open defiance of the Court’s decisions may very well serve as a fire alarm23 in and of
itself to the elected branches, spurring them to action. At the very least, such information may be
enough to draw more police patrol-style oversight to a particular agency or division thereof. In
these ways, defiance or evasion of the will of the Court might be tied to an increased likelihood
of direct, concrete consequences for the offending agencies.
Case Selection
There is, however, more to understanding the role and influence of the Supreme Court
than understanding how it reaches the decisions it makes. Before writing opinions, meeting in
conference to discuss or vote, or hearing arguments, the Court must first decide which cases it
will address in a given term. In the modern era, the Court is largely free to take only the cases it
wishes to. Taking a particular case presents the opportunity to change, enshrine, or unify lower
court precedent. Passing over a potential case allows the status quo, as decided by the lower
court, to stand.24 Either decision has a real impact on policy.
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While a discussion of the Court’s agenda setting process is not central to addressing my
core question, I include such a discussion here for two reasons. First, because the environment
that the Supreme Court operates within is a very particular one. It is important to remember that,
because of the near-total discretionary control that the justices have over their own caseload, the
cases that reach the Court do not do so by accident. Instead, those cases are chosen by the
justices based on a combination of institutional norms, interpersonal dynamics, and personal
views. Failure to acknowledge the nature of the Court’s agenda is a failure to place the decisions
they reach into proper context. Second, because understanding case selection is important to
fully appreciating the significance of a central player in this area of the law, the Office of the
Solicitor General.
Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States Supreme Court (Perry 1991) is
one of the most in-depth examinations of the process underlying grants of certiorari that has
been performed to date. Focusing on the 1976-1980 terms of the Court, Perry makes extensive
(though not exclusive) use of interviews with justices and their former law clerks. In broad
strokes, Perry identifies two primary modes of behavior when deciding whether or not to grant
cert. What he calls “Jurisprudential Mode” involves consideration of the traditional legal factors
involved in setting the Court’s agenda: inter-circuit conflict, the importance of the question
presented in terms of substantive policy, and sufficient percolation in the lower courts along with
a few others. Perry holds that this mode of evaluation will apply when the Justice in question is
not especially concerned with the particular direction of the potential decision, as he believes
will be the case for most cert applications. The second is “Outcome Mode,” which applies when
a Justice is more directly concerned about the decision in a potential case. When operating in
Outcome Mode, the justice will behave in a more strategic manner. The first question asked here
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is whether or not the justice’s preferred position is likely to prevail (though a case that would be
“institutionally irresponsible not to take” (Id. at 278) might be granted cert despite this),
followed by the likelihood of the particulars of the case shaping the decision in an undesirable
way. When a justice votes to grant cert on a case that he or she intends to use to move the law in
a direction more in line with his or her preferences and believes is likely to be decided in accord
with those preferences, that justice is said to be making an aggressive grant. A justice who would
like to grant cert to move the direction of the law but thinks the case is unlikely to be decided in
a manner consistent with his or her preferences and, as such, does not vote to grant is said to
engage in a defensive denial. The process Perry describes is one “of decisional steps or gates
through which a case must successfully pass before it will be accepted. Failure to ‘pass a gate’
will usually mean a case will be denied…It is justice-specific, not issue specific. The decision
process by one justice to take a case may look very different from that of another justice for the
same case; and, the process used by a justice in evaluating one case will be very different from
that used to evaluate a different case” (Id. at 16).
Of course, these considerations only come into play after a great winnowing of the
potential cases. As one former Court clerk put it, “There is a great presumption on the Court that
on its face, a case just won’t be heard…There is really almost a siege mentality…You have to
screen down to [so few] argument days, so there is a strong presumption for not hearing cases”
(Perry 1991, p.219). Given the ratio of cases heard to petitions submitted, close scrutiny at the
cert stage seems inevitable. Perry identifies a number of factors that seem likely to result in a
case being dealt with as chaff. The first is that a case that is plainly frivolous, such as one that
appears to be filed simply as a delaying tactic or is submitted by “that certain proportion of just
nut-cases” (Id. at 222). A perhaps less obvious sort of case that is placed in this category is one
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that is fact-specific, a case where the question at issue boils down to how specific events
unfolded rather than any larger, broadly applicable question of law. “Clear denies” are another
category of cases unlikely to survive the process. These are cases involving issue areas in which
several or potentially all of the justices simply have no interest in acting, though what these issue
areas are may change as time passes or personnel change. The other such categories identified by
Perry are cases that have not sufficiently percolated, those with “bad facts” (a case where the
relevant particulars would make it difficult to deal coherently with a deeper legal issue), and
cases that are seen as “intractable” by the justices (where, for lack of a better description, they
simply do not know what to do with the case).
Empirically, quite a bit is known about how the Court goes about making its certiorari
decisions. Cases where the United States Government is the petitioner, where lower court
conflict exists (be that disagreement between federal circuits, various state courts, federal and
state courts, or a lower court and Supreme Court precedent), or where at least two amicus curiae
briefs have been filed in favor of review are all far more likely than cases where none of these
factors are at play to be brought before the Court, and exhibiting more than one of these qualities
further amplifies this effect (Caldeira and Wright 1988). In fact, the presence of amicus briefs
opposed to a grant actually appear to increase the chances of a case being taken up, though this
effect is not nearly as strong as the others mentioned. A more recent study also found that an
increasing number of amicus briefs arguing in favor of granting cert did increase the chances of a
case being taken by the Court, though the effect of these petitions was greatest when the
petitioner was at a resource disadvantage when compared to the respondent (Black and Boyd
2010).
These findings seem to harmonize with Perry’s ideas. Conflict in the lower courts is, of
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course, the first step of Jurisprudential Mode evaluation. Substantively, such conflict matters
because it means that the law is being applied in different ways in different places (though a
desire for well-percolated cases means that such conflict may be tolerated for a time). The U. S.
as petitioner and the presence of amicus briefs in favor of cert each speak to the importance of
the case. Naturally, a request by the federal government that a decision be reviewed indicates
that such a case is important to the grand organization of which the Court is a part. The presence
of amicus briefs can be seen as an indication that a case matters to organized interests, and thus
might be more likely to pass through the gate of importance. Furthermore, an admittedly limited
analysis of portions of the personal papers of Justice Blackmun appear to “suggest that while the
justices detest tax cases, they are willing to put them on their discretionary docket in an effort to
protect the federal budget” (Staudt 2004, p.920). This seems to provide further support for the
idea that the justices are willing to take cases that are important to the government even if they
have little personal interest in them.
At the same time, there is support for Perry’s postulated Outcome Mode. In a study of
search and seizure cases spanning from 1972-1986, a conservative Court was found to be more
likely to review liberal lower court decisions than conservative ones, all else being equal
(Cameron, et al. 2000). This could be interpreted as simply another signal for Jurisprudential
Mode importance, as a decision viewed by a justice as an improper application of the law may
certainly be substantively important.25 However, viewed through an attitudinalist lens, such
ideological incongruence seems likely to make the outcome in a given case more salient to a
justice. Empirical evidence exists that justices engage in behavior consistent with Perry’s
conception of aggressive grants (Boucher Jr and Segal 1995) and defensive denials (Caldeira, et
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al. 1999), acting strategically to shape the Court’s docket in a manner conducive to seeing their
individual policy preferences expressed in the decisions likely to be rendered. In a more recent
study, Black and Owens (2009) find that justices’ decisions about whether or not to grant cert are
indeed influenced by their preferred outcome, but that the presence of various legal variables,
most notably lower court conflict, tends to reduce the impact of those preferences on the eventual
decision of whether or not to place a case on the Court’s docket. In the presence of such legal
factors, justices are more likely to grant certiorari than purely preference-based analysis might
indicate. This seems to map well to the “institutionally irresponsible to not take case?” step of
Outcome Mode reasoning.
On balance, the various components of Perry’s model of certiorari decision making seem
to match well with empirical findings. Theoretically, the model makes a great deal of sense. It
seems naive (particularly in light of vast evidence of the impact of individual attitudes on judicial
activity) to imagine that a justice’s preferred policy outcomes would have no impact on Court
agenda setting. It seems unlikely that, as a branch of the federal government, the Court would
ignore the demands of the other branches. It also seems improbable (as well as highly troubling)
that the law, even broadly defined, would play no part in shaping the decisions of those who
have been deeply socialized to respect, and derive their authority from, the law. Perry’s approach
makes room for each of these factors to play a role in final outcomes that is both plausible and
pragmatic.
Whatever rationale underlies the Court’s case selection process, it is important to
remember that case selection is not a function carried out only by the justices. As Perry (1991,
Ch.3) records, the modern Court uses a “cert. pool” to assist in sifting through the large number
of potential cases it might take in a given term. The petitions for the term are randomly
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distributed among those justices that opt into the pool. Each participating justice then randomly
assigns those petitions given to his or her law clerks to review. The clerks review their assigned
cases, writing a memo that “summarizes the issues, the facts, and the opinion(s)…followed by a
cursory analysis and a recommendation to grant or deny” (Perry 1991, p.42). These memos are
compiled and sent to the other justices that are members of the pool, each of whom has one of his
or her own clerks review the memo, compare it with the case records, and write his or her own
assessment of the initial memo.
The exact extent to which the justices rely on these memos in making their final decisions
about granting certiorari is not especially well known, although it seems unlikely that such a
system would be put in place and its product not put to some level of use. Most likely, the
particular level of reliance on the views of clerks will vary by justice and term, if not also issue
area and other factors. One analysis of limited scope found that the justices often disagreed with
the recommendations to grant or deny made in pool memos (Palmer 2001). However, while the
justices do not blindly accept the memo recommendations, there is evidence to suggest that the
cert pool does have an impact on the Court’s agenda. Another, broader study has found that the
information contained in the cert pool memos do appear to influence the decisions that the
justices make (Wallander and Benesh 2014). Yet another finds that, while the justices weigh
memo recommendations against their own outlook on the case and appear to take into
consideration the ideology of the author’s supervising justice, roughly seventy-five percent of the
cert votes included in the study followed the recommendation made in the memo (Black, et al.
2014). Others have argued that the mechanism of the pool itself may explain, at least in part, the
reduced number of cases the Court chooses to hear each term (Adler 2008; Chemerinsky 2008).
That the justices do not personally examine each of the thousands of petitions the Court receives
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each term should come as no surprise given the ubiquitous limitations on time that all people
face. However, every pair of hands a decision passes through represent a chance to alter the
eventual decision reached. Given the existence of the cert pool, “one cannot talk about the
agenda setting process without talking about the law clerks” (Perry 1991, p.69).
The Legal Framework of Deference
The justices that make up the Supreme Court can be viewed, I think correctly, as experts
on the law. However, they may take up cases involving questions that touch on issues such as the
regulation of speech, criminal procedure, tax law, air and water quality, and the distribution of
disability benefits over the course of a term. While there are likely few individuals that can
match the justices’ knowledge of common law jurisprudence in the U.S. context, it seems
unlikely and perhaps even unreasonable to expect them to hold a comparable level of knowledge
about the ins and outs of every possible area of life in which the modern administrative state is
involved. So far as specific areas of policy are concerned, the justices are probably better viewed
as generalists. While the courts will inevitably be called upon to examine the actions taken and
rules made by agencies, it can safely be assumed that the agencies themselves are the experts in
their respective fields.
In addition to this informational disadvantage, the federal judiciary also faces a wide
variety of legal questions when exercising oversight of agencies. Often, they are called upon to
determine whether or not an agency is working within the boundaries, through the means, and
towards the ends given them through statutes. At other times, questions of the compatibility of
agency actions or rules with Constitutional law are raised. At still others, the courts will be called
on to see whether or not an agency is operating in compliance with its own stated policies and
procedures. All of these questions will, of course, be influenced by a body of case law dealing
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with agencies both as a broad class of actor and in very particularized ways such as the
interpretation of specific statutory requirements. Considering all of this, it can safely be assumed
that the specific factors that will be relevant in a given case are bound to vary a great deal. Seen
in this light, administrative law takes on a quite fractured appearance.
As briefly discussed in the previous chapter, however, there is an alternative to viewing
the review of agency activity through a variety of highly specific lenses. I turn, instead, to the
concept of deference. Deference, in short, is the Court choosing to allow an agency’s own
interpretation of relevant statutory or regulatory provisions to stand rather than imposing its own
understanding of the legal text in question to the situation at hand.
Deferring to an agency’s reading of the law can be a way to overcome the practical
limitations the Court faces as a participant in the policy process. The justices could simply leave
it to the technical experts to decide how things should be. Sometimes, they do just that. Applied
in an overbroad manner, though, deference leaves open the possibility that agencies lack an
effective post-facto check on their activities.26 This possibility is particularly troubling given the
fused-power nature of many agencies.
To begin to understand how the courts approach issues of deference to agencies, it is
necessary to examine a series of Supreme Court cases. The first is Skidmore v. Swift & Co
(1944). The case reversed and remanded a decision by the 5th Circuit that upheld a lower court
ruling that seven overnight, on-call firefighters were not entitled to overtime pay for time spent
waiting in the Swift and Company fire hall in addition to their regular daytime employment.
However, the most important aspect of the case was the rationale for this decision. In Skidmore,
the Court held that:
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Especially given the structural and practical limits that Congress and the president face in monitoring and
managing the bureaucracy as discussed in the previous chapter.
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the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under
this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their
authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment
to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The
weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and
all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking
power to control (Skidmore V. Swift & Co. 1944, p.140).
This reasoning lays out a take-them-as-they-come approach to reviewing agency actions in
which agencies can expect to be required to defend the choices they make in exercising their
authority (Graham 2007), but which is also not openly hostile to those choices. While the
decision represents a seemingly reasonable attempt at sorting out how to deal with agency action
during the early days of the modern administrative state, “Skidmore marked the beginning of a
morass of judicial power in deferring to agencies that cried out for clarity” (Womack 2002,
p.295).
Skidmore remained the standard for assessing agency action for several decades.
However, National Muffler Dealers Association v. United States (1977) marked an important
move away from the New Deal-era evaluation method. The Dealers Association in question
sought a refund of income taxes already paid, claiming exemption under the “business league”
provision of §501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The Internal Revenue Service
held that the Association did not qualify for the exemption, as business league status was
contingent upon working in the interest of an entire industry rather than that of a specific product
or manufacturer and the Association was composed only of licensed dealers of Midas brand
mufflers. The majority noted that the IRS had previously held “businesses that market a single
brand of automobile, or have licenses to a single patented product, or bottle one type of soft
drink” (Id. at 483) failed to qualify for the exemption as well. The Association argued that this
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construction of what constitutes a business league, adopted through a Treasury Regulation rather
than being defined by statute, was too narrow and ran counter to Congressional intent. Finding
little meaningful guidance in the statute as to what exactly a business league is, the Court sided
with the IRS, holding that “while the Commissioner's reading of § 501(c)(6) perhaps is not the
only possible one, it does bear a fair relationship to the language of the statute, it reflects the
views of those who sought its enactment, and it matches the purpose they articulated” (Id. at 484)
and that “The choice among reasonable interpretations is for the Commissioner, not the courts”
(Id. at 488). Also of importance to the Court’s decision were the consistency of the denial with
the Service’s larger pattern of enforcement and the policy’s grounding in the “established
principle” (Id. at 488) of not favoring one organization within a given industry over another with
a tax exemption. However, the core question of the case is “whether the regulation harmonizes
with the plain language of the statute, its origin, and its purpose” (Id. at 477).
While perhaps standing as something less than a perfectly clear standard for how the
judicial system should evaluate agency activity, National Muffler did formalize the notion that,
under some circumstances, agencies could be viewed as the primary interpreters of statutory
language. It “established a standard of moderate deference to agencies,” (Pacelle 2015, p.112)
leaving the Court with a variety of options should it wish to intervene, but stepping back from
the level of scrutiny that could potentially be brought to bear under Skidmore. Chevron USA Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984) takes things further still, giving a great deal of
deference to agency actions. Chevron was a case about EPA interpretation and implementation
of a provision of the Clean Air Act, but more relevant to our purposes here, it applies a new
standard to the evaluation of agency activities. This standard involves a two part test. The first
step is asking whether or not Congress has, in the relevant enabling statute, spoken specifically
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to the power in question. If it has, either negatively or affirmatively, the Court takes that as the
answer. If there is no clear answer, though, the Court determines whether or not the agency
action is valid within a “permissible construction of the statute” (Id. at 866). If so, the action is
found to be allowable. This is a seemingly far more deferential standard than existed under
Skidmore, as the Court moved its official position from making no assumption that agencies are
acting within their authority to instead accepting any agency action that is not clearly taking
place outside of statutory bounds. This created a legal environment where “judges are required to
decide cases against the backdrop of a Court that appears to favor agency decision making in
particular contexts” (Womack 2002, p.301).
There were, however, limits to how far the Court was willing to go in applying Chevron’s
highly deferential standard. Those boundaries began to coalesce in Christensen v. Harris County
(2000). Amendments made in 1966 and 1974 to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 allow state
and local governments to offer compensatory (hereafter “comp”) time rather than monetary
reimbursement for overtime hours worked to employees, though employees must be paid for any
time accrued but not used upon leaving employment with that government entity and/or overtime
beyond a cap set by statute. Harris County, Texas made arrangements to do just this with the
employees of its Sherriff’s Department but became increasingly concerned with the potential
financial burden of paying for large stores of unused comp time. As a result, the county put a
policy in place that allowed supervisors to set threshold levels of time that could be accumulated.
As employees approached these thresholds, the supervisor would inform the employee and
request that hours be used to reduce the number banked. If the employee failed to do so, the
supervisor would schedule the time to use the hours. In response, the employees brought suit,
holding that the policy violated the FLSA. The federal government filed an amicus brief siding
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with the employees, citing an opinion letter issued by Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour
Division that interpreted the FLSA as allowing such a policy only on condition that an existing
labor agreement provided for it. The Court’s majority upheld Harris County’s policy, specifically
stating that Chevron deference was not appropriate. Two factors are critical to the majority’s
rationale here. First, the Division’s position was based on “an interpretation contained in an
opinion letter, not one arrived at after, for example, a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment
rulemaking. Interpretations such as those in opinion letters-like interpretations contained in
policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of
law do not warrant Chevron-style deference” (Id. at 587). Second, this particular interpretation
seemed to run directly contrary to the agency’s existing, relevant regulations. Justice Thomas
wrote that “To defer to the agency's position would be to permit the agency, under the guise of
interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a new regulation” (Id. at 588).
United States v. Mead Corp, a case that dealt with a tariff decision issued by the Customs
Service via a ruling letter, is the final deference case that must be examined. Mead had been
importing day planners, “three-ring binders with pages for daily schedules, phone numbers and
addresses, a calendar, and suchlike,” (United States V. Mead Corp 2001, p.224) for several
years, and from 1989 to 1992 the Customs Service classified these planners in such a way that
they were not subject to tariffs. However, in 1993, the Service reclassified the planners as bound
diaries, a category subject to tariffs, by way of ruling letter. Ruling letters prepared by the
Customs Service represent the agency’s position on various issues, serve as a source of authority
for action for representatives of the Service, and at the time of this case “could be modified
without notice and comment under most circumstances” (Id. at 223). Mead protested the agency
ruling through administrative means, but brought suit when that proved unsuccessful. The
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Federal Circuit held that the ruling letter was not due Chevron deference, or any deference at all,
and reversed the Court of International Trade’s original decision for the government. In
remanding the case, the Supreme Court instructed that the Service’s ruling letter was indeed due
no deference under Chevron, but that Skidmore should instead be applied to decide whether the
action could stand. However, rather than eliminating Chevron in favor of reestablishing
Skidmore, the Court had actually applied separate standards based on Congressional intent.
Writing for the eight-member majority, Justice Souter stated that “administrative
implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it
appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the
force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the
exercise of that authority” (Id. at 226-227). As for how exactly to make this determination, the
opinion says that

We have recognized a very good indicator of delegation meriting
Chevron treatment in express congressional authorizations to
engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces
regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed. It is fair to
assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative action
with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal
administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and
deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force.
Thus, the overwhelming number of our cases applying Chevron
deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment
rulemaking or formal adjudication (Id. at 229-230).
However, the lack of notice and comment proceedings is not enough in and of itself to preclude
Chevron deference, as “we have sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when no
such administrative formality was required and none was afforded” (Id. at 231).
As with almost any decision the Court renders, opinions differ on both the legal
reasoning behind and the substantive impact of Mead. One of the most outspoken critics of the
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decision was the late Justice Scalia, who opined in his lone dissent that Mead “has largely
replaced Chevron, in other words, with that test most beloved by a court unwilling to be held to
rules (and most feared by litigants who want to know what to expect): th'ol' "totality of the
circumstances" test. The Court's new doctrine is neither sound in principle nor sustainable in
practice” (United States V. Mead Corp 2001, p.241). Some have pointed out that, while Mead
states that a decision being reached through formalized procedures is a sign that they are due
Chevron deference, it also states that other kinds of decisions may also be granted Chevron rather
than Skidmore deference without articulating a clear test for determining which to apply (Jordan
2002; Beerman 2014). Others have chosen to focus their critiques on the difficulty of
operationalizing Mead’s search for Congressional intent to act with the “force of law,” as such
intent might be indiscernible or simply absent (Weaver 2002).
There are those who speak much more favorably of the new standard, though. Mead
makes it quite clear that Chevron deference goes above and beyond what should be granted
under other possible standards of deference, and should be granted only when Congress has
delegated legal authority to an agency (although it is not always clear what this will look like in
practice) (Merrill 2002). Hickman observes that “Although admittedly based only on informal
impressions rather than empirical analysis, contrary to Mead's critics, I would assert that Mead
overall has had a stabilizing effect on the lower courts' Chevron jurisprudence” (Hickman 2014,
p.549). The opinion’s dual standard can also be seen as serving an important normative function,
providing more deference to rules made in a more publicly accountable way and more scrutiny
applied to those made through less open means (Hickman and Krueger 2007).
Whatever one might think about the standard of review created by Mead, it is important
to consider how it is employed by the Court in practice. Unfortunately, as is so often the case in
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the discipline, the shortest version of the answer is “it’s complicated.” The Court can and does
bypass the Mead factors in possibly qualifying cases by finding that the statute in question is
unambiguous ( Eskridge Jr and Baer 2007; Hickman 2014). Sometimes, it simply does not apply
Mead when it appears that it could, opting instead for other or ad hoc forms of review (Eskridge
Jr and Baer 2007).27 That being said, it does seem that Chevron would likely be applied where
more structured forms of rulemaking, such as notice-and-comment or formal adjudication, were
used, whereas the less deferential Skidmore standard would be used when the action stemmed
from less formalized means, such as the letter issued in Mead itself (Martin and Super 2006).
There are also a few issue areas that are currently considered outside of the Mead
framework altogether. First, there are times when an agency is given explicit and total
discretionary power through an enabling statute (Martin and Super 2006). There are very few
issue areas where this holds true, but there are some, including CIA security clearance decisions
for employees. Where such grants of authority exist, though, the Court lacks jurisdiction to rule.
There are three more broad classes of agency activity that are decided on a more ad hoc but nondeferential basis that deal with domestic policy: (1) those where agencies fail to promulgate rules
altogether (either in dereliction of their delegated responsibilities or when insufficient guidance
is provided as to what activities are subject to sanction); (2) those where rules are made in a
manner that violates the Administrative Procedure Act; and (3) arbitrary, capricious, or abusive
27

The majority choosing to apply one standard of review over another, or laying out a unique standard rather than
applying a preexisting one, can be interpreted in a number of ways. It could represent an attempt to bring the
decision into alignment with the majority’s ideological preferences when another standard might not reasonably
allow for such alignment. Given the remarkable level of success enjoyed by the government as a litigant, it could be
the result of the Court finding creative ways to justify the acceptance of administrative activity. It could also be due
to the legal complexity of the questions presented making it unclear whether or not Mead is the appropriate or best
framework to apply. These possibilities tie into the forthcoming discussion of various scholarly models of judicial
decision making. It is worth noting that Eskridge and Baer (2007) include a much wider variety of cases in their
study than I do in the later chapters of this work. While their approach certainly has advantages, I also think that
casting the proverbial net as widely as they do increases the likelihood of contradictory legal principles coming into
play. As I have mentioned previously and will continue to discuss throughout this work, administrative cases are
often multifaceted and can incorporate a variety of legal considerations.
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actions.
Taken together, these 5 cases, especially Skidmore, Chevron, and Mead, begin to give us
an idea of how the courts, in general, and the Supreme Court, specifically, are likely to deal with
the administrative questions that are brought before them. The methods employed in an agency’s
decision making process will likely factor heavily in judicial consideration of those decisions.
The intent of Congress, as expressed through statutory language, will as well. However, as is
often the case, such intent is not always clear. To a certain extent, such ambiguity can be placed
at the feet of the imprecision inherent in language. However, it should also be remembered that
the nature and rules of the legislative process itself can lead to the passage of ambiguous statutes
as the alternative may often be that no bill is passed at all.28

Legislators, even within the same political party, will often disagree as
to what policy objectives should be sought through legislation and what
means should be employed to reach those objectives. Moreover,
legislators are influenced by the myriad interest groups (and their lobbyists)
that have a stake in a particular policy issue. Any bill that can muster a
majority in both houses of the legislature will usually undergo significant
changes along the way. Even if the original language of a bill was crystal
clear, the need to build majority support for the bill within the legislature,
or the need to engender the support of the president…will often require
the substitution of more ambiguous language (Scheb and Scheb 2005, p.118).
As the president and courts have been able to turn vague Constitutional language into
sources of substantial authority, agencies are similarly empowered by vague statutory provisions.
The process of turning legislative language into operative policy requires specificity in terms of
goals, means, and procedure, and gaps left by Congress for agencies to fill in present
opportunities to interpret and define delegated authority.
Whether or not the justices currently apply Mead as discussed or applied the other
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As a practical matter, the justices are also free to disregard any legislative intent that may exist. The extent to
which this occurs is a question that, appropriately enough, is open to interpretation.
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standards during their respective eras is not entirely clear. As I will discuss momentarily, there
are camps of scholars working in the subfield of public law that both accept and reject the notion
that the law serves as a meaningful constraint on the Court at all. Chapter 5 of this study will
attempt to empirically address, to a degree, the question of precedent’s impact in administrative
cases. For a number of reasons, I suspect that precedent does matter. First, it seems as though a
degree of predictability in the Court’s decision making would be required for agencies to carry
out their appointed tasks without having their actions and or struck down with seemingly no
rhyme or reason.29 Second, while the elected branches might have limited incentive and capacity
to fully monitor the vast array of activities undertaken by the many subunits of the federal
bureaucracy, both Congress and the president have tools at their disposal to check the Court.
Should the justices consistently behave in a seemingly capricious manner to the detriment of
policy implementation,30 it seems likely that the other branches could eventually be stirred to
action. Finally, the process of developing new precedent merely to use it as justification for the
justices to do whatever they want seems like a great deal of work for little practical payoff. This
seems especially important to remember given the extraordinary breadth of factors that Skidmore
could provide such cover for employing and the Court’s move to standards that provide less
space for justification in this vein.31
Supreme Court Decision Making
The chain of precedent discussed above seems likely to have a bearing on the outcomes
of administrative cases. However, the broader body of scholarship on Court decision making
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Particularly if the circuits do, in turn, follow the Supreme Court’s lead. This stands as a separate question from the
one being addressed here.
30
Perhaps serving as a rubber stamp for agency action that exceeded politically-set boundaries or shirked assigned
duties would have a similar effect.
31
Though less space should not be read to mean no space.
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identifies a variety of factors that may shape the outcomes of cases heard by the justices. Legal
considerations are one such set of factors, but different factors have been proposed as well.
Sometimes, these varying explanations of how the Court reaches its decisions stand in tension
with one another. In this section, I will explore the major fields of thought surrounding Supreme
Court decision making in an attempt to both situate the case law already discussed within the
proper context and to inform my study of this specific portion of the Court’s jurisprudence.
The Legal Model
While there are many ways of understanding Supreme Court decision making, it can be
said that, generally, these various approaches fall into one of three broad categories. The first,
and oldest, of these is the legal model. The legal model holds that the Court is, at some level,
constrained in its action by the law. The law here can broadly be characterized as the plain
meaning of Constitutional or statutory language, the intent of the framers of the Constitution or
legislative intent, and legal precedent created by prior Court decisions (Segal and Spaeth 2002
Ch.2; Pacelle, et al. 2011 Ch.2).32
This model has important normative bearing on the Court. Specific interpretations of
particular Constitutional or statutory provisions have obvious implications for what government
and private actors may be allowed to, compelled to, or prohibited from doing. While individual
decisions are thus important, arguably the most important functional aspect of legal
considerations is the legal stability that comes through the application of precedent. As Spriggs

32

In the modern literature on Supreme Court decision making, legal considerations are not generally viewed as the
force primarily responsible for shaping Court opinions much of the time. However, legal factors, particularly
precedent, have been found to exert significant influence on case outcomes. I will reference some of the available
evidence of this momentarily. I discuss the legal model for two primary reasons. First, regardless of its current
standing within the literature, it is one of the three major models of understanding how the Court decides cases.
Second, I suspect that the legal model will be quite important for explaining the outcomes of administrative cases.
More on this later.
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and Hansford (2001, p.1092) observe, consistent application of the law has societal value, as
“Supreme Court opinions set up referents for behavior by providing actors with information
necessary to anticipate the consequences of their actions. Adherence to precedent, moreover,
facilitates this process by reducing uncertainty and thus allowing individuals to shape their
behavior according to stable legal rules.” It is important to remember that the individuals
potentially impacted by inconsistent application of the law can be private citizens or members of
government. While it would certainly be deeply undesirable if private citizens were, because of a
mercurial judiciary, unable to know what they must do to obey the law, frequent shifts in
Constitutional or statutory interpretation would also render Congress unable to legislate
effectively, the President unable to effectively execute, and agencies unable to effectively
administer.
Beyond broader societal concerns, precedent has the potential to matter to justices for
their own purposes. If it is assumed, as it is by the vast majority of modern scholars writing about
the Court, that the justices have their own particular policy preferences and a desire to see those
preferences enacted to some degree, they have two choices each time they are faced with
precedent that runs counter to their preferences. On the one hand, the justices can respect the
decisions of their predecessors and decide the case in a manner that goes against their own values
to a greater or lesser extent. While this will, by necessity, limit the potential for a justice to leave
his or her mark upon the law, it also reinforces the idea that precedent matters in the first place.
On the other hand, the justices could decide to ignore precedent altogether and to simply do what
they felt was best given the question before them. This would certainly give every justice great
power to influence the law in the short term. However, if today’s justices do not respect
precedent, why should tomorrow’s? In this sort of arrangement, any victories that a justice may
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win for their preferred policy will very likely be fleeting.33 As such, the justices, with both a
desire for consistency and a view towards long-term influence over short-term gains, will restrain
themselves and respect the decisions of those who have gone before.
This model has found some empirical support. Litigants and the justices themselves cite
precedent with great regularity, which seems to me an odd piece of theatre to perform so
consistently if it has no meaning.34 Perhaps the most important set of findings of support for the
legal model have been that precedent does seem to influence the outcomes of the Court’s cases,
even when controlling for the ideological preferences of the justices (Songer and Lindquist 1996;
Bailey and Maltzman 2008; Pacelle, et al. 2011; Johnson, et al. 2012).35 A properly specified
legal approach has been found to predict the outcomes of search and seizure cases, a type of case
often thought to be decided in a seemingly random fashion (Segal 1984). Legal reasoning, in the
form of arguments made before the Court, has been found to impact the outcomes of cases
(Johnson, et al. 2006). There is also evidence that, between the 1953 and 2000 terms, the Court
overruled its own precedent, on average, 2.7 times per term (Segal and Spaeth 2002 Ch.2). If 85
is taken as the average number of cases heard by the Court each term (which is accurate for more
recent terms, but would be an under-estimate as examination proceeds farther back into the
Court’s history) (Baum 2013 Ch.3), then the Court overrules its precedents roughly 3.2 percent
of the time during the referenced period. While this certainly places the following of precedent
outside the realms of inviolable principle, I feel comfortable saying that something that happens
less than 4 percent of the time that it can possibly happen qualifies as a relatively rare event. As
Spiller and Spitzer (1992, p.41) observe, “Courts are not free to do ‘whatever they want,’ but
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This principle is often referred to as “The Golden Rule of Precedent.”
Though a staunch attitudinalist might argue that theatre, or at best justification, is precisely what such citations
from the justices amount to.
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More on the importance of those preferences in a moment.
34

45

must operate with tools and within spaces that are defined for them by various sources of
authority.”
To add a bit of anecdotal information to this body of scholarly work, I also offer two
examples. In Texas v. Johnson (Texas V. Johnson 1989), the Court ruled that a Texas statute
making it illegal to desecrate an American flag ran afoul of the First Amendment. Justice
Antonin Scalia, perhaps to the surprise of many, was a part of the majority that joined Justice
Brennan’s opinion. Speaking about the decision in 2016, Scalia noted that “If it were up to me, I
would put in jail every sandal-wearing, scruffy-bearded weirdo who burns the American
flag…But I am not king” (Bump 2016). In Brown v. Entertainment Merchant’s Association
(2011), the Court found that video games were protected by the First Amendment and
subsequently struck down a California law that created fines for renting or selling violent video
games to those under eighteen years of age. Discussing her vote for the majority position in the
case, Justice Elena Kagan said that so far as her personal preferences went, “it should be that this
law was OK…But I could not figure how to make the First Amendment law work to make it
OK…It’s clearly a content-based distinction [and] that’s usually subject to the strictest scrutiny.
There was no very good evidence, not of the kind one would normally need, that the viewing or
playing of violent video games was harmful [to minors]. And so I just couldn’t make it work
under the First Amendment doctrine that we have and have had for a long time” (Orland 2015).
While I acknowledge that the plural of anecdote is not data, I think that both justices’ statements
illustrate the fact that, at least sometimes, a justice might see the law as a real impediment to
making the decision that he or she would most prefer despite having a seemingly strong opinion
about the outcome.
At the same time, it is worth taking a moment to acknowledge the weaknesses of the
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legal model. First, plain meaning is not always so plain. Discussing Constitutional interpretation,
Justice Souter (2013, p.262) has said:
The Constitution has a good share of deliberately open-ended guarantees,
like rights to due process of law, equal protection of the law, and freedom
from unreasonable searches. These provisions cannot be applied like
the requirement for 30-year-old senators; they call for more elaborate
reasoning to show why very general language applies in some specific
cases and not in others, and over time the various examples turn into
rules that the Constitution does not mention.
As an example, one plain meaning interpretation of the Eighth Amendment might protect any
form of punishment that was either cruel or unusual, so long as it did not fit both categories
(whatever, in turn, those terms might mean). Even if the language might be thought of as
relatively clear, “the Court might behave arrogatingly,36 reading into the document rights that are
not explicitly there, and reading out of the Constitution rights that it explicitly contains” (Segal
and Spaeth 2002 p.110). Turning to the intent of the drafters of law can be a similarly fraught
process. Whether Constitutional or statutory (or, for that matter, administrative or precedential),
law in the U. S. is a product of group decision making, and different members of a group can
mean different things even if they can agree to support a given broad principle. To drive this
point home, a textual analysis of the opinions of Justices Rehnquist and Brennan covering a ten
year period revealed that both would cite the intentions of the framers to support very different
outcomes in particular cases (Gates and Phelps 1996). While the Court may overturn precedent
at a relatively low rate, there is evidence to suggest that the individual justices do not always see
themselves as constrained by it in a meaningful way (Segal and Spaeth 2002 Ch.7). Furthermore,
as many of the cases that come before the Court present difficult legal questions or are unusual in
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some way (Perry 1991), how to apply precedent and perhaps whether or not there is precedent
that is directly applicable is likely to be an open question.
The Attitudinal Model
The second major approach to understanding Court decision making is the attitudinal
model. The attitudinal model is based on the idea that the justices have sincere policy preferences
and that the decisions they make from the bench are attempts to align policy with those
preferences more closely. In other words,
This model holds that the Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the
facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes of the justices. Simply
put, Rehnquist votes the way he does because he is extremely conservative;
Marshall voted the way he did because he was extremely liberal
(Segal and Spaeth 2002, p.86).
It is an individual level model, focusing on each justice as an independent actor working to bring
about their preferred outcomes. In light of the policy-making power belonging to the Court,
viewing it through the lens provided by this model might leave us with the impression that it is a
body very much like Congress, albeit without electoral concerns. Cases could be viewed as
roughly analogous to proposed bills, each justice arguing for and ultimately voting for the
answer they feel is most appropriate. Without any direct recourse available to the other branches
of government or the populace, a belief might begin to develop that the justices are free to decide
cases entirely as they wish. This approach to understanding judicial behavior seems eminently
reasonable. After all, the justices, along with the rest of humanity, are faced with constraints of
time and information-processing capacity and, as such, have to fall back on certain heuristics to
understand the various problems that they are faced with (Segal 1986). What tool could be more
useful to navigating a seemingly endless array of value and outcome possibilities than one’s
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personal sense of right and wrong?37 This may seem especially likely as each justice has a
lifetime appointment, has reached the headiest heights of the American legal profession and
cannot thus be enticed through the potential of promotion, and is not required (in any sort of
directly enforceable way, at least) to make decisions on any particular basis. The fact that
justices with the power to assign the writing of decisions tend to either keep the decision or give
it to the justice most closely aligned with them on the issue in question supports this view
(Rohde 1972). An examination of conference notes from the personal papers of Justices Brennan
and Powell indicated that, at least during their time on the Court, policy outcomes were a much
more frequent matter of discussion than a variety of legal factors (Epstein and Knight 1998). In
fact, evidence to support this outlook has even been found by scholars seeking evidence to
support other models of understanding the Court (Sala and Spriggs 2004).
Nonetheless, there are some serious problems with the attitudinal model. Its core idea,
that judges’ rulings are based on their sincere preferences, is remarkably difficult to test given
that there is no direct way of actually observing what a person’s sincere preferences are.38 Using
one-dimensional ideological scales (a method still in use today), early attitudinalists used
justices’ votes on cases to determine their ideological preferences to show evidence of the
influence of attitudes (Segal and Spaeth 1993 Ch.6). Perhaps unsurprisingly, past votes turned
out to be a pretty good predictor of future votes. As many others have pointed out, using
observed behavior as an indicator of sincere attitudes which in turn drive behavior is a
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The concept of attitudes is, of course, broader and more complicated than simply one’s sense of right and wrong.
It involves one’s preferences about specific policy outcomes, one’s conception of the proper or best way of pursuing
those outcomes, and one’s political ideology.
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This difficulty does not pose a problem for the theoretical underpinnings of the model itself, but it does make it
difficult to collect meaningful evidence of the model’s veracity. The proverbial mountains of evidence that support
the basic premise of the attitudinal model do much to overcome this difficulty. However, to gain an accurate
understanding of the impact of attitudes, the available evidence needs to be viewed in the light of its inherent
limitations and methodological peculiarities. The failure to do this runs the risk of scholars declaring the complete
explanatory power of an undoubtedly important but still limited approach.

49

tautological approach to explaining the impact of attitudes on judicial action (Segal and Spaeth
1993 Ch.6; Epstein and Knight 1998 Ch.1). This method also excludes cases where the Court
reaches a unanimous decision as differences between justices are needed to place them on the
ideological spectrum. Unfortunately, this means that the nearly forty percent39 of total Court
cases that are decided unanimously are omitted from such analysis (Spaeth 2016). Other methods
of determining justice’s sincere preferences have been constructed, such as using preconfirmation journalistic descriptions of nominees to the Court as liberal or conservative (Segal
and Spaeth 2002 Ch.8), but I would argue that the core issue of determining what a person really,
truly wants absent all contextual considerations remains intact. However, it is worth noting that,
as I mentioned earlier, there appears to be a consensus within modern accounts of judicial
activity accepting the idea that the policy preferences of judges are an important factor in
understanding their decisions to some degree. It is also important to remember that, as I will
discuss in a moment, individual preferences are not the only factor that influences group decision
making.40
The Strategic Model
Whatever specific effect the law and attitudes exert on Court decisions, no such decision
is made in pure isolation. Regardless of the views of any given justice, the Court is still a
majoritarian institution operating within a system of separated powers and checks and balances.
The influence of these contextual factors is the primary focus of the third model of Court
decision making: the strategic model. An application of rational choice to understanding the
Court, the strategic model makes three key assumptions consistent with that approach: that actors
39

Looking at the 1946-2015 terms of the Court recorded in the Supreme Court Database, 3454 cases of 8737
recorded have a minVotes (number of votes for the minority position) value of zero. This is 39.53 percent of total
cases recorded during this time frame.
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Particularly when that group is itself operating within a system of separated powers and checks and balances.
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have goals, that strategic interactions take place between actors, and that institutional structures
influence these interactions (Epstein and Knight 1998). The strategic model addresses behavior
at both the individual justice level and also at the institutional level. The individual level aspects
include how the decision is made to hear a case to begin with and how the justices maneuver to
bring the final opinion closer to their preferences. The institutional level aspects focus instead on
how the Court, as a single governmental entity rather than as a collection of individuals, acts to
maintain its power and independence. Both aspects of the model provide important insight into
how the Court functions. It is worth noting that the vast majority of strategic models of Court
behavior accept in part the attitudinalist argument that at least one of the sources of utility
justices seek are policy outcomes based on their personal preferences, though this does not
necessarily have to be the case (Epstein and Knight 2000).
On the matter of intra-Court strategy, there are two broad categories of activity: choosing
whether or not to grant certiorari, and the rendering of decisions in the cases that have been
granted cert (Epstein and Knight 1998 Ch.3). The basic considerations of Court strategy during
the cert stage have already been discussed in this chapter. As for strategic action at the decision
stage, no single justice can, in isolation, impose his or her preferences on the other eight. If initial
discussion of a case does not reveal at least a five justice coalition that shares effectively the
same view of that case, some form of compromise must occur between actors to settle the matter.
If the decisions that faced the Court were as simple as deciding which party before them
triumphed, such compromise might be largely unnecessary. However, the justices are called on
not only to choose winners and losers41 in the present, but to enshrine their rationale in an
opinion that, depending on how narrowly or broadly it is written, goes on to influence other
cases. What parts of the law are most relevant? Which facts of the case are worthy of the
41

As well as declaring the occasional judicial do-over through remand orders.
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greatest attention? How is this case different, or not, from similar cases? Reaching consensus
around details such as these makes naturally occurring, negotiation-free majorities far more
difficult to reach. The act of assigning the opinion to a particular justice to write can also be a
matter of strategic choice (Rohde 1972, Slotnick 1979).
The most notable of the institutional considerations would be the standing and power of
the Court as one of the three branches of the United States government. Where Congress has the
power of both taxation and spending and the President sits as the Commander-in-Chief of the
military and the chief administrator of the nation’s bureaucratic apparatus, the Court has no such
tool available to it to facilitate the enforcement of the decisions it makes. As the Court relies on
other actors to enforce its will and thus maintain its power, it must, as an institution, concern
itself with how it is viewed by the other branches of government as well as adhering to the
broader norms that exist between all three branches (Epstein and Knight 1998 Ch.5). In other
words, “justices rely on other institutions and actors to execute the Court’s decisions. These
actors are likely only to execute decisions that satisfy notions of normatively appropriate
behavior—decisions that trespass such boundaries are likely to be met with noncompliance”
(Black and Owens 2009).
This may seem a particularly difficult task when it is remembered that one of the primary
intended purposes of the Court is to serve as a check upon the power of both the President and
Congress, both of which are in turn supposed to serve as checks upon the Court’s power, and
both of which possess the previously discussed substantive tools for doing just this that the Court
has no direct analogue for. What the Court does have, however, is a place in the minds of the
American people as a legitimate actor and authoritative voice in questions of law (Caldeira and
Gibson 1992). It can perhaps be inferred that this legitimacy means that open defiance of the
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Court has the potential to result in electoral backlash or other substantive consequences, as
various government actors do comply with rulings that they almost certainly would have
preferred not to (Baum 2013 Ch.6). Maintaining this legitimacy, though, means that the Court
faces pressure to maintain to some extent a public image of being above the political wrangling
of the day, of being beyond questions of what each member wants, and to speak, instead, to what
is right and proper in the eyes of the law (Caldeira and Gibson 1992). Sometimes (such as when
the law and its traditional application view a particular question as the domain of Congress or the
President), maintaining this image means that the Court might be more likely to defer to the
decisions of the other branches despite the specific preferences of the justices. National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2012), where Chief Justice Roberts declared the
Affordable Care Act to be the sort of policy decision that is rightfully the business of the elected
branches rather than the Court to decide on, could be viewed as an example of such behavior.
There is evidence, albeit mixed, to support the strategic model at both the individual and
institutional levels. At the individual level, the personal papers of various justices show clear
evidence of bargaining behavior occurring when rendering decisions (Epstein and Knight 1998,
Ch.1). The Court tends to reverse the decisions of lower courts more than it upholds them,
(Epstein and Knight 1998, Ch.2), strategically managing limited docket space with likely
majorities mostly allowing the cases with outcomes they view favorably to stand on the authority
of the circuit courts. In the meantime, they tend to spend their cert grants to overturn those
decisions they oppose.
There are signs that the Court might engage in strategic consideration of the preferences
of the other branches as well. There is empirical evidence showing that the Court is deferential to
Congress in the decisions it reaches under certain kinds of conditions (Hansford and Damore
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2000), and particularly when Congress as a whole is hostile towards the Court (Clark 2009).
There is evidence to suggest that the Court is influenced in deciding Constitutional questions,
often thought to be the sole domain of the Court, by the preferences of Congress (Harvey and
Friedman 2006). The office of the Solicitor General, which has close ties to the President and
acts on behalf of the U. S. government in all cases where it is a party that come before the Court,
wins its cases far more often than it loses (Baum 2013).Viewed through a particular lens, this
might be viewed as a sign of strategic deference on the Court’s part, though there is also
evidence that points towards alternative explanations.42 There is even evidence to suggest that
Court decisions are influenced by public opinion (Mishler and Sheehan 1996; McGuire and
Stimson 2004; Casillas, et al. 2011), though the exact reasons for this, as well as the degree of
substantive impact it has, are unclear.
One criticism of the strategic model is that it overstates the ease with which Congress can
interfere with the Court (Segal and Spaeth 2002, Ch.3), an idea that can probably also be applied
to the President’s strategic role. Also, while the study of strategic considerations does not have to
take place within the context of a formal model (Epstein and Knight 2000), it is worth noting that
the utility of such models is entirely dependent on the quality with which they are specified by
their authors. While statistical approaches are not immune to such potential problems, the danger
of “discovering” something that has very little to do with the way things operate in the real world
seems very real when one’s method of inquiry is a wholly mathematical abstraction unbound by
observational data. However, Clark (2009) does offer compelling, empirical evidence that the
Court becomes increasingly deferential to Congress as its public support and, thus, legitimacy,
decreases.

42

More on this in a moment.
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The Three Models Considered
All three of these models have their strengths and weaknesses as well as their respective
adherents and detractors. For my part, I expect that each has some important things to teach us
about the function of the courts generally and of the Supreme Court specifically. It seems
reasonable to expect that there are some areas of the law that the justices feel especially strongly
about and where the other branches have little capacity to act. As a result, attitudes might
dominate in such areas. In another area, the elected branches might have great capacity to act and
the public may have a sizeable and fairly consistent interest in actions taken in that area. In such
an area, institutional strategic imperatives might lead to the Court largely deferring to the elected
branches. In yet another area, predictability and stability in the law might be held as the greatest
goal to be pursued, and as such legal factors might come to the fore while the policy preferences
of Congress, the president, and even the Court might tend to fade into the background.
We do, in fact, have evidence of something very much like this set of differing influences
occurring in practice. The law, in the form of precedent, does appear to exert influence on the
outcomes of cases, though this effect is more pronounced in statutory and/or economic cases
than in Constitutional or rights and liberties cases (Pacelle, et al. 2011). The impact of attitudinal
influence is witnessed across a wide variety of case types, though such influence may have the
greatest effect in high salience cases such as those involving civil rights and liberties and cases
involving Constitutional questions (Unah and Hancock 2006; Pacelle, et al. 2011). The Court
also appears to behave in a somewhat deferential manner to the elected branches, though the
president appears to have greater influence in civil rights and liberties matters while Congress
seems more influential in cases involving economic questions (Pacelle, et al. 2011).43 I will
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discuss these relationships in greater detail in Chapter Four. For now, I will simply say that each
of the models does appear to have a bearing on the way the Court decides cases, but that each
factor appears to have a differing level of influence depending on the specific area of the law
being examined. It may be the case that the legal factors discussed earlier exert important
influence in the area of administrative law. It may, instead, be that the preferences of the justices
or of the elected branches hold primary sway. It may be that all matter in equal measure, or that
there is simply no discernible pattern in this particular area of the law. Whatever the outcome, it
is important to remember that the process by which the justices arrive at their conclusions, and
by which the Court makes its decisions, has a tangible impact on what the law is in practice.
Having reviewed the literature, I expect that legal factors will predominately determine
the outcome of administrative cases I will examine in subsequent chapters. It seems likely that
many administrative cases will involve subject matter about which the justices may not have
especially strong preferences. In the absence of strong attitudinal cues, it seems reasonable to
expect legal factors to guide the justices. As I have argued previously, it also seems likely that
stability in the standard of review will be of critical importance if agencies are to carry out their
duties in the face of virtually inevitable challenges to their activities.44 However, I do not think
that administrative law must be the exclusive domain of the legal model. A scenario where a case
dealing with an administrative question that was particularly salient to elected actors was
handled primarily through the evaluation of inter-branch strategic considerations is not difficult
to imagine. Neither, for that matter, is an administrative case that the justices are particularly
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invested in being decided on the basis of their respective policy preferences. There is room for
each model to play a part, though I expect that the legal model will prove the most influential.45
The Solicitor General
As I have discussed throughout this chapter, the Supreme Court does not operate in
isolation. The justices exist within a vast, interconnected web of government actors who all,
through intent, structural relationships, or occasionally even happenstance, influence the
environment of, problems faced by, and potential solutions available to the others. The president,
Congress, employees and leaders of federal agencies, the public, and the Court’s own clerks have
all received some degree of attention. However, there is one other set of actors that must be
mentioned in order to have a relatively complete picture of the dynamics of administrative law:
the Office of the Solicitor General.
In the wake of the Civil War, the federal government was engaged in, for that point in
time, an unprecedented level of litigation (Salokar 1992). Lacking the personnel to handle the
volume of cases in-house, the government was forced to hire private attorneys to meet the new
demand. As might be expected, this was quite expensive and not especially well coordinated. In
response, and as part of the larger Judiciary Act of 1870, Congress created a new position to
assist the Attorney General and represent the government in legal arguments. Thus, the Solicitor
General, a position so influential that the officeholder is sometimes referred to as “the tenth
justice,” had its beginnings as a cost saving measure.
The Solicitor General serves as a part of the Department of Justice and serves at the
pleasure of the president (Salokar 1992). While formally nominated by the president and
45

Of course, the distinctions between these approaches are not entirely clear cut. As many others have pointed out,
legal reasoning can serve as window dressing for the pursuit of preferred outcomes. The existence of stability in
review might itself be seen as a strategic concern for the Court as an institution in a separation of powers system.
Legal reasoning and argument could play a role in shaping one’s policy preferences.
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confirmed by the Senate, the Solicitor General is typically chosen by the Attorney General for a
combination of legal acumen and ideological compatibility with the administration. Working
under the Solicitor General are the principal deputy, who is also a political appointee, three (or
sometimes four) deputy solicitors general who are a part of the federal civil service, and
seventeen to twenty staff attorneys (Pacelle 2003). The office is responsible for presenting briefs
and oral arguments before the Supreme Court on behalf of the government, authorizing others to
argue on behalf of the government before the Court, and preparing amicus curiae briefs to
represent the government’s interests in a case when it is not a party46 at both the cert and merits
stages.
In addition to the duties listed above, and of great importance to my broader topic, the
Solicitor General decides which cases the government may appeal to the Supreme Court or en
banc review. When the government faces an unfavorable decision from a three-person appellate
court, the affected actor (either a federal agency or a prosecutor) has four options (Zorn 2002):
(1) the case may simply be dropped and the decision allowed to stand, (2) an application to have
the case reheard by the same three-judge panel that heard the initial appeal might be made,47 (3)
an en banc review involving all or most of the judges for the circuit in question can be requested,
or (4) a writ of certiorari might be sought. No clearance outside of the agency involved in the
case is required to take the first two options, but the Solicitor General must agree for any further
review to be pursued. However, before a potential case reaches the SG, the Department of
Justice’s appellate section will review the details and make its own recommendation about
whether or not to proceed. Examining cases that underwent this process in 1994 and 1995, Zorn
found that the Department of Justice’s recommendation appeared to carry a great deal of weight
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These may be filed voluntarily, but at times the Court will invite the office to file as amicus.
According to Zorn, this is quite rare.
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with the Solicitor General, as the recommendation not to pursue further action was accepted by
the SG in all but nine of 1338 cases. He went on to find that factors representing cost to the
government, reviewability, and prospects for success also influenced the Solicitor General’s
decision to pursue review of a case. Cost is conceived of broadly here as adverse impact on the
government’s ability to bring about the policy preferences of various leaders, and the
invalidation of a law or order was found to significantly increase the chances of a case being
granted further review. Reviewability, or the likelihood that the case will be seen worthy of an
additional hearing, finds support in both the presence of intercircuit conflict in decisions (as
previously discussed, an important legal indicator) and the filing of amicus briefs (also already
discussed as a marker of importance and relatively rare at the circuit level) increasing the
likelihood of further review being sought. Winnability, which is what it sounds like, also appears
to matter, as the unfavorable circuit decision overturning a trial decision in the government’s
favor (indicating a fact pattern or reading of the law that at least could be conducive to a progovernment decision) also increases the chances of a case advancing.
Any meaningful discussion of the Solicitor General must include a discussion of just how
successful the office is before the Court. At the certiorari stage, a case is significantly more
likely to be reviewed by the Court if the Solicitor General is the petitioner (Caldeira and Wright
1988; Perry 1991). At the merits stage, the SG wins more than it loses as both petitioner and
respondent (Salokar 1992; Bailey, et al. 2005). When participating as amicus at the merits stage,
the SG’s support significantly increases the supported party’s chance of winning (Salokar 1992;
Collins 2004). In some cases, final opinions may even borrow directly from the language used in
briefs filed by the Solicitor General (Corley 2008). In short, “the United States federal
government is the most frequent, the most important, and the most successful litigant in the
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American federal courts” (Zorn 2002, p.145).
Black and Owens (2012) identify six overarching theoretical themes in the broader
literature to explain this level of success. The repeat player theory holds that the SG’s victories
are based in a combination of informational advantage gained through repeated litigation before
the Court, a higher level of resources relative to opposing litigators that can be leveraged to
perform more thorough research and thus formulate better arguments, and additional trust gained
from the Court through long-run incentives to present information and arguments in an open and
honest manner that firms arguing before the Court far less frequently lack. One line of thought
focuses on the quality of the lawyers employed by the office, positing that, as a prestigious
institution that hires in a very selective manner, the attorneys that serve the Solicitor General are
more often than not of a higher caliber than their opponents. The ideological approach suggests
that the success of the Solicitor General is dependent on how closely the office’s preferences for
policy outcomes (or, perhaps, the specific policy outcomes argued for) match those of the Court.
The separation of powers theory is based on the idea that the various capabilities of Congress and
the president to check the Court (e. g., restriction of jurisdiction, impeachment, marshalling of
public opinion) give the justices an incentive to consider the preferences of the political branches
and render decisions that reflect these preferences when the question is salient to those branches.
The selection strategy approach holds that the SG carefully chooses the cases it will bring to the
Court and selects those that it believes are most likely to be decided in the government’s favor.
Finally, there is the idea of professionalism. This is, in this instance, the premise that the Court
accords the office consideration due to the valuable and well-executed screening function it
performs in allowing government cases to apply for cert and because, while the office does and
can represent the president’s interests, it also provides the court with high-quality legal research
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and arguments.
Each of these factors is likely to play a part in the frequent success enjoyed by the
Solicitor General. Given the overwhelming evidence that the justices’ policy preferences
influence their decisions, it seems wrong to assume that this plays no part in SG success. There
is, in fact, evidence that indicates that the office is most effective in convincing individual
justices when the preferences of the SG and justice align or the SG is taking a position
understood to run counter to the administration’s preferences (Bailey, et al. 2005). The office has
been described as attracting top-flight talent (Salokar 1992), and as strong legal arguments have
been found to impact the Courts’ decisions (Black and Owens 2011),48 it seems difficult to
dismiss the idea that employing quality litigators matters. Given the importance of attitudes and
legal reasoning, along with the resources available to the SG and the wider Department of
Justice, it follows that the office’s ability to continually place well trained, well researched, and
very experienced attorneys before the Court is almost certainly beneficial. There is at least some
evidence of the Court acting in ways that, all things considered, its members would probably
prefer not to when issues with substantial impact on the federal government are at play (Staudt
2004). Given the Court’s limited docket, well-known factors influencing the granting or denial of
cert, the once again noted influence of attitudes, and the potential for adverse decisions, it seems
foolish to expect that the Solicitor General would not engage in strategic consideration of cases
to bring to the Court. There is evidence that this sort of consideration occurs (Zorn 2002).
But what about professionalism? As it turns out, professionalism might be the most
important factor of all. To begin with, there is evidence that the more overtly political the
behavior of the Solicitor General becomes (effectively, the more that the office focuses on
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pushing the president’s agenda rather than providing well-grounded legal arguments) the more
the office’s influence diminishes (Wohlfarth 2009). Black and Owens (2012) have searched for
evidence of influence wielded by Solicitor General. Influence in this case is distinct from mere
success, as success might be achieved through strategic action, ideological alignment, or even
pure dumb luck (albeit probably not with the consistency that SG has found it). Influence,
instead, would be evidenced by the Court taking actions that it would not absent the participation
and position of the Solicitor General. Through a series of tests on data at the agenda and merits
stages, Black and Owens claim to find evidence of exactly this sort of power. Of the various
approaches to understanding the SG’s success, they argue that only professionalism can explain
the influence wielded by the office.
The Solicitor General is, first and foremost, a strategic actor. The office, and its chief
occupant, are beholden to the president and expected, to some degree, to work in a manner that
advances the values and preferences of the administration (Pacelle 2003). However, doing this
requires maintaining influence (or at the very least a good working relationship) with the
Supreme Court despite arguing positions that will not line up with those of the all of the justices
all of the time. If the Solicitor General fails to serve the president well, he or she may very well
be replaced. If the Solicitor General fails to serve the Court well, then he or she becomes unable
to serve the president well. In order to serve both institutions, the Office of the Solicitor General
must be a policy advocate, but an advocate who builds its arguments within the framework of a
longstanding-legal tradition.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court specifically plays an important if limited role in providing oversight
for federal agencies. The Court can be the final arbiter of whether or not agencies are faithfully
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carrying out the duties they have been given by the elected branches. While space on the Court’s
agenda is limited, it has the capacity to grapple with issues that elected officials might choose to
overlook. There is evidence that agencies are responsive to the decisions of the courts generally
and to the Supreme Court specifically.
Case selection will not play a major role in this study,49 though understanding it is an
important part of a functional knowledge of the Court. Generally speaking, the Court is more
likely to take cases to which the federal government is a party than other kinds of cases. There is
evidence to suggest that the justices do consider their policy preferences when deciding which
cases to take and are more likely to take those cases that they expect can be used to move policy
in a direction more to their liking. However, other factors such as circuit decisions that are at
odds with one another or cases involving questions that have substantive impact on how the
federal government carries out its business are also likely to be taken by the Court.
The Court’s treatment of deference has evolved a great deal since the early days of the
modern administrative state. Skidmore (1944) opened the discussion with the Court taking a
fairly moderate position: there is no assumption that an agency’s interpretation is the proper
interpretation, but neither is there an assumption that the agency is wrong. Administrative
interpretations of the law could be found persuasive or not based on a wide variety of factors.
Skidmore stood as the primary piece of precedent in the realm of deference until National
Muffler Dealers Association (1977) was decided some three decades later, marking the Court’s
move towards a stance of greater deference towards agency interpretations of the law.
National Muffler was not as long-lived as its predecessor, though, as Chevron USA Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984), the next milestone case in our evolutionary
49
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record, was decided seven years later. Chevron stands as the high-water mark for the Court’s
presumption of deference, placing much greater value on agency expertise than those decisions
that came before or after it. Chevron did not represent a proverbial blank check for agencies to
act as they pleased, as clear Congressional intent as embodied in statutory language was still
given priority over conflicting agency interpretation. However, absent clear Congressional intent,
agencies were given the benefit of the doubt so long as the justices did not see their
interpretations as clearly falling outside of corresponding grants of authority.
At the turn of the century, the Court began to step back from Chevron’s high level of
deference. The opinion in Christensen v. Harris County (2000) marks a departure from Chevron
by stating that certain kinds of agency action might not be due Chevron deference while others
might still be. In Christensen, both the fact that the relevant agency decision was reached
through an interpretive letter rather than through some more formalized means and the fact that
the interpretation in question departed from a longstanding interpretation were cited as important
for the Court’s refusal to apply Chevron deference. Following hot on the heels of Christensen,
United States v. Mead Corp (2001) refined and solidified this line of jurisprudential thought.
Mead explicitly sets forth a double standard for evaluating agency interpretations of the law. If
Congress has empowered the agency to act with the force of law, agency activities ensuing from
this grant of power should be evaluated using the Chevron standard. However, agency action that
is not intended by Congress to carry the force of law should be evaluated under the far less
deferential Skidmore standard.
This jurisprudential evolution has some important implications for the question this work
attempts to answer. If the Court is taken at its word as embodied in these five decisions, then it
should be expected that the way the justices have evaluated agency actions has changed over

64

time. To simplify the incorporation of this concept into something operationalizable,50 it seems
appropriate to look to the way that the Mead decision focuses on Skidmore and Chevron. These
cases, along with Mead itself, should be carefully considered in any evaluation of the Court’s
decisions in administrative cases. National Muffler and Christensen are probably best viewed as
significant but limited transitional cases between these three touchstones.
Of course, discussing the importance of these cases presupposes that the law actually
factors into the justice’s decisional process. Part of the literature on Supreme Court decision
making acknowledges that legal matters do influence case outcomes, but there are other
perspectives as well. The attitudinal model views the policy preferences of the justices as the
primary driver of what the Court does. In the attitudinal view, legal language might be used to
drape judicial policymaking in a veneer of respectability, but any appeal to legal reasoning is a
post facto exercise. The strategic model accepts the attitudinal model’s proposition that the
justices have and are influenced by preferences for particular policy outcomes, but acknowledges
a variety of constraints on individual justices’ ability to see these preferences put into place.
These constraints take two main forms: (1) the majoritarian nature of the Court and (2) the
Court’s place in a larger system of separated powers. On the first point, the strategic model
focuses on the idea that majority opinions, existing ultimately as a product of small group voting,
are unlikely to result in every or possibly any justice receiving a policy outcome that matches his
or her preferences in their entirety. On the second point, the strategic model emphasizes the
Court’s lack of substantive tools to enact its own decisions and the potential for the ensuing
reliance on elected actors to carry out to influence the way that the Court makes decisions. The
law can matter inside of the strategic model, but would function primarily as either a common
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point of reference for crafting intra-Court consensus or an expression of the policy preferences of
other governmental actors to be considered51 depending on which variety of constraint the
discussion emphasizes.
Each of these models has its detractors and supporters. The attitudinal model can
probably be described as the one generally accepted by the academic community as providing
the greatest degree of explanatory power, though this apparent power must be understood to
carry some important caveats. Taken in isolation, the legal model can probably be described as
the one generally accepted by the academic community as being the most limited, though there is
evidence to support the impact of the law in some contexts. Empirical study of the strategic
model has met with mixed results, though its core premises seem facially valid. While there has
been much discussion of which of the models offers the most powerful set of explanatory tools,
there is also work that considers the models together. This seems appropriate, as the factors of
judicial decision making that each model focuses on seems likely to exert at least some influence
on the outcomes of cases. My goal is to incorporate aspects of each of these three models into
my attempt to address the question of how the Court evaluates agency actions.
Finally, the Office of the Solicitor General is an influential actor in both the case
selection and decision stages of this process. While the Solicitor General does not have direct
control over which cases the justices choose to take, a request to hear a case from the Office is
likely to be met with a writ of certiorari. Furthermore, the SG is hugely influential in shaping the
body of cases involving the federal government that are submitted to the Court for review. At the
decision stage, the SG wins far more than it loses as both petitioner and respondent. While the
government does not win every case it appeals to the Court, it does win the vast majority of
51

Excluding precedent, at least. So far as inter-branch strategic considerations go, precedent is likely to represent
either a constraint on or an opportunity for the justices pursuing their preferred policy outcomes in the face of
opposition from elected actors.
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them.52 A large part of the credit for this impressive record can be placed squarely at the feet of
the lawyers of the Office of the Solicitor General.53 In evaluating how the Court reaches its
decisions about agency actions, the part played by the Solicitor General must be considered and
included.
This chapter marks the last time that I will focus primarily on the work others have done.
Chapter 3 will focus on describing the cases I will examine in Chapters 4 and 5 and the process I
used to identify those cases. However, the literature discussed here informs the selection process
and the subsequent analysis. The remainder of the study will stand on the foundation set down
here.
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To briefly jump ahead one chapter, the government won almost 71 percent of the cases included in this study.
There are a small number of cases where a specific agency litigator represents the government’s interests before
the Court. Even in these cases, the SG can act through amicus briefs.
53
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Chapter 3
Selection and Description of Cases
My ultimate goal in this work is to address the question implied on the title page: how
does the Supreme Court evaluate the actions of federal agencies? To do this, it is necessary to
identify and isolate relevant cases for study. In this chapter, I will discuss the process I used to do
just this. In the early stages of this project, I had hoped that I might find a pre-existing template
that I could use to rule in and rule out cases as presenting primarily administrative questions.
This would have had the advantage of allowing my research to be more easily and directly
compared to existing studies. It also, quite frankly, would have resulted in far less work for me to
do.
For good or ill, I found no such template and instead proceeded to construct my own set
of criteria for inclusion in this study.54 This chapter begins with a discussion of what those
criteria are, how I arrived at them, and how I applied them. While the criteria themselves and the
related discussion have been through a number of revisions, the work presented here might still
be best viewed as a first draft of a plan for attempting to isolate these cases from the larger body
of the Court’s caseload. I have full confidence that my approach is fit for purpose, though I do
not doubt that future studies will include refinements to it. Every conversation does need a
beginning, though, and I think that I provide a decent one here to a conversation that I hope can
continue in an increasingly large number of voices.
After discussing my selection criteria, I will go on to describe the chosen cases at some
length. Given the novelty of my approach and the relatively scant attention paid to the specific
set of cases I have identified, this seems a useful exercise. Chapters 4 and 5 involve statistical
54

I did find a number of articles that examined cases that explicitly cited major administrative law cases such as
Chevron or Mead. While this approach certainly has merit depending on the ends pursued, my goal is a more holistic
examination of cases directly involving federal agencies.
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examination of the outcomes of these cases, but such examination means little without a fuller
understanding of the context in which they exist.
The cases that I am interested in are those that involve judicial evaluation of agency
action. To this point in time, political scientists have given little specific attention to how the
Court treats these questions. This is somewhat understandable, as the finer points of, for instance,
applying specific portions of the tax code likely do little to stir the imagination of the public, the
student, or the researcher, particularly when compared with their oft-studied cousins such as the
freedom of speech or religion. That being said, tending toward the arcane and, to some, perhaps
uninspiring end of the spectrum of American politics does not make this facet of administrative
law any less substantively important.55
Criteria for Inclusion
I began the process of isolating these specific cases by limiting my search to those cases
that involved the government as either petitioner or respondent to ensure that agency action was
at the center of each case. I continued by determining the time period I wished to examine. It
seemed important to include cases from the Skidmore, Chevron, and Mead eras, as I wanted to
test whether or not these regime changes significantly impacted the way these cases were
decided. Given the role of the Solicitor General in selecting the government cases that are made
available to the Court for consideration, I wanted to include multiple presidents of both major
parties as I suspect that both personal and partisan differences between administrations could
have the potential to shape the Court’s agenda and its decision making in this area. Finally, I
wanted to draw on a body of cases large enough to enable me to perform meaningful statistical
55

It should not be forgotten that, while cases with narrow societal impact involving highly technical questions are
certainly a part of this area of the law, administrative cases can also have implications for essential rights and
liberties.
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analysis but constrained enough to be manageable in scope.
With these criteria in mind, I settled on the 1977-2007 terms of the Court. This includes
the waning years of the Skidmore era (the 1977-1982 terms), the entirety of the Chevron era (the
1983-1999 terms) and the beginning of the Mead era (2000-2007 terms). It also covers the
entirety of the Carter, Reagan, H. W. Bush, and Clinton administrations, along with all but the
final stretch of W. Bush’s last year in office. Using the 2007 term as the cutoff for inclusion is
the result of trying to limit the scope of the project, the supplemental data56 available to me
ending in the 2007 term, and the data for the Obama administration terms being unavailable at
the time that the project began. In terms of the Court itself, the studied span includes the last few
years of the Burger Court, all years of the Rehnquist Court, and the opening years of the Roberts
Court. Ideologically speaking, this period has a decidedly conservative bent.57
After deciding which terms to focus on, I next worked to establish which cases within
those terms I would include in my analysis. I turned to the Supreme Court Database (Spaeth
2016) as a starting point. Examining the codebook for the database, the adminAction variable
seemed to provide a likely place to start. This variable is used when administrative agency action
precedes a case and includes which agency took that action. In cases where multiple agencies are
involved, the value of adminAction is based on which agency’s action is more relevant to the
case or, alternatively, the agency that took action more recently. Included in such actions are
those taken by agency officials and official denials of requests for the agency to take specific
actions. In the Database, the following are not coded as agency actions:
56

Very generously provided to me by Dr. Richard Pacelle.
19 out of a total 31 terms with a Republican president seem sufficient to characterize the presidential politics of
the period as more conservative than liberal. As for the Court, the Common Space scores for the median justice are
positive for 19 of the 30 terms for which I have data. This denotes a Court that has, at the least, conservative
leanings. No cases meeting my selection criteria were heard by the Court in the 2005 term, so I omit it from this
description. 10 of these conservative median justice terms coincide with a Republican president holding the White
House at the beginning of the term.
57
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-
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A "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc. A
request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against
agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred.
A mere request for an agency to take action when there is no
evidence that the agency did so.
Agency or official action to enforce criminal law. The hiring
and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby
public officials are appointed to office.
Attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting.
Filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the
ballot.
Actions of courts martial.
Land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a
court.
Federally funded private nonprofit organizations. (Spaeth 2016,
p.26-27)

Equipped with this information, I proceeded to eliminate all cases that were assigned no
value for adminAction.58 However, this still left a number of cases where the federal
government was not a party. I made this determination by going through the “petitioner” and
“respondent” variables in the database and finding several cases where both parties to the case
were private or state actors. I dropped these cases, giving me a pool of 526 potentials. Then I
began to read.
Mirroring the process used by Spaeth et al. in coding the adminAction variable (albeit
with different ends), I read through the syllabi and occasionally parts of the majority opinion for
each of the remaining cases. As I read, I took notes about the legal questions presented59 by each
case left in my list. After my initial survey, I reviewed my notes and constructed a list of the
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Examination of Dr. Pacelle’s solicitor-general focused data yielded six cases that met all of the criteria applied
except for having a value assigned for adminAction, and were subsequently included in my final dataset. While this
does raise the possibility of other relevant cases in the original database that might also be missing an adminAction
value, I am convinced that the likelihood of this is low. My initial study of Pacelle’s data yielded fifty-four
additional cases where the federal government was a party, and, as previously stated, only six of those met the
additional criteria for inclusion.
59
It’s worth noting that the classifications I applied to these cases were based primarily on the way that the Court
addressed them. If the majority held that the question was really one of whether or not an agency overstepped their
authority in promulgating a regulation rather than whether or not they applied that regulation correctly, or vice versa,
I took them at their word.
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sorts of questions that I would keep and that I would drop. Those that would be kept were those
that involved questions of whether or not an agency regulation was made within the confines of
that agency’s statutory authority, whether or not an agency action violated that agency’s own
rules and regulations, and whether or not enforcement or other policymaking actions taken by an
agency under color of direct statutory authority were within the scope of that authority.
I think it is probably useful to take a moment to discuss those sorts of questions that did
not make the list. One that arose quite often was whether or not a given statute was in conflict
with either the Constitution or another statute or statutes. Cases involving the civil liability of the
U. S. government or government officials were also excluded, as were those focused primarily
on the jurisdiction of a given court to hear a case. I wrestled with whether or not to include cases
involving agency responses to Freedom of Information Act requests, coming down on the side of
excluding them as the act of releasing (or not) documents to public request seems fundamentally
different than creating or enforcing the law. I wrestled even more with civil suits brought by
agencies in order to enforce statutory provisions or regulations. On the one hand, this is an
important class of enforcement behavior. On the other, an agency bringing a civil suit against an
individual or entity seems like an inherently different kind of action than the unilateral
rulemaking and enforcement activities in which I am primarily interested. As such, I leave those
cases for another study.
There are a variety of other case types that would generally meet the stated criteria, but
either still raise what I argue are fundamentally different sorts of questions or that incorporate
confounding factors that would diminish or overshadow the administrative questions presented.
The following case types were generally less common than those already named, but were also
excluded for these reasons:
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The post-litigation award of attorney’s fees
The authority of district courts to apply specific sanctions
Who may represent or join a class in a class action suit
Whether a particular kind of information is covered by
attorney-client privilege
The powers and immunity of the president
The applicability of estoppel
State application of federal statutes or regulations
Cases rendered moot by circumstance
Cases remanded because the issue was deemed not to be ripe
Separation of powers
Whether or not federal statutes or regulations pre-empt state
law
Questions of foreign policy and the application of treaties
Cases where the final vote was an equally divided decision

Many cases very clearly fell into one of the included or excluded categories, but (perhaps
unsurprisingly) others were more difficult to classify. For instance, in General Motors
Corporation v. United States (1990), a civil suit for enforcement was filed by the EPA in
addition to issuing a notice of violation, but the Court spoke to the question of whether or not the
EPA’s failure to comply with statutorily mandated timeframes stripped the agency of all
enforcement power in the matter. I decided to keep this case, as the question addressed by the
Court fell strongly into the included category of agency enforcement action taken under statutory
authority despite the presence of facts that would otherwise exclude it. A number of cases, both
included and excluded, featured such conflicts of classification. I have made every attempt to be
as consistent as possible in treating similar cases in similar ways when such conflicts arose. A
full list of the cases included in my analysis can be found as an appendix to this work.
At this point, it seems worth taking some time to discuss how this body of cases looks.
Figure 3.1 shows the total number of cases heard by the Court60 for each term included in this
study as well as the number of cases from each term that met the above-discussed criteria. The
number of cases the Court takes each term has decreased markedly from a high-water mark
60

As recorded in the Supreme Court Database.
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of almost 180 in 1981 to fewer than 80 in 2007. The number of cases I have identified follows a
similar albeit less dramatic decrease over time, reaching a maximum of just over 20 cases in both
the 1982 and 1983 terms, with no cases at all in 2005 and only 2 in the 2007 term.
Figure 3.2 gives a clearer picture of the percentage of the Court’s docket these
administrative cases occupied during the selected years. While the year-to-year change can best
be described as erratic, there is a general downward trend as time progresses with a couple of
notable exceptions. The administrative cases included here were roughly 13.5 percent of the total
cases heard by the Court in the 1977 term, the first included, though this is followed by a sharp
decline. There is a notable spike during the 1982 and 1983 terms where the Court heard 22 of
these cases each term (the highest raw number of cases, though the overall number of cases
heard nears the peak of 177 cases heard in the 1981 term). Erratic change with a downward trend
continues to hold until the 2000 and 2001 terms, with these administrative cases just making up
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just over 11 percent of cases heard in the 2000 tern and just over 15 percent of the cases in the
2001 term.
While the raw number of cases here is relatively low compared to the late 1970s and
early 1980s, the Court’s docket during these terms was roughly half the size it reached during the
1981 term. Interestingly, these spikes correspond with the Chevron decision (1983 term) and the
Mead decision (2000 term) respectively. It seems likely that there is some connection between
these cases and the increase in the proportion of administrative cases making their way to the
docket. If such a connection exists, I suspect that it would take one of two forms. The first
possibility is that the Court had decided to spend some additional time in those terms dealing
with administrative matters and that this interest led the justices to take both more cases and
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these two specific cases.61 The second possibility is that these were cases that grabbed the
attention of the justices and consequently put them into a state of mind more open to addressing
administrative cases. Given Perry’s (1991) assertion that the justices often see individual cases
that deal with similar subject matter as largely interchangeable and the particulars of both
cases,62 I would be more inclined to hold with the first possibility. This is, of course, only
speculation on my part.
Case Outcomes
Table 3.1 identifies the number of cases in which the government either wins or loses as
either petitioner or respondent. In the cases I have identified, the government is the petitioner
almost 62 percent of the time and wins roughly 71 percent of the time. As a respondent, the
government still wins more than it loses (almost twice as often, in fact), but tends to find success
less frequently than it does as petitioner (where it does so nearly three times as often as it loses).
This is especially striking when compared to the rate of success for petitioners and respondents
in the total set of cases from the studied period. Overall, the respondent prevails in just over onethird63 of the cases that came before the Court during this time while the petitioner found success
in just under two thirds.64 The government wins far more often in both roles than the average
litigant.
Decision direction is an attempt to capture how liberal or conservative a given Court
decision is. It is a central part of attitudinal models of judicial decision making and has been
61

Pacelle (1991) argues that the Court may take related cases in this manner as a way of expanding the effective
amount of agenda space. All else being equal, dealing with a handful of related cases requires less overall work than
dealing with a handful of cases from entirely different areas of the law.
62
See Chapter 2 for a larger discussion of Chevron and Mead.
63
According to the Supreme Court Database, the respondent was victorious in 1403 of the 3744 cases heard in the
1977-2007 terms (37.4 percent).
64
Also according to the Supreme Court Database, the petitioner was victorious in 2341 of 3744 cases heard in the
1977-2007 terms (62.5 percent).
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Table 3.1 Wins and Losses by Petitioner Type
Gov. Position Prevailed
Yes
No
Total

Government as Petitioner
Yes
No
145 (65%)
79 (35%)
51 (54%)
43 (46%)
196 (62%)
122 (38%)

Total
224
94
318

found to have significant influence on how the justices decide cases, particularly in cases
involving civil rights and liberties. The pro-federal government position is coded in the Supreme
Court Database as liberal in most issue areas,65 and with the general trend of victory the
government has before the Court, it might be expected that a majority of the cases would be
decided in a liberal manner. However, this might be offset by two additional factors. The
generally conservative tendencies of the Court during the investigated era might skew the results
in a more conservative direction. Also, given the expectations that the Solicitor General serves in
some capacity as an advocate for the president’s policy preferences, the government’s high win
rate, and the prevalence of Republican presidents during these terms, it might reasonably be
expected that such an effect would be further amplified than might otherwise be the case.66
Table 3.2 presents some decidedly mixed results. There is a perfectly evenly split
between conservative and liberal decisions and the decisions for these cases were, on the whole,
slightly more liberal than the full set of cases for this period.67 Cases that the government won
were slightly more likely to be coded as liberal decisions (58 percent of total) than conservative
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This is notably not true for criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys
cases.
66
Though it is worth remembering that presidents of all parties can and do benefit from power vested in the federal
government.
67
The Supreme Court Database records 3744 total cases in the 1977-2007 terms. Of these, 2041 were coded as
conservative decisions, 1634 as liberal, and 69 as unspecifiable. This works out to a roughly 54 percent/44 percent
conservative/liberal split.

77

Table 3.2 Decision Direction in Government Wins and Losses
Gov. Position Prevailed
Yes
No
Total

Decision Direction
Conservative
Liberal
94 (42%)
130 (58%)
65 (69%)
29 (31%)
159 (50%)
159 (50)

Total
224
94
318

(42 percent of total) whereas cases that the government lost were more than twice as likely to be
decided in a conservative (90 percent of total) rather than liberal (30 percent of total) direction.
The policy preferences of the various actors involved are likely pushing the results of these cases
in a more conservative direction than might be expected otherwise, though perhaps not to the
extent that a purely attitudinal outlook would predict.
For many, though not all, issue areas, a liberal decision is one that favors the government.
It might not be especially surprising, then, that the government so often appears to be arguing for
a liberal outcome. At the same time, a great deal of the literature that addresses the Court’s
decision making is heavily influenced by the policy preferences of the justices. As there is every
indication that the Court was predominately conservative during the period examined, the fact
that the majority of the decisions were not, as a result of these preferences, conservative seems
an important observation. I suspect that the reason for this lies largely in the influence of legal
factors, precedent in particular, in this set of cases. I will test this suspicion directly in Chapters 4
and 5.
It is worth remembering that decision direction is coded using a fairly complicated set of
criteria and that those criteria are dependent on the specific issue area that a case addresses. As I
will discuss in greater depth momentarily, this group of cases represents something of a mixed
bag of the traditionally defined issue areas, encompassing civil rights, taxation, and criminal
procedure, among others. Additionally, as discussed in the previous chapter, the justices can and
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do seem to approach different issue areas in different ways (Lauderdale and Clark 2012), with,
for instance, a justice that consistently votes conservatively on questions of criminal procedure
also voting in a consistently liberal fashion on First Amendment questions. As such, trying to
infer some coherent set of ideological preferences for this set of cases from this information is
likely to be unfruitful (and, as with any simple correlation when studying complex phenomena,
unwise). What can be gathered from this, however, is that the simple assertion that a
conservative Court leads to drastically more conservative set of decisions does not appear to hold
true for this set of cases. Such findings68 are one of the reasons I think that these cases and
questions of administrative law more broadly are so potentially interesting.
Table 3.3 presents the decision direction of the decisions for each case along with the
president under which each decision was reached.69 I include it for two reasons. First, the
various administrations provide a compact if uneven stand-in for time. Second, given the success
of the Solicitor General and the expectation that the office will attempt to act in accord with the
president’s preferences70 to some extent as allowed by good legal reasoning and argumentation,
it might be expected that Republican and Democratic administrations result in significantly more
conservative and liberal decisions respectively in this body of cases. The data will, once again,
disabuse us of this entirely reasonable notion. While the Carter era does contain more liberal
outcomes than conservative, with the opposite holding true for the H. W. Bush era, the
differences in both instances are minor. Even more to the point, the Reagan, Clinton, and W.

68

Though these particular findings might be ascribed to the potentially low salience of these cases. I will explore
this possibility more in Chapter 5.
69
Based on the term of the Court. During transition terms, the president listed will be the outgoing president.
70
It does appear that the OSG reversing its position on a specific issue due to a change of administration is a
relatively rare thing (Pacelle 2003, Ch.8). Such changes do occur, though, typically in high salience cases.
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Table 3.3 Decision Direction by President
President
Carter
Reagan
H. W. Bush
Clinton
W. Bush
Total

Decision Direction
Conservative
Liberal
33 (49%)
35 (51%)
61 (50%)
62 (50%)
22 (51%)
21 (49%)
27 (55%)
22 (45%)
16 (46%))
19 (54%)
159 (50%)
159 (50%)

Total
68
123
43
49
35
318

Bush eras run counter to partisan-ideological expectations, though the total difference is also
small for each of these.
Table 3.4 presents the cases that should be most likely to exhibit the influence of
presidential preferences: those where the government was the petitioner and also won the case.
As described in the previous chapter, the Solicitor General serves as a gatekeeper for which cases
the government will bring. While the SG is constrained in some significant ways in deciding
which cases to seek cert for, such as the facts of the case, actions taken or rules promulgated by
agencies, and the general litigation strategy followed by the Department of Justice to that point,
there is still room for the office to exert its influence. While most of the particulars for any given
case are pretty well defined by the time the SG makes a decision about filing a cert petition, there
are many cases to choose from (Zorn 2002). From this body of cases, it is expected that the SG
would seek cert for a limited number of those cases that meet some key criteria. First, that the
case would serve as a vehicle to either advance or at least defend some aspect of the president’s
agenda, although such advancement is likely to be more limited than it might be in, for instance,
a civil rights case with broad implications.71 Second, that the case would possess a fact pattern
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The SG will likely also petition for some cases that the president has little direct interest in to be taken by the
Court for such purposes as resoling conflicting decisions from different Circuit courts or simply to settle a matter of
law.
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Table 3.4 Decision Direction by President for Cases When Government was Petitioner and
Won
President
Carter
Reagan
H. W. Bush
Clinton
W. Bush
Total

Decision Direction
Conservative
Liberal
12 (40%)
18 (60%)
31 (49%)
32 (51%)
12 (55%)
10 (45%)
7 (44%)
9 (56%)
8 (57%)
6 (43%)
70 (48%)
75 (52%)

Total
30
63
22
16
14
145

and a set of arguments made at the lower levels of the judiciary that seem likely to prevail before
the Supreme Court. While these factors likely do not apply in all cases, the literature on the SG
suggests that both should often hold true.
With these cases, the expected relationship between partisanship and decision direction is
generally observed. The strongest relationship occurs during the Carter era, with 60 percent of
the decisions reached having a liberal direction. The W. Bush, Clinton, and H. W. Bush eras also
follow the expected trend, with 57 percent, 56 percent, and 52 percent of the respective decisions
having the expected direction. While this is notable, it is also not the very lopsided sort of pattern
that might have been expected.72 Additionally, the Reagan era actually sees one more liberal
decision than it does conservative.
Again, care should be taken about drawing conclusions from a few simple comparisons,
particularly with such a small number of cases. Nonetheless, this information does lead me to
think that attitudinal factors may not play as strong a role in determining the outcomes of these
cases as they seem to in other issue areas. Of course, it is also possible that they simply work in a
different manner than the academic community is accustomed to seeing or that the coding
72

It should be remembered that the OSG must also serve the Court if it wishes to maintain its standing and
influence. As such, arguing from a solid legal position and imposing order on the law is likely to be as or even more
important than achieving a particular, ideologically-driven end.
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criteria for decision direction or the mix of issue areas represented here confuse or otherwise
mask those effects. However, it has also been argued that “The Court and the OSG are partners
in a process of imposing consistency on the law so that agencies and their clientele will know the
appropriate boundaries” (Pacelle 2015, p.119). If such stability is the goal of both the Court and
the Solicitor General, then I would expect to see precedent matter at least as much, and likely a
good bit more than, the policy preferences of the moment. A measure of partisan influence
tempered by a robust respect for what has come before seems a reasonable explanation for the
results seen in Table 3.4. Whatever the reason for the emergence of this pattern, I intend to test
this particular suspicion more rigorously in the following two chapters.
Table 3.573 lists the various agencies involved in the identified cases and how often they
appear as both petitioner and respondent. Each agency involved in at least four cases receives its
own line on the table, but those involved in fewer cases are lumped together and listed at the
bottom of the table in order to save space. A few things from this table stand out. First, the
Internal Revenue Service is far and away the most frequent litigant, appearing almost as many
times as a petitioner as the next most frequent litigant has appeared before the Court at all and
making up almost 23 percent of the full number of cases identified. The next most frequent
litigant, the National Labor Relations Board, accounts for around 13 percent of the total cases,
and the numbers begin to drop quickly after that. Only twenty-one of the fifty-eight agencies
included in the data participated in a case before the Court four or more times, and twenty-two
agencies participated in only a single case. Among those litigants that participated in four or
more cases, the majority appeared more frequently as the petitioner than the respondent. This is
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I use the adminAction value assigned to each case in the Supreme Court Database (along with the six I entered) to
arrive at the totals in Table 3.5. This makes for a bit of a simplification of reality in some instances, but provides
what I contend is a generally accurate picture of which agencies are involved. However, one limitation is that this
method does not include the other agency involved in the four cases with different government agencies serving as
both petitioner and respondent.
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Table 3.5 Agency Appearances before the Court
Agency
As Petitioner
As Respondent
Total
40 (56%)
32 (44%)
72
Internal Revenue Service
19 (45%)
23 (55%)
42
National Labor Relations Board
14 (78%)
4 (22%)
18
Department of the Interior
10
(67%)
5
(33%)
15
Board of Immigration Appeals
9 (60%)
6 (40%)
15
Department of Health and Human
Services
6 (55%)
5 (45%)
11
Federal Communications Commission
5 (50%)
5 (50%)
10
Environmental Protection Agency
5 (71%)
2 (29%)
7
Department of Labor
6 (86%)
1 (14%)
7
Immigration and Naturalization Service
3 (50%)
3 (50%)
6
Department of Justice
3 (50%)
3 (50%)
6
Federal Reserve Board of Governors
4 (67%)
2 (33%)
6
Interstate Commerce Commission
1 (20%)
4 (80%)
5
Benefits Review Board
3 (60%)
2 (40%)
5
Customs Service
3 (60%)
2 (40%)
5
Department of Education
3 (60%)
2 (40%)
5
Federal Trade Commission
3 (60%)
2 (40%)
5
Securities and Exchange Commission
5 (100%)
0 (0%)
5
Social Security Administration
2 (50%)
2 (50%)
4
Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare
2 (50%)
2 (50%)
4
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
3 (75%)
1 (25%)
4
Federal Labor Relations Authority
3 included cases: Department of the Treasury, Equal Opportunity Employment Commission,
Food and Drug Administration, Merit Systems Protection Board, Patent Office, Secretary of the
Army, and U. S. Sentencing Commission
2 included cases: Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Department of Commerce,
Department of Energy, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Federal Bureau of
Prisons, Federal Election Commission, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Occupational Safety
and Health Administration
1 included case: BATFE, Civil Aeronautics Board, Comptroller General, Comptroller of
Currency, Department of Agriculture, Department of State, Department of Transportation, FBI,
Farmers Home Administration, FDIC, Federal Maritime Commission, Federal Railroad
Administration, OMB, NASA, National Security Agency, Occupational Safety Review
Commission, Pension Benefits Guaranty Corporation, Postal Rate Commission, Provider
Reimbursement Review Board, Secretary of the Navy, State Agency74, U. S. Forest Service,
Veterans Administration, and 1 unidentified75 agency.
74

This is Andrus v. Idaho (1980), which involved a dispute over lands that Idaho requested removed from the public
domain in order for the state to develop it under provisions of the Carey Act of 1984. The Department of the
Interior’s refusal to do so gave rise to this case.
75
This is Leo Sheep Company v. United States (1979), a case involving the government clearing a road through land
held by the Leo Sheep Company to allow public access. I am fairly confident that this action was taken by the
Department of the Interior or some agent thereof, but have been unable to verify this.
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not particularly surprising, given that the Court takes far more of these cases with the
government serving as the petitioner than the respondent. However, the National Labor Relations
Board and the Benefits Review Board (part of the Department of Labor that deals with aspects of
the Longshore and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act and the Federal Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act of 1969) both appear more frequently as respondents. The Environmental Protection
Agency, Department of Justice, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (since restructured into the Department of Education and Department of
Health and Human Services), and the Federal Regulatory Energy Commission have all appeared
an equal number of times in each role.
Table 3.6 includes information detailing the number of wins and losses experienced by
each agency participating in at least five cases as both petitioner and respondent. Once again
unsurprisingly, most of the included agencies tend to fair better as a petitioner, though the
National Labor Relations Board, Department of Health and Human Services, and Customs
Service have all found more success as the respondent. The Department of Justice and Federal
Reserve Board of Governors have fared equally well in each role. Table 3.7 lists the issue areas
of the cases included in my analysis, along with the number of cases in each that the government
both won and lost. Given the frequency of both the Internal Revenue Service and National Labor
Relations Board as litigants, it should not be surprising to see that Federal Taxation and Unions
account for over one-third of the included cases. Given the often economic-focused nature of
regulation and regulatory activity, it also should probably not be surprising to see that Economic
Activity shows up quite often as well. Perhaps less expected is the number of Civil Rights cases
included.
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Table 3.6 Wins and Losses for Selected Agencies
Agency
Internal Revenue
Service
National Labor
Relations Board
Department of the
Interior
Board of Immigration
Appeals
Department of Health
and Human Services
Federal
Communications
Commission
Environmental
Protection Agency
Immigration and
Naturalization Service
Department of Labor
Department of Justice
Federal Reserve
Board of Governors
Interstate Commerce
Commission
Benefits Review
Board
Customs Service
Department of
Education
Federal Trade
Commission
Securities and
Exchange
Commission
Social Security
Administration
Totals

Wins as
Petitioner
28 (39%)

Losses as
Petitioner
12 (17%)

10 (24%)

9 (21%)

14 (33%)

9 (21%)

42

11 (61%)

3 (17%)

2 (11%)

2 (11%)

18

9 (60%)

1 (7%)

2 (13%)

3 (20%)

15

6 (40%)

3 (20%))

5 (33%)

1 (7%)

15

5 (45%)

1 (9%)

4 (36%)

1 (9%)

11

5 (50%)

0 (0%)

3 (30%)

2 (20%)

10

3 (43%)

3 (43%)

0 (0%)

1 (14%)

7

3 (43%)
2 (33%)
2 (33%)

2 (29%)
1 (17%)
1 (17%)

1 (14%)
2 (33%)
2 (33%)

1 (14%)
1 (17%)
1 (17%)

7
6
6

4 (67%)

0 (0%)

1 (17%)

1 (17%)

6

0 (0%)

1 (20%)

1 (20%)

3 (60%)

5

2 (40%)
3 (60%)

1 (20%)
0 (0%)

2 (40%)
2 (40%)

0 (0%)
0 (0%)

5
5

3 (60%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

2 (40%)

5

2 (40%)

1 (20%)

1 (20%)

1 (20%)

5

4 (80%)

1 (20%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

5

102

40

64

39

245
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Wins as
Losses as
Respondent Respondent
22 (31%)
10 (14%)

Totals
72

Table 3.7 Government Wins and Losses by Issue Area
Issue Area
Criminal Procedure
Civil Rights
First Amendment
Due Process
Privacy
Attorneys
Unions
Economic Activity
Judicial Power
Federalism
Federal Taxation
Total

Government Won
15 (94%)
36 (72%)
10 (100%)
8 (80%)
2 (100%)
2 (100%)
28 (58%)
48 (69%)
19 (68%)
7 (64%)
49 (69%)
225 (71%)

Government Lost
1 (6%)
14 (28%)
0 (0%)
2 (20%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
20 (42%)
22 (31%)
9 (32%)
4 (36%)
22 (31%)
93 (29%)

Total
16
50
10
10
2
2
48
70
28
11
71
318

The government won more cases than it lost in each individual issue area but did
particularly well in Criminal Procedure, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, and Attorneys
cases (though there were a mere two cases in each of the last two categories). It fares the most
poorly in Unions, Federalism, and Economic Activity cases, but never reaches a win rate lower
than around 63 percent (for Unions cases) in any issue area. Given the way that ideological
factors are coded, the lopsided number of government wins in the areas of criminal procedure,
First Amendment, and due process are a likely source of the conservative-tilted outcomes noted
above.
Table 3.8 collects the direction of the various decisions made in each issue area. As
expected, Criminal Procedure and First Amendment cases appear to be decided in a generally
conservative manner,76 while Due Process and Judicial Power tend to go in that direction, but not
by such large margins. These outcomes should not be particularly surprising given the overall
conservative tendencies of the Court during the period examined. Privacy and Attorneys cases
76

I expect the administrative issues at play in cases that address questions of Criminal Procedure or application of
the First Amendment to have a somewhat attenuated impact on the outcome of the case when compared with other,
likely less salient, issue areas such as Federal Taxation.
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Table 3.8 Decision Direction by Issue Area

Issue Area
Criminal Procedure
Civil Rights
First Amendment
Due Process
Privacy
Attorneys
Unions
Economic Activity
Judicial Power
Federalism
Federal Taxation
Totals

Decision Direction
Conservative
Liberal
14 (88%)
2 (13%)
25 (50%)
25 (50%)
9 (90%)
1 (10%)
6 (60%)
4 (40%)
2 (100%)
0 (0%)
2 (100%)
0 (0%)
22 (46%)
26 (54%)
34 (49%)
36 (51%)
18 (64%)
10 (36%)
5 (45%)
6 (54%)
22 (31%)
49 (69%)
159 (50%)
159 (50%)

Total
16
50
10
10
2
2
48
70
28
11
71
318

see no liberal decisions at all, but there are a very small number of cases in both categories. No
issue area is as overwhelmingly liberal as the Criminal Procedure and First Amendment areas are
conservative, but Federal Taxation is the area most consistently decided in a liberal fashion.
Unions, Economic Activity, and Federalism all lean more liberal, while Civil Rights is evenly
split between liberal and conservative decisions.77
Each decision of the Supreme Court comes down, ultimately, to a vote among the
justices. The majority’s position, typically requiring a minimum of five justices to join, will go
on to become precedent. Those in the minority may call to future justices with the arguments
written in their dissent or dissents. While a significant number of the Court’s cases are decided
unanimously, the majority of them are not. Depending on one’s theoretical inclinations, the

77

The outcomes of the Civil Rights cases need to be placed into the proper context. Looking at all cases in the
Supreme Court Database that are coded as Civil Rights cases (1372 in total), more were decided in a liberal
direction (771) than a conservative one (601). Examining the data in a term-by-term fashion, the Court begins
deciding these cases in an overwhelmingly liberal direction in the early 1950s. This trend continues until the mid1970s when conservative decisions begin to become more common than liberal ones. This trend matches closely,
albeit not perfectly, with the election of Richard Nixon as president and the conservative swing of the Court that
followed in the wake of his and later Republican presidents’ appointments. The even split observed here represents a
departure from the far more liberal approach to Civil Rights cases the Court employed in the preceding decades.
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degree of dissension in a case might be a signal that the law is particularly unclear on the point in
question, a sign of the impact of attitudinal factors in the issue area, or some combination of
these. Unanimous decisions might be understood to represent either low salience cases or cases
decided primarily on the basis of fairly clear legal principles. Cases decided by the narrowest
margin might be seen as the most legally difficult or attitudinally charged. Table 3.9 shows the
level of disagreement on the Court in each of the issue areas represented in the cases that the
government won through tracking the number of votes for the minority position in each case.78
Examining these data, a few patterns begin to emerge. First, and most strikingly, almost
half of the government victories were unanimous decisions. The less contentious one- and twovote minorities are the least common outcomes, with the more divisive three- and four-vote
minorities falling somewhere in the middle. Each issue area includes at least one unanimous
decision, while unanimity occurs most frequently in Economic Activity and Federal Taxation
cases.79 As a proportion of the total number of cases in each issue area, Due Process and
Federalism cases appear to be relatively non-contentious. On the other side of the coin, Criminal
Procedure, Civil Rights, and First Amendment cases show more common and apparently deeper
divides among the justices. While close decisions certainly occur with some regularity when the
government position prevails in these administrative cases, this information points to a generally
high level of agreement between the justices when finding for agencies.
Table 3.10 details the number of minority votes in those identified administrative

78

The data in Tables 3.9 and 3.10 were gathered using the Supreme Court Database’s minVotes variable. It should
be remembered that there are a number of instances where fewer than nine justices participated at the decision stage
of the case.276 total decisions of the full 318 involved all nine justices, 36 involved eight, 5 involved seven, and 1
case involved only six justices at the decision stage of the case. This was Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System v. Investment Company Institute.
79
Perhaps unsurprising, given that these are themselves the areas with the greatest number of cases in this category.
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Table 3.9 Dissension in Cases the Government Won
Issue Area
Criminal Procedure
Civil Rights
First Amendment
Due Process
Privacy
Attorneys
Unions
Economic Activity
Judicial Power
Federalism

Number of Votes for Minority Position
0
1
2
3
4
3 (20%)
1 (7%)
2 (13%)
4 (27%)
5 (33%)
14 (39%)
2 (6%)
4 (11%) 11 (31%) 5 (14%)
3 (30%)
0 (0%)
2 (20%)
3 (30%)
2 (20%)
3 (38%)
3 (38%)
0 (0%)
1 (13%)
1 (13%)
1 (50%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
1 (50%)
1 (50%)
0 (0%)
1 (50%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
13 (46%)
2 (7%)
2 (7%)
5 (18%)
6 (21%)
30 (63%)
1 (2%)
5 (10%)
6 (13%)
6 (13%)
10 (52%)
1 (5%)
1 (5%)
4 (21%)
3 (16%)
5 (71%)
1 (14%) 1 (14%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
26 (53%)
109 (48%)

Federal Taxation
Total

8 (16%)
19 (8%)

6 (12%)
24 (11%)

8 (16%)
42 (19%)

1 (2%)
30 (13%)

Total
15
36
10
8
2
2
28
48
19
7
49
224

Table 3.10 Dissension in Cases the Government Lost

Issue Area
Criminal Procedure
Civil Rights
First Amendment
Due Process
Privacy
Attorneys
Unions
Economic Activity
Judicial Power
Federalism
Federal Taxation
Total

Number of Votes for Minority Position
0
1
2
3
4
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
1 (100%)
0 (0%)
2 (14
1
2
3
6
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
1 (50%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
1 (50%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
4 (20%)
0 (0%))
1 (5%)
4 (20%)
11 (55%)
3 (14%)
3 (14%)
2 (9%)
8 (36%)
6 (27%)
5 (56%)
1 (11%) 2 (22%)
0 (0%)
1 (11%)
1 (25%)
0 (0%)
1 (25%)
1 (25%)
1 (25%)
4 (18%)
20 (21%)

3 (14%)
8 (9%)

8 (36%)
16 (17%)
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4 (18%)
22 (23%)

3 (14%)
28 (30%)

Total
1
14
0
2
0
0
20
22
9
4
22
94

cases that the government lost. The data for these cases paint a picture in stark contrast with
those that the government won. While there are unanimous decisions that find against the
government, these are only the third most common type. The most common such decision is one
with four justices in the minority, with the second most common being a three-justice minority.
Whatever the underlying logic or rationale, the decision to find against the government in cases
involving administrative rulemaking or action appears to be much more divisive than the
decision to find in its favor.
Looking at the issue areas individually, Judicial Power cases still exhibit a majority of
unanimous decisions with only a single case with a 5-4 decision. However, this appears to be a
bit of an oddity. While all but two of the issue areas that were represented by at least one case
before the Court contain at least some unanimous decisions, dissension is clearly more common
in these cases than unanimity. Furthermore, high levels of dissension seem to be the norm in
Civil Rights, Unions, and Economic Activity cases. Federal Taxation is more of a mixed bag,
with dissension being more common than unanimity, but with more instances of one- and twojustice minorities than three- and four-justice minorities. Federalism is more evenly split between
the possible outcomes, though only four such cases are included.
Conclusion
The ultimate goal of this study is to shed some light on the manner in which the Supreme
Court evaluates the actions of various federal agencies. Another way of phrasing this central
question might be “why are some federal agency actions upheld by the Supreme Court while
others are struck down?” Any attempt to address this, or any, question empirically requires that
boundaries to the inquiry be set. This is for two primary reasons: (1) to ensure that the answers
arrived at are actually connected to the question being asked and (2) to set forth a task that can
90

actually be completed. These goals often exist in tension with one another. The subjects of a
political scientist’s questions are often vast and multifaceted while time, as so much of the
discipline’s literature points out, is a valuable and highly limited resource. The result of this
tension is that every study is limited in some important ways, and this study is no exception.
This being said, I have tried to draw the boundaries of this particular work in a way that
is both theoretically sound and inclusive enough of relevant data to provide a reasonable answer
to the question at the core of this document. The time period being examined, the 1977 through
2007 terms of the Court, is advantageous for answering this question for a variety of reasons. It
includes terms from each of the three major eras of administrative deference jurisprudence. It
includes stretches of time with multiple Democratic and Republican presidents,80 which is
potentially relevant due to both the president’s role as chief administrator and because of the
importance of the Office of Solicitor General in this area of the law. This period also allows for
the use of pre-existing data from a variety of sources to allow for more time to be devoted to
analysis than data collection.81 Finally, the period is expansive enough to include a large number
of cases to study in the face of fairly restrictive case selection criteria.
To briefly recap these criteria, the Supreme Court Database (Spaeth 2016) serves as the
starting point for my selection criteria as it is widely used and generally considered highly
reliable. After choosing a time frame to examine, my next step was to filter out all cases that had
no value for the adminAction variable. This variable denotes that agency action occurred during
the events preceding the case as well as recording which agency took that action. Limiting the
included cases in this manner began the process of focusing in on administrative cases, but still
cast the net too wide. I also eliminated all cases to which the federal government was not a party.

80
81

Albeit skewing more Republican overall.
Though a considerable amount of time has still been spent on data collection despite these advantages.
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This removed two primary sets of cases. The first were those that involved state rather than
federal agencies. Due to federalism and the variability of state law, these seemed like
fundamentally different sorts of cases than the ones in which I am interested. The second set was
those cases that involved no government actor as a party. My reason for this was a combination
of the overall level of success enjoyed by the federal government as a litigant seeming to set
those cases apart from others where the government did not participate directly and the potential
for cases that addressed administrative questions in an oblique manner to add further murk to
already unclear legal waters. This done, I proceeded finally to eliminate those cases that centered
around questions other than whether or not the action taken or rule made by the involved agency
was within that agency’s authority. The most common such disqualifying question was whether
or not a statute that would potentially empower an agency to take a given action was properly
within Congress’s authority to enact. This process left me with 318 cases in total.
The majority of the space in this chapter was given over to describing a variety of
characteristics of this body of 318 cases. The first reason for this is that neither this particular set
of cases nor ones similar to it have received much focused attention from researchers. While
these cases have certainly been included in past analysis, I am aware of no other studies that
group and isolate them as I have here. Simply put, the discipline knows little about the contours
of this specific portion of the legal landscape and the discussion contained in this chapter thus
seems useful in its own right. The second reason description is important here is that those
heretofore unknown contours can and should inform the understanding of these cases in the
context of both this study and of the broader literature.
A number of notable trends have emerged in the data assembled here. Some of these
conform to much of the common scholarly knowledge about the Court and its cases. The
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government wins more than it loses, the Court could generally be described as a conservative one
during the 1977-2007 terms, and cases in issue areas such as Civil Rights and First Amendment
questions tended to divide the justices more than those in areas such as Federalism and Federal
Taxation. These points might be considered common knowledge among scholars that study the
Court, but each of them has important implications for putting the results in ensuing chapters into
proper context. Government losses are comparatively uncommon, and any factors that might lead
to significantly increased chances of such losses thus seem important to identify and understand.
An attitudinalist would see the conservative tendencies of the Court during this time and expect a
high proportion of conservative outcomes. Instead, there is an ideological tie that is less
conservative than the full set of cases for the period being examined. This could point to the
reduced importance of attitudinal factors in this set of cases. While I think that the cases I have
identified here represent a unique and coherent area of jurisprudence,82 the observed division in
levels of dissension suggests that factors spanning beyond purely administrative concerns are
probably still relevant.
Some observed trends, such as the number of tax cases heard by the Court, which has
near total control over its own docket and claims to detest hearing them, are surprising. While
there is some correlation between the president’s membership in the Democratic or Republican
Party and the frequency of liberal or conservative decisions in these cases, the differences are
relatively minor and, in the case of the Reagan administration, run counter to expectations. If the
Court were primarily looking to the chief administrator for cues about how to make its decisions
in these cases, a different set of outcomes might be expected. Alternatively, it might be expected
that a different set of outcomes would occur if the Solicitor General were acting in an overtly
political manner in a large portion of the included cases, particularly given the government’s rate
82

This point will be the focus of my next chapter.
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of success. While a great many agencies have appeared before the Court during the thirty-one
terms examined, many agencies were involved in only one or two cases during this span. On the
other end of the spectrum, nearly 51% of the total cases gathered here involved only five
different agencies. Given the segmented nature of the federal judiciary, some additional
consideration might need to be given to the idea of agencies complying with Supreme Court
decisions due to potential repeat-player status. While this very well may hold true for the Internal
Revenue Service as the most frequent litigant before the Court from this set, NASA and the
Forest Service might be more interested in what the relevant circuit has to say about a particular
question. Finding in favor of agency action or rulemaking appears to be a generally less
contentious action than finding against it, though there is a large degree of issue area and case-tocase variation. On its face, this has the look of inter-branch strategic considerations, though it
very well might be something else. Criminal procedure, civil rights, and first amendment cases
appear to be fairly contentious. Taxation and economic activity cases do not. This might recast
the question of dissension in a primarily attitudinal light, some other information seen here to the
contrary.
In closing, I will repeat myself on a few points. The first is that it would be dangerous to
attempt to infer too much about the nature of these cases from the descriptive data presented
here. The outcome of any given case that the Court decides to hear is, as discussed in the
previous chapter, the product of fact patterns, the application of relevant Constitutional,
statutory, administrative, and case law, the preferences of each individual justice, strategic
interactions between the justices, considerations about the preferences of the other branches and
of the public, and the arguments made by attorneys to the Court, among others. The questions the
Court seeks out are often not simple ones, and the answers and the manner in which the justices
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arrive at them are not likely to be either. However, some patterns have made themselves apparent
here. It is my hope that these observations will shed some valuable light on an understudied
portion of the Court’s docket, and that this light will reveal the path to an answer to my core
question.
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Chapter 4
The Integrated Model of Supreme Court Decision Making
Research on the Court often incorporates the concept of issue area, the broad subject
matter of a body of cases. The assumption of this inclusion is that different areas of the law will
be subject to different sets of factors that bear consideration in reaching a final decision. If the
Court’s decisions are driven, at some level, by legal factors, the reasonableness of this
assumption is self-evident. Constitutional, statutory, and common law provisions are and must be
different for handling questions of, for instance, civil liability versus religious expression. The
law is structured differently in a variety of areas, and as a result cases in different areas see
different kinds of questions asked and reasoning applied, different legal tests and standards of
evaluation used, and different weights given to competing objectives in deciding different kinds
of cases. In short, different issue areas are likely to be dealt with in very different manners.
While the law itself creates differing sets of criteria for evaluating cases with different
subject matter, the law is not the only factor that influences the outcome of cases before the
Supreme Court. As attitudinalists will point out, judges in the U. S. judiciary, particularly those
that serve on the Supreme Court, are quite free to take a wide variety of actions and impose a
multitude of interpretations on the law (Segal and Spaeth 2002). Depending on their
predilections, two justices may read the same legal provision in profoundly different ways. Such
differences, taken in aggregate across the Court, have the potential to lead to different outcomes
in similar cases as the ideological makeup of the Court changes. As proponents of the strategic
approach to judicial decision making remind us, the Court is in many ways more than the sum of
the attitudes held by the justices. One justice’s view of an issue, no matter the strength of the
conviction with which it is held, cannot come into legal effect without the support of at least
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some other members of the Court. As such, interpersonal and inter-group bargaining and
negotiation will shape the way that these attitudes coalesce and transform into a written opinion
(Epstein and Knight 1998). It might be expected that attitudes and the ensuing small-group
dynamics that spring from them83 will factor heavily into those decisions whose outcomes the
justices have great interest in and where they are the primary influencers of the law, such as in
Constitutional civil liberties cases.
In addition, the judiciary is more than just the Supreme Court. While the Court may
choose to have the final say in any case that seeks certiorari, the total number of cases the
justices will take up in a term represents only the tiniest fraction of the full number of cases
moving through the wider federal court system (Perry 1991 ; Baum 2013). The justices must
work through the cases they choose, but the Court also has a responsibility to provide guidance
to those acting in the lower levels of the judiciary in order to facilitate a measure of consistency
between courts operating across the entirety of the nation.84 Part of this responsibility requires
the Court to answer difficult and important legal questions, providing clear and replicable
decisional criteria in emerging or changing sectors of the law. Part of this responsibility is also to
maintain a certain level of stability in the law (Pacelle 2015). While legal interpretations can and
do change, frequent, radical change in the Court’s rulings within a given area would leave lower
court judges unsure of how to proceed and litigants unsure of the rules by which they were
playing. As a practical matter, the Court must be aware of standing precedent even as it attempts
to navigate an ever-shifting statutory and regulatory landscape.
To further complicate matters, the judiciary does not operate in a vacuum. Proponents of
83

Such dynamics might even be expected to play a larger role in cases where a large number of the justices are
largely unconcerned with the particulars of the outcome and, therefore, potentially more open to persuasion.
84
While the Supreme Court can help foster this consistency, it cannot enforce it in a comprehensive manner.
Conflicting interpretations of the same legal provisions across the circuits are, and likely will remain, an ongoing
phenomenon.
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the strategic model would once again remind us that the U. S. government is one of separated
and sometimes competing powers. Congress has the power to tinker with the Court’s jurisdiction
and, of course, is primarily responsible for creating the law. The president is tasked with taking
the law and putting it into action. Both possess the tools to curtail the Court’s influence on policy
outcomes (Epstein and Knight 1998). As a result, the Court might defer to the preferences of the
elected branches in some instances. The will of Congress might, for example, mean a great deal
in matters that are of great importance to the voting public and which are shaped principally
through statutes, such as national economic policy.85
At the same time, while the occupants of the three institutions may not always see eye to
eye with one another, they do share a common source of power and influence in the continuing,
stable function of the federal government. Given these facts, it might be assumed that there will
be times when the Court defers to the other branches in contradiction of the sincere preferences
of the majority of its members. It might also be the case that there will be instances where the
primary preference of the Court, along with one or both of the other branches, will be
maintaining the function and power of the federal government of which they are all a part.86
For a variety of reasons legal, structural, and practical, different combinations of these
factors appear to apply in different amounts in different issue areas (Pacelle, et al. 2011). This
brings me to the first question I wish to address: do the cases I have identified represent a
coherent and distinct area of Court decision making? A couple of definitions are in order here.
When I ask if these are a coherent group of cases, I ask whether or not there are sufficient threads
of commonality between them that they will be decided using similar criteria. As discussed in a
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This dichotomous treatment of civil liberties and economic policy is discussed by the Court itself in the now
famous Footnote Four of United States v. Carolene Products (1938) (Segal and Spaeth 2002, Chapter 4).
86
The goals of the individual justices and of the institution that is the Court are not exactly one and the same. While
the justices likely have their own policy goals, those goals require the cooperation of the other branches to attain.
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prior chapter, the Supreme Court Database codes the cases I have identified as existing within a
variety of different issue areas. This is reasonable, as, viewed through a certain lens, they deal
with a wide variety of questions.
However, it is my contention that all of these cases have a great deal in common. First,
each selected case involves an exercise of authority by a federal agency. Second, the authority
exercised in each case finds its source in power delegated by Congressional statute.87 Third, the
Office of the Solicitor General will almost always be closely involved in such cases, either
representing the government as respondent or bringing the case before the Court as petitioner.
Finally, each case involves the ability of the United States government to carry on its chosen
business. If I am correct, this coherency will mean that these cases will be decided using a
similar set of criteria in a closely related and observable manner. I think that it is possible that the
question shared by all of these cases, “Did the agency in question act within the authority granted
to it?” might serve to set them apart as their own, distinct area of the law.
When I ask if these cases are distinct, I ask are they, taken as a whole and taken in
various parts, decided in a demonstrably different manner than both the full set of cases from
which they are drawn and other similar but non-administrative cases. The question I hope to
answer later in this work is how specifically the Court evaluates these cases. However, if the
answer to this preliminary question is “no,” either because they are not treated similarly to one
another or because their treatment is due to different factors unrelated to the ones I have
identified in selecting these cases, this second question becomes essentially meaningless.
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The agencies all claim as much at least, though the Court does not always agree that an action represents a proper
exercise of that power.
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The Integrated Model
Fortunately, a tool that is well-suited to precisely this question has already been
developed. In Decision Making by the Modern Supreme Court (2011), Richard Pacelle, Brett
Curry, and Bryan Marshall present an integrated model of Supreme Court decision making. The
model incorporates a variety of attitudinal, strategic, and legal factors to examine a large body of
Court cases as well as several subsets thereof. Using their data in addition to supplemental data
coded by Pacelle, I intend to use their model to analyze my data in an attempt to answer this
preliminary question.
The integrated model uses the binary decision direction of the Supreme Court’s decision
in a given case, coded 0 for a conservative decision and 1 for a liberal one, as the dependent
variable. The ideological decision direction data in the Supreme Court Database (2016) serves as
the basis for this variable, though it is recoded by Pacelle et al. (2011) for analytical reasons.88 It
employs seven independent variables chosen to represent the mixture of attitudinal, strategic, and
legal factors that seem to be relevant to Supreme Court decision making. The NOMINATE
Common Space measure of median justice ideology developed by Epstein, Martin, Segal, and
Westerland (2007) stands in for the attitudes of the Court. The president’s preferences are
represented by a Common Space score as well. The NOMINATE scores (Poole and Rosenthal
1997), measuring the ideological preferences of the median members of the House and Senate,
are included as a measure of the potential strategic impact of Congressional preferences.89
The model includes three legal variables. The first of these is the ideological direction of
the most relevant precedent cited in the syllabus of a case (coded -1 for a conservative decision,
88

The SCDB numerically codes conservative decisions as 1 and liberal decisions as 2. Recoding these as 0 and 1
respectively is required for meaningful analysis through logistic regression.
89
Pacelle et al. reversed the sign of the NOMINATE and Common Space scores in order to achieve ideological
congruence (specifically, more positive numbers equating to more liberal outcomes) across their measures. I use
their data in this analysis, so the same holds true here.
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1 for a liberal decision). The second is the presence or absence of on-point precedent in a case.
As the model’s originators put it, “On-point precedents typically refer to cases that are virtually
identical to a recent decision. In most instances, the on-point case is a companion to the full
decision…In other circumstances, the on-point decisions occur in cases that follow the landmark
decision by a year or two” (Pacelle, et al. 2011, p.60). In other words, a case coded as a 1 for onpoint precedent will have been recently preceded by a very closely related case. If precedent is
constraining on the Court’s decision making, on-point precedent would be expected to be even
more so given the subject matter and temporal connections between the precedential decision
and the present case. The final legal variable included is issue evolution. Issue evolution consists
of four stages (Pacelle, et al. 2011). In the first, the Court is perhaps unsure of what to do with an
emerging issue and attempts to couch that issue in the jurisprudence of a similar existing issue
area. In the second stage, separate specific precedent is created and refined for the issue at
question. In the third stage, the facts of the case become more complicated and are perhaps
handled less well by the existing precedent. In the fourth stage, the issue begins to mix with other
issues, leading to potentially conflicting imperatives. Generally speaking, moving from one stage
to the next indicates an increase in the difficulty of the question being presented. The variable
was coded by Pacelle et al. (2011) as a 1, 2, 3, or 4 corresponding to the stages described above.
Pacelle and his colleagues tested their model on the majority90 of the full set of cases
heard by the Supreme Court from the 1953 to the 2000 term, as well as several subsets. For the
full set of cases, each of the independent variables was found to have significant impact on the
direction of the decision except for the preferences of the Senate. For each independent variable
that reached significance except for issue evolution, the relationship with the dependent variable
was a positive one. In other words, the more liberal the preferences of the median justice of the
90

Cases involving questions of federalism and of the separation of powers were excluded from their analysis.
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Court, the median member of the House, and the president, and in the presence of liberal
precedent and on-point precedent, the more likely the case would be decided in a liberal manner.
The relationship between decision direction and issue evolution was negative, meaning that the
later the stage of issue evolution a case represented, the more likely the decision would be a
conservative one. With the exception of the influence of the Senate, the model’s results
conformed to the authors’ expectations.
Data and Hypotheses
In order to determine whether or not the cases discussed in the previous chapter constitute
a coherent and distinct area of jurisprudence, I will examine those cases using Pacelle, Curry,
and Marshall’s (2011) integrated model of Supreme Court decision making. As in the original
work, the analysis will employ logistic regression as the dependent variable91 is dichotomous.
The common space measures for the ideological preferences of the median justice,
president, House, and Senate will be referred to as Court, President, House, and Senate
respectively. The ideological direction of relevant precedent will be referred to as Precedent. The
issue evolution stage will be referred to as Evolution. Table 4.1 provides summary statistics for
these variables. All ideological variables are coded such that more positive values equate to a
more liberal position and more negative values equate to a more conservative position. The
common space variables are continuous in nature with upper and lower bounds of -1 and 1
(Epstein, et al. 2007). Precedent is a categorical variable with -1 indicating conservative
precedent, 0 indicating an indeterminable ideological direction, and 1 indicating liberal
precedent. Evolution is also categorical in nature, taking on values from 1 to 4. The coding of

91

The ideological direction of the Court’s decision in a given case. As discussed in the previous chapter, 159 of the
cases are coded as liberal decisions and 159 are coded as conservative.
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Table 4.1 Summary Statistics of Independent Variables
Court
President
House
Senate
Precedent
Evolution

Observations
318
318
318
318
318
318

Mean
-.049
-.164
.021
.052
.179
2.871

Std. Deviation
.099
.490
.165
.067
.951
.696

Minimum
-.245
-.564
-.386
-.155
-1
1

Maximum
.103
.475
.292
.164
1
4

these variables is the same as used in Decision Making by the Modern Supreme Court, and
higher values indicate generally more difficult legal questions.
I expect to see a different pattern of significance in the cases I have identified. To provide
a speculative answer to my question, I suspect that these cases are different in some important
ways from the complete universe of cases that the Supreme Court hears each term. To begin
with, I expect that the policy preferences of the Court will not have a significant impact on the
outcome of these cases. As a practical matter, Pacelle et al. (2011) find a limited impact for the
Court’s attitudes in statutory economic cases,92 and judicial attitudes do not exert significant
impact on the outcomes of Constitutional economic cases. There are, I believe, some important
similarities between these sets of cases and the ones identified here. First, I suspect that these
administrative cases are, like those economic cases, of low salience93 to the Court. While they
undoubtedly represent questions of substantive importance, and some of the cases do indeed
address questions of fundamental rights and liberties, many, many more are steeped in
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Pacelle et al. (2011) classify a case as a statutory economic case based on two criteria. The first is the subject
matter. Qualifying subject matter includes cases where the U.S. government is defendant against a tort claim, cases
involving the Internal Revenue Code, and bankruptcy law, labor relations, antitrust, and commerce cases. Most
cases that do not fall into this category would be considered by Pacelle et al. to be rights and liberties cases.
Referring to cases as statutory serves to distinguish those that focus on the interpretation of language found in
Congressional statutes from other cases that deal primarily with the interpretation of Constitutional language. This
distinction is important because Constitutional interpretation is primarily the domain of the Court, while Congress
possesses the ability to alter statutory language with (hypothetically) relative ease.
93
Unah and Hancock (2006) provide evidence for the idea that attitudes have a stronger effect in high salience cases.
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administrative arcana. The specific provisions of the tax code and their application matter in a
very real way to both the nation and its people. Despite this, I have difficulty imagining that the
justices become deeply, personally invested in the outcomes of such cases. The fact that, as
discussed in the previous chapter, around forty-one percent of the administrative cases included
here were decided unanimously may provide some support for this view. For comparison’s sake,
about 35 percent of the total civil rights cases heard by the Court from 1977-2007 were decided
unanimously, while only 25 percent of First Amendment cases heard during that time were free
of dissension.94
Second, while these administrative cases are more often than not statutory in nature, I
believe they mimic Pacelle’s Constitutional economic cases in that the Court’s primary goal is
“to settle the law, not to settle it in a particular direction” (Pacelle, et al. 2011, p.166). If people
are to follow the law, then they must first know the law (more or less, at least). This can be
relatively difficult on its own, but could be made practically impossible by frequent, drastic shifts
in legal obligations and expectations. While this principle has important implications for anyone
and everyone, it is perhaps of greater-than-usual importance to federal agencies. Tasked as they
are with carrying out the work of government under the overlapping supervision of Congress, the
president, and the judiciary, agencies have a strong set of incentives to act within legal
boundaries. To do otherwise invites scrutiny, challenge, and censure.95 In order to ensure
compliance, policy and procedure must be developed and deployed, consuming time and other
agency resources. Relevant law being in a constant state of flux thus presents a risk of hindering
or, depending on the frequency and magnitude of the changes, even crippling agencies. While
this is problematic in its own right, it might also be expected that both the president and
94

Taken from the Supreme Court Database (Spaeth 2016) using the issueArea variable.
This is not to imply that such things cannot be found where agencies are very clearly operating inside of legal
boundaries.
95
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Congress would, regardless of their specific policy preferences, take issue with at least some of
the core functions of modern government in the U. S. being disrupted in this manner. This, in
combination with the likely low salience of many of these cases to the justices, should result in
less attitudinal impact than is typically observed in other areas of the law.
That brings me to my next expectation: I posit that each of the legal variables will have
significant impact on decision direction. Keeping with the findings of Pacelle, Curry, and
Marshall (2011), precedent direction should relate positively to decision direction while issue
evolution should have a negative relationship. I do make a modification to the original model
here by removing on-point precedent from it. The reason I do this is because only eleven cases in
the set are coded as having on-point precedent.
As for the strategic variables, I expect that the preferences of the House and the president
will each rise to significance. The original model generally found that the preferences of the
Senate were not significant, and I expect that the same will hold true here. The president is a
more complicated matter. The president has a number of points of contact with agencies and the
power granted to the various agencies within the broader executive branch serves as a
substantive source of the president’s own power (e. g. Wood and Waterman 1991; Mayer 1999;
Croley 2003). Additionally, the Solicitor General serves at the president’s pleasure and is
responsible for deciding which cases the government will appeal as well as actually arguing all
cases in which the government is a party (Salokar 1992; Pacelle 2003). Given this, I expect that
the president’s preferences will have a significant and positive influence on decision direction.
However, there is an important caveat to keep in mind. The extant literature on the SG indicates
that, while the office is expected to pursue the president’s interests to some extent, attempting to
do so through the naked support of ideology-driven outcomes is not a long-term winning strategy
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(Wohlfarth 2009). If this is accurate, and particularly if the Court and SG share the goal of
imposing stability on the law in these cases, it might be expected that the policy preferences of
the president will not be significant. Finally, given the aforementioned low salience of these
cases to the Court, the importance of their preferences in low-salience cases, and their general
connection to agencies, I expect that the preferences of the House will have a positive and
significant impact on decision direction. Low salience for the Court does not necessarily translate
to low salience for the House, whose members write the legislation that shapes administrative
action, sit on the committees that oversee these agencies, are lobbied by interest groups that
operate in agencies’ domains, and receive electoral support (or not) from constituents that take
an interest in or receive benefits from administrative activity.
However, if I am incorrect and these cases are instead nothing more than the proverbial
grab-bag of cases pulled from other areas of the law, I would instead expect to see a different set
of outcomes. The first possibility that could indicate a lack of commonality between the cases is
that no meaningful pattern is discernible when examining the full set of cases. If there is no
substantive connection between the assembled cases, then it seems reasonable that none of the
included variables would have any meaningful impact on the aggregate direction of the Court’s
decisions. The second possibility for such an outcome is that the analysis of the full set of cases
does result in some variables displaying significant impact, but that impact is merely the result of
other, non-administrative connections between the cases.
It is functionally impossible to rule out this second possibility, but I think that there are
some very likely markers of such a relationship that can be examined. Pacelle et al. (2011)
initially test the integrated model on the full set of civil rights, civil liberties, and economic cases
taken by the Court during the 1953-2000 terms, but they also go on to examine several subsets of
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cases based on subject matter and whether questions of Constitutional or statutory interpretation
are primarily at play. By subdividing and analyzing the administrative cases based on the same
criteria, comparison between my results and Pacelle’s are possible. If the results of these area
comparisons are identical in terms of the mix of variables exerting significant influence across
studies, it seems fair to assume that any significance displayed in the unified analysis is the result
of the relationships identified in Decision Making. If these area comparisons display a different
set of significant relationships, though, then I would argue that greater confidence about the
distinctiveness of the administrative cases is warranted.
Quantitative Results
Table 4.2 displays the results of the integrated model on the full set of administrative
cases that meet my selection criteria. Several of my hypotheses find support in the data, while a
few others do not. Fortunately, both sets of results are interesting in their respective ways. I will
begin with those hypotheses that have found support. First, and least surprisingly, the ideological
preferences of the Senate do not significantly impact the ideological direction of the Supreme
Court’s decisions in these cases. This held true in the majority of the case types tested by the
model’s originators and was fully expected here. Second, the direction of the most relevant
precedent has a significant and positive effect on the decision direction in these cases. This is
consistent with my expectation that legal stability would be a key concern here. Third, issue
evolution stage is significantly and negatively influential on decision direction. As the cases
become more difficult, precedent would perhaps fit less well with the facts of the cases presented
and thus exert less influence on the eventual decision.
Now, on to those hypotheses that failed to find support. First, the preferences of the
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Table 4.2 Integrated Model: All Identified Cases96
Court
President
House
Senate
Precedent
Evolution
Constant
Chi-Squared
Log Likelihood
N
*p<.05, **p<.01

Model
1.26
(1.31)
-.05
(.31)
.46
(1.13)
-1.24
(2.74)
.79**
(.13)
-.36*
(.18)
.98
(.55)
.00
-198.84
318

Change in Probability
.27
-.01
.10
-.27
.17
-.08

House do not exert significant influence on the decision direction in these cases. This lack of
significance for the House’s preferences is, on its face, theoretically difficult to explain as these
cases are largely the sort of economics-focused, non-Constitutional questions that would
typically be seen as likely to display the effects of Congressional preferences.97
It should be noted that, while the contemporary preferences of Congress do not appear to
influence the decisions of the Court in these cases significantly, Congress does play an important

96

The Pearson χ2 value for the overall model is 129.06, with a probability of .3837, indicating that the model fits the
data well. As a secondary check, evaluation of the model via Receiver Operator Characteristic curve returns a p
value of .7097, indicating that the model predicts observed outcomes reasonably well. Collinearity does not appear
to be an issue, with the VIF values for the independent variables ranging from 1.02 for Precedent to 2.38 for Court.
A correlation matrix of the independent variables indicates some cause for concern with a correlation of .6039 for
House and Senate. This is still acceptable, if a bit higher than ideal, and the linked election cycles for the two
chambers present a clear theoretical reason for the two variables to jointly vary. The next highest correlation is for
Court and President at .2723.
97
It would be interesting to examine the impact of the preferences of a relevant Congressional committee or
committees on the outcome of these cases. While the questions posed in these cases may be of limited interest to the
full chambers, the preferences of such specialized subgroups might be influential. Such analysis is beyond the scope
of this work, but seems worthy of future investigation.
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role in this process. While agencies are structurally located within the executive branch, they are
also creatures of Congress. They are created and empowered through statute, and, having read
significant portions of each of these decisions, the justices devote a great deal of ink to the
discussion of how faithfully agencies adhere to (or not) those statutes. I think the reason for the
apparent lack of the House’s influence here is, as suggested by the significance of both legal
variables, that the Court is primarily interested in imposing stability and predictability on the law
in this area. As such, it is not that Congress’s preferences do not matter. It is only, I suspect, that
the preferences of Congress contemporary with the decision of the Court fade to insignificance
relative to the preferences of Congress as expressed in relevant enabling statutes.
Second, the preferences of the president did not achieve significance. On the one hand,
this is surprising given the broad influence the president wields in the policy process. On the
other hand, given the high proportion of economic cases and cases raising statutory rather than
Constitutional questions included in the set, and given that the model’s originators generally
found the House to be more influential than the president in both of these categories of cases, it
is perhaps less surprising that presidential preferences fail to reach significance when those of the
House do as well. Additionally, if stability in the law is the Court’s goal in this area, it might,
once again, be expected that the preferences of contemporary elected leaders would exert little
influence on outcomes. If such stability is as important to the effective function of agencies as I
have argued, political leaders might see some measure of value in it even when they are not
particularly fond of the outcomes it might produce.
Finally, and perhaps most interestingly of my hypotheses that have not found support, the
ideological preferences of the Court as measured by the median justice do not rise to
significance. While the expectation was that the overall impact here would be significant but
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small compared to other, especially legal, factors, to find no significant relationship between the
ideological preferences of the Court and decision direction is unexpected and potentially
important for a few reasons. Generally speaking, scholars of the Court accept that one of the
most important factors in determining how the Court decides cases are the policy preferences of
the justices (e. g. Epstein and Knight 1998; Segal and Spaeth 2002). Identifying an area of the
law where those preferences hold very little sway98 may help us better grasp the context inside of
which attitudinal factors are at their strongest and weakest. While perhaps of less importance to
the subfield but with greater bearing on my initial question in this chapter, only one group of
cases that Pacelle and colleagues evaluated with the integrated model did not find a significant
impact for attitudes: Constitutional economic cases. In those cases, precedent direction was
significantly and positively related to decision direction, as was on-point precedent which is
omitted here. The president’s policy preferences were also significantly but negatively related to
decision direction, and the impact of issue evolution was not significant. In addition to different
mixes of significant factors other than the lack of attitudinal impact, very few of the cases
examined here are Constitutional economic cases. Using Pacelle’s classifications, a mere sixteen
of the 318 cases I have identified pose Constitutional economic questions. Given this, the lack of
attitudinal impact displayed here resulting from a high proportion of such cases within the larger
set can likely be ruled out.
With these results, there appears to be some evidence to support the idea that the
identified cases are significantly different from the full set of cases tested by the integrated
model’s authors. This is perhaps not surprising, as a non-randomly selected subset seems
somewhat likely to differ in important ways from the larger set from which it is taken. Still, the
98

I do not present the limited findings here as conclusively supportive of this possibility, particularly in light of
some potential weaknesses in the measures employed which I will discuss in a moment. That being said, I do think
that the totality of my findings in this chapter at least warrants further investigation into the matter.
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results from the full model are unusual in their lack of attitudinal and strategic influences, and
the question of distinctness seems worth pursuing. Fortunately, the model’s originators also
tested a number of subsets of cases with the model themselves. By similarly restricting my cases
and comparing my results to theirs, I hope to provide a more complete answer about the separate
nature of these cases. Unfortunately, I will not be able to recreate each test that they performed,
as my set includes only forty-two Constitutional cases. Given the number of independent
variables in the model, applying it to these cases would not prove fruitful.
Area Comparisons
While evaluating Constitutional cases in my data may not be possible, a brief discussion
of what Pacelle and colleagues found in these cases should prove useful. In the full set of
Constitutional cases, the model found that the median justice’s policy preferences, precedent, onpoint precedent, and issue evolution stage exerted significant influence on the direction of the
final decision.99 Constitutional civil rights and liberties cases were similar in their mix of
influential factors, but precedent drops from significance while the preferences of the president
rise to it.100 Constitutional economic cases were significantly impacted by precedent direction,
the presence of on-point precedent, and the preferences of the president.101 So, while
Constitutional cases cannot be isolated within my set for similar analysis, it can at least be seen
that the set taken as a whole exhibits a different mix of influences than any of these groups.
Table 4.3 displays the results of the integrated model as applied to the full range of non-
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The relationship between decision direction and the Court, precedent, and on-point precedent were all positive for
both Constitutional and civil liberties cases. The relationship between decision direction and on-point precedent was
negative in both sets of cases.
100
The sign of each significant variable remains the same as in the above footnote. The sign for presidential
preferences is positive.
101
While the sign for precedent and on-point precedent are positive for these cases, the sign for the president’s
preferences is negative.
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Table 4.3 Integrated Model: All Non-Constitutional Cases
Court
President
House
Senate
Precedent
Evolution
Constant
Chi-Squared
Log Likelihood
N
*p<.05, **p<.01

Model
1.51
(1.47)
-.09
(.33)
.33
(1.22)
-.05
(2.93)
.94**
(.14)
-.27
(.20)
.79
(.61)
.00
-164.90
275

Change in Probability
.31
-.02
.07
-.01
.19
-.06

Constitutional cases in my set. This provides a total of 228 observations, with the only variable
reaching a significant impact being precedent direction. In the full set of non-Constitutional cases
from the 1953-2000 terms analyzed by Pacelle and colleagues, precedent was similarly
significant and positively related to the dependent variable. However, in that set of cases, all
other independent variables also had a significant impact on decision direction.102 Rather than
attitudinal, strategic, and legal factors each rising to significance, only a legal variable appears to
exert significant influence here. This seems an important difference.
Table 4.4 reports the results of the integrated model applied only to economic cases.103

102

Supreme Court, presidential, and House preferences each had positive relationships with decision direction, as
did precedent direction and the presence of on-point precedent. Senate preferences and issue evolution stage were
negatively related to decision direction.
103
The definition of an economic case used here is somewhat expanded as compared to that used by Pacelle, Curry,
and Marshall (2011). Some of the cases I included were not coded as dealing with either economic or civil liberties
issues. My analysis in the next chapter required all cases to fall into one of these two categories, so examined these
uncategorized cases and shifted each into the category that most closely matched the subject matter of the case.
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The n here is 228, and once again only precedent achieves significance while remaining in the
expected direction. By comparison, the integrated model indicated that all factors other than
presidential preferences exerted significant influence on decision direction104 for the full set of
economic cases examined by its authors. Again, this seems an important difference, particularly
in the lack of Court preferences influence on decision direction. However, there is something to
keep in mind about these cases. A large number of these economic cases, sixty-six105 to be exact,
involve the Internal Revenue Service. As discussed in a previous chapter, these cases are often of
very low salience to the Court and are, perhaps, approached more with grim determination than
genuine interest by the justices. Given this, and given that such cases make up almost a third of
the total economic cases, it could be that the inclusion of such cases is suppressing the influence
of the Court’s preferences. If, for the sake of argument, it is assumed that the other branches are
similarly disinterested in the workings and actions of the IRS,106 the inclusion of these cases
might also suppress the impact of their preferences as well.
Table 4.5 uses the same set of economic cases analyzed in table 4.3 but removes the
sixty-six IRS cases from the group. This gives an n of 161 and, despite the lack of tax law
involved, finds significant impact on decision direction only in the direction of precedent.
Neither the attitudinal nor strategic factors make significant contributions, representing a distinct
break from the larger universe of economic cases examined by Pacelle and colleagues. This is,
along with the other results discussed here, encouraging, as it seems to bolster the idea that these

104

And, once again, the relationship between decision direction and Court and House preferences, along with
precedent direction and the presence of on-point precedent were positive. Senate preferences and issue evolution
stage were still negatively related.
105
For those of you that recall that the IRS was involved in seventy-two of the cases studied here, the count here is
accurate. Four of these IRS cases are coded as addressing civil liberties by Pacelle. For anyone interested, these four
cases are: United States v. Lasalle National Bank, United States v. Euge, Bob Jones University v. United States, and
Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Two others, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. John W. Banks,
II and Michael J. Knight v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue are coded as neither economic nor civil liberty issues.
106
This is an admittedly unsafe assumption.

113

Table 4.4 Integrated Model: All Economic Cases
Court
President
House
Senate
Precedent
Evolution
Constant
Chi-Squared
Log Likelihood
N
*p<.05, **p<.01

Model
-.41
(1.66)
-.23
(.38)
-.96
(1.43)
1.30
(3.51)
.90**
(.16)
-.36
(.21)
.99
(.64)
.00
-137.31
228

Change in Probability
-.08
-.04
-.19
.27
.18
-.07

Table 4.5 Integrated Model: Economic Cases Excluding IRS Cases
Court
President
House
Senate
Precedent
Evolution
Constant
Chi-Squared
Log Likelihood
N
*p<.05, **p<.01

Model
-1.47
(1.98)
.04
(.46)
-1.23
(1.80)
3.39
(4.52)
.93**
(.19)
-.34
(.25)
.65
(.82)
.00
-96.09
160

Change in Probability
-.30
.01
-.25
.70
.19
-.07
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cases are indeed unique. Having said that, there are some potential issues with these findings that
should be discussed. While the apparent lack of attitudinal influence on the outcomes of these
cases is in line with my expectations, it is also highly unusual. While I suspect that this result is
an accurate representation of the influence of attitudes on these administrative cases, there are
two alternative explanations that I believe are worth mentioning.
First, as Lauderdale and Clark (2012) have pointed out, there are in fact many median
justices on the Court. Depending on the issue area the Court is addressing, a number of justices
might occupy the influential median ideological position. If the cases I have identified do in fact,
as I posit, represent a coherently unique subset of Court cases, it is possible that the cross-issue
median justice is often or perhaps always different from the administrative law median justice. If
this were the case, it could be that attitudes as measured by the cross-issue median justice exert
little to no influence on outcomes, as they have here.107 While I cannot conclusively rule out this
possibility, to test it directly is beyond the scope of this study. Furthermore, the ubiquity of the
measure in large observation pool research of the Court should mean, at the least, that the results
arrived at here should share any such inbuilt bias with other studies using the measure and
remain comparable.
I have also considered the possibility that, given the fairly high proportion of unanimous
decisions reached in these cases108 and the necessity of non-unanimous decisions for ascertaining
position on the attitudinal spectrum, the measure of preferences in this sector of the law might be
somewhat underdeveloped. Once again, however, some additional description should prove
useful. Comparing the full set of Court cases heard in and between the 1977 and 2007 terms and
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I do not think that this possibility is especially likely, but thought that it seemed worth mentioning for theoretical
reasons.
108
Using the minVotes variable in the Supreme Court Database, 129 total decisions in my set of 318 had no justices
voting for a minority position. This accounts for 40.57 percent of the total cases included.
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administrative cases, the administrative cases actually exhibited a slightly lower proportion of
unanimous decisions than the full set.109 With this being the case, I am more comfortable with
the idea that additional attitudinal impact is not being masked by a lack of non-unanimous cases
for inclusion in the measure of attitudes. Still, 189 observations spread across thirty-one terms of
the Court may not be sufficient to get an accurate picture of where the justices preferences in
these cases lie.
The final comparison group is civil liberties cases.110 For all civil liberties cases
examined by Pacelle, Curry, and Marshall (2011), the model found that the median justice’s
policy preferences, precedent, on-point precedent, and issue evolution stage exerted significant
influence on the direction of the final decision. Table 4.6 reports the results of the integrated
model as applied to these administrative civil liberties cases.
The results are quite surprising in that none of the included variables rise to significance.
Precedent comes closest, but not quite close enough. The directionality of each independent
variable is similar to that displayed in the analysis of the full set of cases, though the president’s
preferences are positive rather than negative here. The preferences of the Court are closer to
significance here111 than they have been in any of the other analyzed case groups, but remain
farther from significance than precedent.
I will admit some confusion at this particular outcome. My best guess at explaining it
consists of two components. The first of these is that the focus on civil liberties weakens the
otherwise pervasive influence of the law for this group of cases by enticing the justices into a
109

Again using the minVotes variable in the Supreme Court Database, 1536 total decisions in the full set of 3744
had no justices voting for a minority position. This accounts for 41.03 percent of the cases included.
110
As with the economic cases previously discussed, my definition of civil liberties cases is somewhat broader than
that employed by Pacelle, Curry, and Marshall (2011). The cases included here as civil liberties cases were not all
classified as such in their work, though many of them were. The two sets of criteria are, however, largely
comparable if not identical.
111
The coefficient of 3.96 and standard error of 2.30 give us an α of .085.
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Table 4.6 Integrated Model: All Civil Liberties Cases
Court
President
House
Senate
Precedent
Evolution
Constant
Chi-Squared
Log Likelihood
N
*p<.05, **p<.01

Model
3.96
(2.30)
.10
(.56)
2.92
(2.07)
-5.13
(4.75)
.47
(.25)
-.22
(.38)
.33
(1.20)
.24
-55.21
93

Change in Probability
.81
.02
.59
-1.04
.10
-.05

greater degree of personal investment in the outcome of these cases than might otherwise hold
for the broader administrative context. The second is that, despite this increased degree of
personal investment, the administrative aspects of the case still mean that legal stability is of
great importance and thus suppresses the likelihood of outright attitudinal action.
There is one other thing that should be remembered about these cases: they include the
highly contentious criminal procedure cases. While there are not an especially large number of
these cases, only 16 in total, the overall number of cases examined in Table 4.6 is only 93. Table
4.7 examines this same body of cases but excludes criminal procedure cases in an attempt to
examine whether or not these cases are strongly influencing the results seen above.
Filtering the cases in this way brings the total number of observations quite low, but they
remain at a technically acceptable if not ideal level for analysis. Doing this also appears to bring
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Table 4.7 Integrated Model: Civil Liberties Cases Excluding Criminal Procedure Cases
Court
President
House
Senate
Precedent
Evolution
Constant
Chi-Squared
Log Likelihood
N
*p<.05, **p<.01

Model
2.83
(2.54)
-.14
(.60)
3.28
(2.26)
-8.64
(5.34)
.60*
(.27)
-.42
(.43)
1.08
(1.40)
.19
-46.63
77

Change in Probability
.59
-.03
.68
-1.80
.13
-.09

the results into harmony with the trends of significance previously observed. Precedent direction
once again exerts significant and positive influence on decision direction while all other
variables fail to reach significance. It appears that the ideologically divisive criminal procedure
cases were enough to obscure the influence of precedent in this small set of cases even if their
influence was not sufficient to elevate attitudes to significance.
Conclusion
So where does this leave us? Comparing the results here with Pacelle and colleagues’
integrated model of Court decision making, it appears that there is evidence of administrative
cases representing a distinct area of evaluation by the justices. Analysis of the full set of cases
provided evidence of a mix of significant factors distinct from the relevant factors in the full set
or the subsets of Pacelle et al.’s (2011) cases. The area comparisons here likewise proved distinct
from their counterparts in the original study. Of particular interest is the general strength of legal
118

factors112 in explaining decisions made in these cases to the exclusion of often-relevant
attitudinal and strategic factors. Pacelle, Curry, and Marshall (2011) found legal factors to be
influential in every issue area they examined.113 However, other factors had a significant effect
on the decision direction of cases in each of the areas they examined.
As discussed in the previous chapter, many of these cases were decided unanimously.
The strong apparent influence of the law and the muted impact of attitudes on display, in light of
the proportion of unanimous decisions on display here, seems to make sense. Depending on
one’s view of the Court, such a pattern can be read in one of two general ways: either there was
little disagreement because the law was so clear, or the justices were not particularly interested in
the outcome and thus decided to go in the direction the law pointed.
The lack of strategic influence still seems a bit strange on its face. While the lack of
readily apparent impact of presidential party on decision direction in Chapter 3 hinted at the
White House playing a perhaps diminished role here when compared to other areas of the law,
the outcome might still be seen as an unexpected one given the connections between the
president and executive agencies. I explore this relationship a bit more in the following chapter.
I believe the lack of significance in the case of both Congressional chambers is perhaps
not so difficult to explain. While it might be expected that the Court would act strategically and
defer to the wishes of Congress in these cases due to the cases being overwhelmingly
economically and statutorily focused in nature, such expectations overlook an important aspect
of administrative law. Stability in the law is an important value to be pursued if agencies are to
know what they need to do and how they might go about doing it. While Congress as an
institution will be very influential in creating the framework inside of which agencies work, their
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Administrative civil liberties cases before dropping criminal procedure cases notwithstanding.
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influence will likely be more rooted in the statutes of the past than the political passions of the
moment. If a stable, predictable application of the law is as important as I believe it to be in this
issue area, it makes a great deal of sense that the Court would not make their decisions primarily
or even heavily based on the preferences of those working in the Capitol today. Congress’s very
real influence on agencies should instead be more time-lagged in nature. I think that this presents
an interesting and likely fruitful avenue for additional examination, but I will leave that for
another day.
There is, I think, sufficient evidence of both coherence and distinctiveness on display
here to justify treating the examination of the body of cases identified in Chapter 3 as meaningful
and potentially useful endeavor. This being established, I will now proceed to attempt to address
the question that the previous 119 pages have been building to: how does the Supreme Court
evaluate the actions of federal agencies?
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Chapter 5
Evaluation of Administrative Action
We now arrive at the main event, so to speak. I have discussed the role of both the
Supreme Court and the federal bureaucracy as powerful and important actors in the national
policy process, reviewed literature relevant to the functions of both the Court and agencies,
identified, isolated, and discussed a body of Supreme Court cases that focus on the interactions
between these actors, and conducted an analysis that provides evidence that this body of cases
represents a coherent and unique area of the Court’s jurisprudence. Up to this point, however, I
have not lived up to the promise114 of this work’s title and addressed the question of how the
Court actually evaluates the various and sundry actions of federal agencies. I shall now attempt
to correct that.
Before I begin, though, it seems worth taking a moment to discuss why I think this is a
question worth answering in the first place. Virtually any activity or program undertaken by
government will be placed in the hands of a federal agency to carry out.115 If, as Lowi (1986)
argues, Congress is in the habit of delegating authority while proving deficient in setting clear
goals and boundaries, these programs and activities might either fail to serve as intended or
vastly overstep what would generally be viewed as the appropriate boundaries. Of course,
agencies are not only beholden to Congress. The president also has a wide variety of tools at his
disposal to manage the bureaucracy. If, however, as Wilson (2000), Croley (2003) and Pika
(2017) have argued, there are serious limitations to the overall level of oversight and control the
president can exert, then review of those questionable administrative actions that the president
cannot monitor and Congress will not stir itself to collectively notice will fall to the courts.
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Or threat, depending on the reader’s interests.
This might be directly or indirectly, through means such as grant administration or contracting with the private
sector. In either case, the larger point still stands.
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If the courts play a substantial role in the process, it seems worth knowing how they will
execute this duty. While the Supreme Court is unique and distinct from the rest of the federal
judiciary, it does sit at the pinnacle of the third branch of government. What the Court does and
how the Court does that will influence what the circuit and district courts do. Furthermore, the
Court’s rulings will influence the goals that agencies pursue and the means by which they pursue
them.
I have previously discussed three models of understanding the Court’s decision making.
The attitudinal model holds that each of the justices are single-minded pursuers of their own
preferred policy outcomes. The legal model posits that the justices follow and apply the dictates
of the law as embodied in the Constitution, relevant statutes, and, perhaps most importantly, the
Court’s own precedent. The strategic model116 expects the Court to, at least from time to time,
bow to the wishes of the elected branches due to the web of interdependence the federal
government is built upon and the lack of direct enforcement mechanisms the Court possesses.
Each of these models has important implications for the specific way the Court wields its
influence over agencies, especially if one particular approach is dominant. If the justices
approach administrative cases primarily as predicted by the attitudinal model, it might be proper
to view any Congressional delegation of authority to an agency as ultimately a potential
delegation of authority to the Court. If the legal model is the best predictor of the Court’s
decisions, it could be appropriate to view the justices as focusing on policing the boundaries that
the elected branches have set.117 If strategic considerations dominate, it might be expected that
the Court would attempt to enforce the contemporary will of the elected branches on agencies.
While such an arrangement might have some positive effects on reinforcing democratic control,
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I focus on inter-branch strategy here, though strategic interactions between the justices are also very important.
Though the Court’s own role in interpreting those boundaries should still not be ignored.
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it also has the potential to introduce significant levels of instability into administrative
considerations as the preferences and priorities of elected officials shift with those of the
electorate. Given the expansive nature of the modern administrative state, it seems useful to
know under which, if any of these, set of arrangements agencies might be operating.
Data and Model
The data used for this analysis are the same described in Chapter Three and used in
Chapter Four. The same body of cases are employed, and several of the variables that have been
used descriptively or analytically in previous chapters make a reappearance alongside a few new
ones.
For the dependent variable, I chose to use whether or not the government position in the
case prevailed.118 Given that my interest is how the Court evaluates administrative action, the
wins and losses of the agencies seemed the most appropriate dependent variable. Government
victories are coded 1, while government losses are coded 0. This information was obtained by
examining the petitioner, respondent, and partyWinning variable in the Supreme Court Database
(Spaeth 2016). In the five cases where different government actors were both petitioner and
respondent, I coded the case 1 if the actor that received the support of the Solicitor General was
successful.119 Because my dependent variable is binary in nature, I will be using logistic
regression to test the model.
Before I continue, it seems worth elaborating on why government success or failure is the
most appropriate dependent variable for this analysis. Decision direction, which is used as the
dependent variable in a large proportion of modern studies of the Court, seems inappropriate
here. The coding of decision direction is based on the issue area of the case being examined, and
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In all five such cases, the SG supported the petitioner.
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issue area coding generally does not make an accounting of the presence or absence of
administrative factors which are at the center of this work. Additionally, both the practical and
normative applications of this study revolve principally around examining under what conditions
government actions are upheld or struck down by the Court. While decision direction
incorporates concepts of pro- or anti-government impact, the usefulness of these components is
limited by the aforementioned issue area-based coding and far less direct than simply examining
whether or not the government’s position prevailed.
The first independent variable included is whether or not the government acted as
petitioner in a given case. This will be referred to in the following tables as Government as
Petitioner. The government has an extremely high rate of success when acting as the petitioner
before the Court.120 Cases where the government is acting as the petitioner are, by their nature as
cases of choice for the SG, likely to be important in some way to either the president or the
government more broadly. For example, the many tax cases included in the group of cases
examined here have real bearing on how the U. S. government carries out one of its core
functions. Given this, it seems important to examine whether or not the government bringing the
case to the Court has significant impact in and of itself on the likelihood of success. This variable
is coded as a 1 if the government is listed as the petitioner in the Supreme Court Database and a
0 if it is not. I expect the impact of this variable to be both positive and statistically significant
controlling for the effects of the other independent variables included.
The second independent variable is the presence or absence of administrative rulemaking.
This will be referred to in the following tables as Rulemaking Occurred. The previously
discussed language of the Mead (2001) decision indicates that the Court should, following that
decision, give greater deference to agency action when the agency has engaged in notice-and120

Compared to the merely very high win rate it has as respondent.
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comment rulemaking that empowers it to take the actions in question. If the Court is taken at its
word, it can also be assumed that it showed similar deference to actions with supporting
regulations during the Chevron (1984) era. Given the importance the Court has placed on
promulgating relevant regulations in Mead, it seems important to include the presence of such
activity in the model.
In order to determine whether or not rulemaking activity occurred, I read through the
syllabus and majority opinion of the included cases. I looked for mentions of formalized
regulations121 that would allow or require the agency to take the action that it took. Cases where
such regulations were mentioned are coded 1, those that were not are coded 0. Most often, a
reference to agency regulations appearing in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) was the first
sign that such regulations existed. However, a simple CFR citation was not sufficient to code a
case as a 1 absent other information. The regulation mentioned had to have some bearing on the
action taken by the agency. I have tried to err on the side of overinclusion, and have coded cases
as 1 if there seemed to be some sort of substantive connection between the regulation and the
agency’s action. I have also coded cases as 1 if the question the Court addressed was whether or
not the agency possessed the authority to promulgate a given regulation or whether the agency
properly applied, enforced, or interpreted one of its own regulations. In some instances, the
information contained in the syllabus was sufficient to rule a case in, but cases were not ruled out
without examining the majority opinion as well.
In some cases, the Court made mention of regulations that had been established through
notice-and-comment procedures but went on to note that those regulations would prohibit the
activity the agency engaged in. These cases were coded as 0. There were also a few cases where
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the Court discusses regulations that did have a bearing on the actions taken by an agency, but
were not finalized until after the action in question was taken. These cases are also coded 0.
Given the language in the Mead (2001) decision, I expect the impact of this variable to be both
significant and positive controlling for the effects of the other independent variables included.
The third independent variable I include is whether or not the agency action in question
involved formal adjudication. This variable will be referred to in the following tables as Formal
Adjudication. I include this because, like notice-and-comment rulemaking, the Mead decision
states that formal adjudication has often been involved in the application of Chevron deference
during the Mead and Chevron eras and I wish to evaluate this claim. The basic process for
coding this variable was similar to that of coding the regulatory variable in that I read the
syllabus and majority opinion looking for the Court to mention formal adjudicatory activity.
However, as what exactly constitutes formal adjudication is less well-defined than what
constitutes notice-and-comment rulemaking, my approach here is a bit less refined. If an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) or Immigration Judge122 was involved in the agency’s decision
making process, I code the case as 1. If no such official was involved, the case is coded as 0.
While this approach to coding the variable may overlook some instances of activity that might be
considered formal adjudication, it at least allows me to be confident that those cases that are
coded 1 do involve activity that can be classified as such. Such possible exclusions are not ideal.
However, it seems to me that, when dealing with a concept that lacks well-defined outer
boundaries, the prudent course of action is to include only those instances that can be said with
certainty to meet the desired criteria. Once again taking the Court at its collective word, I expect
both this and the rulemaking variable to positively and significantly impact the likelihood of the
government’s position prevailing before the Court controlling for the effects of the other
122
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independent variables.
The fourth independent variable included is the presence or absence of a high rate of
dissension in the justices’ final vote. This variable will be referred to in the following tables as
High Dissension. I include this variable as a proxy measure of issue salience in a given case.
There is evidence to suggest that the justices’ preferences are likely to be more impactful on
decisions in cases of high rather than low salience (Unah and Hancock 2006). Given this, it
seems appropriate to include a measure of such salience in an attempt to tease out any potential
sources of attitudinal influences in this area. However, the more commonly used measure of
contemporary salience based on the appearance of a case in the New York Times (Epstein and
Segal 2000) seems inappropriate to use in this context. I believe this to be so due to the nature of
the cases being examined. While the outcomes of administrative cases have substantive
importance for the functioning of our nation, I suspect that the subject matter involved in such
cases will rarely be the sort of thing that captures the attention of the public at large or would
offer much incentive to buy a newspaper.
Cases with three or four dissenting votes are coded as 1 while all others are coded as 0 for
this variable. My choice of three dissents to be the demarcation point for the coding of this
variable is based on two factors. First, almost 14 percent123 of the cases in my dataset involve
less than nine justices participating at the decision stage. Using three dissents as the cutoff allows
for these cases to be meaningfully included. Second, even for those cases where all justices are
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participating, a full third of the total number of justices dissenting seems to me to be worthy of
attention, particularly given the large proportion of unanimous cases included in the data.124
In comparing this measure to the Times based measure of salience, there is little
agreement. In total, there are 122 cases with high levels of dissension as defined above while
only 38 of the cases in my dataset made an appearance in the New York Times. Of those 38 cases
making an appearance, only 24 also displayed high levels of dissension. I suspect that the
reasons for this are those I have already provided. However, there is at least a modest link
between this measure and the use of the Times. In the article where they initially proposed the
use of the New York Times as a source for information about salience, Epstein and Segal (2000)
noted that cases with higher rates of dissension in the final vote were more likely to be
considered salient than those cases with fewer or no dissenting votes. Given the links between
high issue salience and the increased impact of attitudes as well as low issue salience and the
potential for greater deference to elected officials and/or precedent (Pacelle, et al. 2011), I expect
the impact of this variable to be both significant and negative controlling for the effects of the
other independent variables included.125
I also think that I should take a moment to discuss a potential issue with this variable. I
acknowledge the possibility of concerns about this variable being too closely connected to my
independent variable. This is reasonable, given that both the level of dissension and the party
winning the case are a part of the larger process of the Court reaching its final decisions.
However, I argue that, while there are important connections between these variables beyond the
scope of what I have hypothesized, that the two are not so closely related as to make including
High Dissension in the analysis counterproductive. Empirically, while the values for these two
124
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variables are correlated to one another to an extent, this correlation is relatively low and within
generally accepted limits of covariance.126 Theoretically, while both are the product of the
Court’s decision making process, they are not inherently bound together. A 9-0 or 5-4 decision
can be in the favor of the petitioner just as easily as it can be in the favor of the respondent. As
discussed in Chapter 3, high dissension seems to be proportionally higher in government losses,
and that is in fact what initially spurred me to consider this variable for inclusion. However, if
there were no reason whatsoever to suspect a connection between High Dissension and whether
or not the government’s position prevails, there would also be no reason to include it. Finally,
high levels of dissension are used here not because I think that the existence of such dissension is
itself meaningful.127 Instead, I include it as an indicator of a theoretically important but difficult
to measure factor.
The next two variables included in the model are relatively straightforward and deal with
the issues addressed in each case. I include separate variables for cases involving Constitutional
questions and civil liberties questions. These variables will be referred to in the following tables
as Constitutional Question and Civil Liberties Question, respectively. Each case is coded 1 for
each variable if the corresponding subject matter is addressed, 0 if it is not.128 The coding for
these variables is not inherently connected or interdependent, so a given case could potentially be

126

The correlation between whether or not the agency position prevailed and High Dissension is -.1975.
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coded 0 or 1 for both of these variables.129 Both are included due to the general acceptance in the
modern literature on the Court of their role in the justice’s decision making process. As
previously discussed, the preferences of the justices are generally more impactful in high
salience cases (Unah and Hancock 2006). Often, though not always, cases involving
Constitutional questions and questions involving civil rights and liberties are such cases. I
suspect that the Court will generally be unlikely to tolerate bureaucratic intrusions into the realm
of civil liberties or to uphold agency action that has been challenged on Constitutional grounds.
Therefore, I expect both of these variables to be significantly and negatively related to
government victory controlling for the effects of the other independent variables.
The seventh variable included is whether or not there is an apparent ideological
incongruity between the position taken by the Solicitor General and the expected preferences of
the president in a given case. This variable will be referred to in the following tables as
SG/President Incongruity. This is included based on a relationship found by Bailey et al. (2005)
between the justices, the SG, and the president. They find that the SG can be more influential
when arguing for a position that is in opposition to the one that would be predicted on the basis
of the president’s ideology. In other words, “A justice is more likely to support a conservative S.
G. when the S. G. advocates a liberal rather than a conservative outcome” (Bailey, et al. 2005,
p.81).
This effect can be viewed in three different but connected ways. First, it can be seen as a
form of attitudinal influence. The SG is, despite presenting a different sort of ideological
argument than he or she normally might, suggesting an outcome that is perhaps more in line with
the sincere policy preferences of some of the justices. Those justices may be more likely to
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support an outcome that is closer to their preferred one than a given SG might typically make.
The second view is that acting in such an ideologically unusual manner might be a sign of the
quality of the legal argument being made. The basic logic of this second interpretation is the
same that many of us use when evaluating the claims of others: the argument a person makes for
their preferred outcome, or an outcome that is personally beneficial, may need to be heavily
scrutinized; the argument someone makes against their preferred outcome, or for an outcome that
does not directly benefit them, may appear more trustworthy. The third possibility is that, when
behaving in this manner, the Court views the SG as the lawyer for the people rather than for the
president. It is not necessary to reject one view entirely and to accept only the other. Instead, the
three possibilities can be seen as complementary, each indicating one way that the particulars of
a case might influence the justices. Such a view is compatible with the large body of scholarship
that rejects purely attitudinal or legal explanations for judicial behavior.
In order to examine Bailey, Spriggs, and Maltzman’s (2005) findings in this specific
context,130 I have constructed a simple measure of ideological incongruity between the Solicitor
General and president. I begin, as Bailey et al. do, with the assumption that the SG and president
are, at least in their official functions, closely linked in terms of ideology. I also assume131 that
Republican presidents are generally ideologically conservative while Democratic presidents are
generally ideologically liberal. Following from these assumptions, I will say that an SG for a
Republican president arguing for a liberal position represents an instance of ideological
incongruity. The SG for a Democratic president arguing for a conservative position would also
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indicate such incongruity. To determine if such an incongruity exists, I simply compare the party
of the president during the term during which a case was heard132 to the ideological direction of
the argument the SG presents.133 If an incongruity as described above is found, I code the case as
a 1. Otherwise, it is coded as a 0. I expect the impact of this variable to be both positive and
significant controlling for the effects of the other independent variables.134
The eighth variable is ideological congruence between the position taken by the Solicitor
General and the preferences of the median justice, further building on Bailey, Kamoie, and
Maltzman’s (2005) findings. This variable will be referred to in the following tables as SG/Court
Congruity. In the same paper as previously discussed, Bailey et al. (2005) also find evidence to
support the idea that the Solicitor General can have increased effectiveness when arguing for an
outcome that is ideologically appealing to the justices. This is in keeping with the broader
literature’s acceptance of the impact of the preferences of the justices on case outcomes, and I
include this variable as a means of examining the impact of these attitudes on the outcomes of
administrative cases. Similar to the previous variable, I have coded this one based on a
comparison of ideological direction of the position taken by the SG135 with ideological
preferences of the median justice as measured by common space score. I code a case as 1 if the
position argued by the Solicitor General is liberal and the common space score takes on a
negative value or if the position argued by the Solicitor General is conservative and the common
space score takes on a positive value. Otherwise, a case is coded as 0. Given the general power
of judicial attitudes in explaining the outcomes of cases before the Court, I expect the impact of
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this variable to be both positive and significant controlling for the effects of the other
independent variables included.136 It is, however, important to note that this is not a direct
measure of judicial attitudes. Using whether or not the government’s position prevailed as my
dependent severely complicates any attempt to approach the impact of the justices’ preferences
in a straightforward manner. I do include the variable as an indirect way of trying to measure any
such potential impact.
The ninth variable included is ideological congruity between the direction of the position
taken by the Solicitor General and the direction of the relevant precedent in the case. This
variable will be referred to in the following tables as SG/Precedent Congruity. I again use
Pacelle’s coding for the direction of the position taken by the SG and the precedent direction data
from Pacelle, Curry, and Marshall (2011) used in Chapter 4 to construct this variable. If both the
SG’s position and the direction of relevant precedent are coded as conservative or liberal, I code
the case as a 1. If one of these factors is coded as liberal and the other conservative, I code the
case as a 0. Given my argument that legal stability is highly important for decisions rendered in
this area of the law and the evidence from the previous chapter to this effect, I expect the impact
of this variable to be both significant and positive when controlling for the other included
variables.
The final variable I include in the model is whether or not the case was decided during
the Chevron (1984) era. This variable will be referred to in the following tables as Chevron Era.
The evolution of the Court’s approach to granting deference to agencies can be traced through
three distinct eras.137 The first of these, embodied in the logic of the Skidmore (1944) decision,
assumed no particular deference on the Court’s part to agency decisions, but neither did it
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Table 5.1 Independent Variable Frequencies

Government as Petitioner
Rulemaking Occurred
Formal Adjudication
High Dissension
Constitutional Question
Civil Liberty Question
SG/President Incongruity
SG/Court Congruity
SG/Precedent Congruity
Chevron Era

Coded 0
122 (38%)
186 (58%)
239 (75%)
196 (62%)
275 (86%)
225 (71%)
171 (54%)
157 (49%)
142 (45%)
146 (46%)

Coded 1
196 (62%)
132 (42%)
79 (25%)
122 (38%)
43 (14%)
93 (29%)
147 (46%)
161 (51%)
176 (55%)
172 (54%)

Total
318
318
318
318
318
318
318
318
318
318

embody any particular level of mistrust in agency exercise of discretion. With the Chevron
decision, the Court drastically changed its stance on deference, presuming that a reasonable
agency interpretation of statutory provisions was valid in the event that the intent of the statute
was unclear. Finally, Mead (2001) struck a balance between the two, applying Chevron
deference if an agency had engaged in a relevant exercise of notice-and-comment rulemaking or
formal adjudication while turning to the less deferential Skidmore standard in the event that such
activity did not precede agency action. For this variable, cases have been coded as 1 if they
occurred during the period including the 1983 term138 through the 1999 term139 of the Court. If
the case occurred during any other term, it is coded as 0. I include this variable to determine
whether or not a case occurring during this period gave the government a higher chance of
success. Given Chevron’s characterization as the most deferential of these three standards, I
expect the impact of this variable to be both positive and significant controlling for the effects of
the other independent variables included. The raw count of values for this and the other
independent variables can be found in Table 5.1.
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When Chevron was decided.
Mead was decided in the 2000 term.
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Results and Analysis
Table 5.2 reports the results of the model. I will begin, once again, with the hypotheses
that have not been rejected. As expected, the occurrence of rulemaking is significantly and
positively associated with the government’s position prevailing before the Court. This finding is
both legally important and, in my view, normatively encouraging. Legally, agencies can have a
fair measure of confidence that their actions will be upheld so long as they engage in the noticeand-comment process and operate within the boundaries established through it.140 This provides
the potential for the sort of legal stability necessary for agencies to effectively pursue their
appointed tasks.
This finding might allay some of the fears of scholars concerned with the potential for
agencies that are largely insulated from public control to act in a manner divorced from public
preferences. This judicial incentivization of engaging in the notice-and-comment process also
provides an important opportunity for interested actors in the elected branches and the public
sphere to become involved in the regulatory process. As discussed in Chapter Two, the president
and Congress have their own tools for managing and influencing agencies. Interest groups and
concerned citizens have the potential to influence public attention and opinion to encourage
elected officials to put those tools to use should they be disinclined to do so otherwise. However,
all of these actors need both time and the information that action may be called for in order to act
in an effective manner. The notice-and-comment process provides both of these, as agencies
must both publicly announce their proposed rule and delay final action for a defined period after
doing so. By finalizing a rule, the agency legally binds itself to taking specific kinds of action in
140

This should not be understood to mean that agencies can effectively give themselves the authority to do anything
and everything their leadership might like through such rulemaking activity, as the Court does not uphold every such
rule or action taken under them. There were 185 total cases where no rulemaking occurred.67 of those resulted in a
government loss, while 118 were wins for the government. There were 133 cases where rulemaking occurred.24 of
those were losses for the government while 109 were government wins.
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Table 5.2 Likelihood of Government Position to Prevail141

Government as Petitioner
Rulemaking Occurred
Formal Adjudication
High Dissension
Constitutional Question
Civil Liberty Question
SG/President Incongruity
SG/Court Congruity
SG/Precedent Congruity
Chevron Era
Constant
Chi-Squared
Log Likelihood
N
*p<.05, **p<.01

Model
.44
(.28)
.95**
(.31)
.15
(.33)
-1.04**
(.28)
1.20*
(.54)
.60**
(.34)
.54
(.28)
.08
(.28)
.82**
(.28)
.34
(.28)
-.56
(.40)
.00
-163.41
318
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Discrete Change
.07
.16
.03
-.18
.20
.15
.09
.01
.14
.06

The Pearson χ2 value for the overall model is 214.05, with a probability of .2208, indicating that the model fits the
data well. As a secondary check, evaluation of the model via Receiver Operator Characteristic curve returns a p
value of .7592, indicating that the model predicts observed outcomes reasonably well. Collinearity does not appear
to be an issue, with the VIF values for the independent variables ranging from 1.04 for Chevron Era to 1.18 for Civil
Liberty Question. A correlation matrix of the independent variables indicates that the most extreme values are .2916
for Constitutional Question and Civil Liberty Question and -.2776 for Rulemaking Occurred and Formal
Adjudication Occurred. Using a predicted probability equal to or greater than 0.5 of the case being decided in the
government’s favor as the cutoff point, the model correctly predicts 75.47% of included observations.

136

specific ways. Courts may or may not always agree with an agency’s interpretation of their own
regulation, but there is evidence here to suggest that the Supreme Court, at least, will defer to the
agency if rulemaking has occurred more often than not. By acting in a more deferential manner
in instances where agencies have engaged in rulemaking, the Court effectively gives agencies
that have the authority to regulate a choice: either submit to greater public and political scrutiny
before taking action or submit to greater judicial scrutiny afterwards.
Next, high dissension amongst the justices appears to exert a significant and negative
influence on the likelihood of the government’s position to prevail. If my assertion that a high
level of dissension does in fact mean that a case is more salient to the justices and that greater
salience, in turn, is likely to make the justices less likely to defer to the preferences of other
actors in government, then it should not be surprising to see such effect and significance. The
real importance of this outcome, I think, could be in providing a starting point to begin to look
for the influence of attitudes in this area of the law. The results of the previous chapter, as well as
some of the results from this one, do give some support to the idea that attitudes are not as
influential in administrative cases as they appear to be in other areas. However, this finding
might indicate that such influence is present, albeit in a specific subset of administrative cases.
However, it is possible that high dissension could exert significant influence for reasons
other than salience and the resulting activation of attitudinal factors. Table 5.3 was constructed to
explore this possibility. The model detailed in the table is identical to the one presented in Table
5.2 except that the variable for high dissension has been removed and the cases have been split
into two categories: those cases that exhibit a high degree of dissension142 and those that do not.
143
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If the impact of attitudinal factors is driving the significance of high dissension, it should be

Those cases coded as a 1 for the high dissension variable as discussed above.
Those cases coded as a 0 for the high dissension variable as discussed above.
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expected that some indication of this would appear in the results presented. The most likely place
to look for such an indication would be in the impact of ideological congruity between the
Solicitor General’s position and the policy preferences of the median justice, indicating that the
argument presented and presumably the action taken is directionally compatible with a majority
of the Court. This variable should rise to significance, or at the least come closer to doing so, if
attitudes are the driving factor of the observed relationship between high dissension and the
government’s likelihood of success.
As Table 5.3 shows, ideological congruence between the SG and the median justice does
not achieve significance in either the high or low dissension cases. In fact, while the congruity
measure is not even remotely close to reaching the .05 threshold in either set of cases, it is
marginally closer to doing so in those cases without high dissension than those with it.144 This
seems to pose some problems for the idea that dissension is driven purely or primarily by the
influence of attitudes. I will return to this point in a moment, but first I would like to discuss the
rest of what is displayed in Table 5.3. The presence of rulemaking activity achieves significance
in both sets of cases, consistent with both the hypothesized importance of the variable and its
observed impact in Table 5.2. Cases that present a civil liberties question are significantly more
likely to result in wins for the government in cases with high dissension,145 similar to the original
model, but this does not appear to hold true for low dissension cases. Unlike the complete set of
cases, the presence of a constitutional question does not appear to have significant impact on the
outcome of the case for the government when the cases are subdivided in this manner. Finally, an
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While not completely comparable, the difference between the coefficient and standard error for the SG/Court
Congruity variable is also smaller in table 5.2 than in the high dissension cases in Table 5.3. As previously
discussed, the variable fails to achieve significance in either version of the model.
145
It seems important to note the impact of the subset of criminal procedure cases within the larger set of civil
liberties cases observed in the previous chapter. I suspect this might be relevant here, but I will discuss this at greater
length when I address the impact of civil liberties cases in the context of the original model.
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Table 5.3 Likelihood of Government Position to Prevail in the Presence and Absence of
High Dissension
High Dissension
Model
Change in
Probability
.85
.16
Government as
(.47)
Petitioner
.21
Rulemaking Occurred 1.16*
(.50)
-.12
-.02
Formal Adjudication
(.50)
1.36
.25
Constitutional
(.77)
Question
.23
Civil Liberty Question 1.24*
(.47)
.81
.15
SG/President
(.43)
Incongruity
.10
.02
SG/Court Congruity
(.44)
.78
.14
SG/Precedent
(.44)
Congruity
.41
.08
Chevron Era
(.46)
-2.12*
Constant
(.69)
.00
Chi-Squared
-66.94
Log Likelihood
122
N
*p<.05, **p<.01
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No High Dissension
Model
Change in
Probability
.20
.03
(.38)
.95*
.15
(.41)
.45
.07
(.46)
1.22
.19
(.80)
.45
.07
(.51)
.33
.05
(.38)
.02
.00
(.38)
.91*
.14
(.37)
.36
.06
(.37)
-.38
(.50)
.02
-94.34
196

argument from the SG that is ideologically consistent with relevant precedent displays significant
and positive impact on the government’s likelihood of success in low dissension cases but fails
to do so in cases with high levels of dissension.
What is to be made of this? On the one hand, one might find some support for my
original hypothesis that high dissension is a marker for salience and thus the prominence of
attitudes in these results. After all, legal cues in the form of congruence with precedent seem to
matter most in those cases with low dissension while not having significant impact in those cases
where three or more justices sign a dissenting opinion. The presence of a civil liberties question,
generally seen as an area of the law where attitudes are at their most influential, has a significant
and positive effect on the government’s chances of victory. Such decisions are generally coded
as conservative in nature, and the Court is generally considered to be ideologically conservative
during the time under examination.
On the other hand, the primacy of attitudes146 in explaining the relationship between high
dissension and government victory is not entirely clear. First, and most importantly, the variable
that stands most closely as a measure of the impact of attitudes fails to achieve significance in
either set of cases. Second, as discussed in the previous chapter, the inclusion of criminal
procedure cases under the larger umbrella of civil liberties cases appears to have the potential to
perhaps be a confounding factor in the analysis of that subset of cases. Finally, the presence of
rulemaking activity, representing a legal cue for deferential treatment of agency action, does
reach significance in both sets of cases on display.
In light of these competing interpretations, I think an alternative explanation of the
impact of high dissension might bear some consideration. I think it is possible that high levels of
dissension amongst the justices might be a marker of a certain, high degree of legal ambiguity
146

To the extent that they can be measured by proxy, as I have attempted to do here.
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present in a case. If the Court makes a unanimous decision upholding a government action, it
seems reasonable to assume that the relevant laws can pretty clearly be read as permitting the
action in question. A unanimous decision against the government would seem to imply the
opposite, either because some aspect of the law did not enable an agency to take a given action
or because some aspect of the law prohibited the action from being taken, or at least taken in the
manner or under the circumstances in question. For those decisions that fall somewhere in
between, it seems fair to say that different, competing interpretations of the law exist in the
minds of the justices.
If it is accepted that the justices are legal experts and act in some capacity as such when they
make their rulings,147 then it is also relatively simple to accept that these different interpretations
have some level of legal validity. While some level of expert disagreement can almost always be
expected on a given topic, as the number of experts that take a specific interpretation increases,
more credence might reasonably be given to that interpretation. If large portions of a panel of
legal experts see different, competing interpretations of a given set of laws as valid, it seems
reasonable to expect that an agency trying to implement this set of laws faithfully would have
difficulty finding the correct interpretation of those laws. This could explain both the
significance and the direction of high dissension in the original model. This is merely speculation
at this point, as I have no way of directly testing this particular hypothesis at this time. I am also
not prepared to entirely abandon the possible explanation of salience for the impact of high
dissension on the government’s chances of success before the Court. However, as already
discussed, I do not think that the results in Table 5.3 wholly support my original hypothesis for
147

This is not entirely uncontroversial, as strict attitudinalists might hold that the law, at most, provides a source of
potential justification for decisions that each justice would prefer to make given the policy implications of a given
case. As a counterpoint to such views, I offer up the large number of unanimous decisions in this area and that the
Court reaches more broadly, as well as the evidence presented in the previous chapter to support the idea that the
law does exert influence on this body of cases.
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the nature of this relationship.
The final hypothesis that finds support in the data is the impact of ideological congruity
between the position taken by the Solicitor General and the relevant precedent in a case. The
impact of the variable is both positive and significant, indicating that the government’s position
is more likely to prevail when the government’s lawyer presents an argument that is consistent
with the most applicable case law. Given the findings of Chapter 4 and my general hypotheses
about the nature of administrative law jurisprudence, this is not a particularly surprising
outcome. It is, however, an important finding. Asking a different sort of question than that asked
in the previous chapter and controlling for a different set of factors, strong evidence to support
the power of precedent in explaining outcomes in this area of the law is once again found.
Moving on to those hypotheses about the full set of cases that failed to find support, I am
once again fortunate that these results are also quite interesting. First, despite the sign being in
the correct direction, the government acting as petitioner does not exert a significant influence
over the outcome of the case when controlling for the other included variables in this set of
cases. This should not be understood to mean that petitioner status for the government makes no
difference, since as just discussed the role of the SG in choosing which cases to petition the
Court to take is an important and impactful role in the larger process. However, it appears that,
controlling for a variety of other factors, petitioner status does not have a significant effect in
determining the outcome of a particular administrative case. It is important to understand this in
its proper context, though. Examining the full set of cases heard by the Court during the period
examined, the petitioner wins almost 63 percent of the time with the respondent prevailing only
37 percent of the time.148 By comparison, the federal government, typically represented by the
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Using the Supreme Court Database’s partyWinning variable, the petitioner won in 2341 of the 3744 cases heard
during the 1977-2007 terms of the Court.

142

Solicitor General,149 wins almost 65 percent of the time when acting as the respondent and
around 74 percent150 of the time as the petitioner. In this light, the lack of significance for this
variable could be viewed as the result of the inherent benefits of being the federal government or
being represented by the Solicitor General as outweighing whatever benefit to acting as
petitioner that might exist.151
Next, though the sign is again in the proper direction, the presence of formal adjudication
does not appear to have a significant impact on whether or not the government’s position
prevails before the Court. Table 5.4 shows the total number of cases that both did and did not
involve formal adjudication as well as how many of those cases the government won or lost.
Cases where formal adjudication occurred were still almost twice as likely to be won by the
government as lost, so, as the positive value for the variable’s coefficient indicates, it does not
appear to be an actively detrimental factor for the government. However, this win rate still falls
behind the nearly three-to-one victory ratio the government enjoys in cases not involving formal
adjudication.
So why the disparity in impact between formal adjudication and rulemaking when the
Court has identified both as receiving high levels of deference? Several potential explanations
seem plausible. The first that I should mention is the possibility that the manner in which I have
coded the variable for the presence of formal adjudication is overly restrictive. While I am
confident that those cases I have coded as 1 for formal adjudication do, in fact, involve such
adjudication, it is possible that my coding criteria have excluded other, less readily apparent
149

The Solicitor General participated directly in the litigation of 314 of the 318 cases included in my data. In the
remaining 4 cases, the office submitted an amicus brief at the decision stage. The cases where the SG was not a
litigant were: Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission (463 U.S.646), Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System v. Dimension Financial Corp. (474 U.S.361), Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. LTV
Corporation (496 U.S.633), and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission (497 U.S.547).
150
Making the OSG arguably the most successful law firm to argue before the Court.
151
And, perhaps, of any such potential remaining benefits being overshadowed by other factors such as the impact
of the law.
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Table 5.4 Government Wins and Losses and Formal Adjudication

Government Won
Yes
No
Total

Formal Adjudication Occurred
Yes
No
53 (24%)
171 (76%)
26 (28%)
68 (72%)
79 (25%)
239 (75%)

Total
224
94
318

cases. I contend that my criteria are a reasonable means to operationalize the study of a
somewhat nebulous concept, but reasonable may not mean adequate in this instance. Still, every
study has its limitations, and I leave this question to be addressed by future research.
Another possibility does seem worth exploring, though. Given the already discussed
importance of issue salience, it should be remembered that many of the cases involving formal
adjudication deal with issues such as immigration or labor disputes.152 If the kinds of cases that
involve formal adjudication are different from those that involve rulemaking, confounding
factors may overshadow the impact of any deference that might otherwise be granted to cases
involving formal adjudication. If one set of cases presents more salient issues than the other, it
might be expected that these factors would be primarily attitudinal in nature. As I have
previously argued that high levels of dissension are an indicator of case salience, it seems
appropriate to use the concept to explore this possibility.
Table 5.5 presents the number of cases an agency won and lost in the presence or absence
of high levels of dissension in the justices’ final vote. This information is further broken down
into two categories: those cases where formal adjudication occurred and those where rulemaking
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Of the 79 cases involving formal adjudication, the three most common issue areas are Unions (26 cases), Civil
Rights (18 cases), and Economic Activity (15 cases). Of the 133 cases involving rulemaking, the three most
common issue areas are Economic Activity (34 cases), Taxation (34 cases) and Civil Rights (20 cases).
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occurred.153 A few patterns emerge from this information. First, while cases with high dissension
did not make up a majority of either set, cases involving formal adjudication make up a higher
proportion (42 percent) of high dissension than rulemaking cases (35 percent). Second, the
likelihood of success for the government does seem to be higher in cases with low rather than
high dissension as previous analysis and discussion would indicate. This effect seems to hold for
both rulemaking and adjudicatory cases, though the extent of this effect does appear to differ
between the two categories of cases. The government wins just over 75 percent of the formal
adjudication cases in the absence of high dissension, but 50 percent when high dissension occurs.
For the rulemaking cases, the government wins slightly more than 87 percent of the cases where
there is not high dissension and almost 72 percent of the cases where it does occur. Salience as
measured by high dissension seems to matter, but to different extents in the two kinds of cases.
There are two other places where the impact of salience specifically or attitudinal factors
more broadly might be found to exert differential influence on these two categories of cases. The
first is the presence of a civil liberties question. Perhaps disappointingly, there seems to be little
difference in the relative proportion of civil liberties cases in each category. 33 percent of the
rulemaking cases154 involve a civil liberties issue while 35 percent of formal adjudication
cases155 do. While there is a difference here, it is not a significant one. The second place to look
is the ideological slant of the arguments being presented. I will discuss the impact, or lack
thereof, of this variable in greater detail in a moment, but the SG/Court Congruity measure
serves as an indicator of ideological agreement between the position being argued by the
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These categories are not mutually exclusive. While there is not a great deal of overlap between the variables,
there are 12 cases that involved both formal adjudication and rulemaking. Of these 12, 5 also exhibit high
dissension.
154
44 of 133 total.
155
25 of 71 total.
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Table 5.5 Agency Success, Formal Adjudication, Rulemaking, and High Dissension

High Dissension
Yes
No
Totals

Formal Adjudication Occurred
Agency Won
Agency Lost
19 (24%)
16 (20%)
34 (26%)
10 (8%)
53 (25%)
26 (12%)

Rulemaking Occurred
Agency Won
Agency Lost
33 (41%)
12 (15%)
75 (57%)
12 (9%)
108 (51%)
24 (11%)

Totals
80
131
211

government and the preferences of the median justice. Also disappointingly, this avenue appears
to offer little to explain the difference between the sets of cases. 46 percent of the rulemaking
cases156 display congruity between the SG and the median justice, while almost 55 percent of the
adjudicatory cases157 do. While this difference is of greater magnitude than that of the civil
liberties cases, I would expect the government to fare better in the cases involving formal
adjudication if ideological congruence were the important factor.
Salience appears to exert differential influence on the two sets of cases, but does not seem
to account for all of the differences observed between them. Attempts to look at the impact of
attitudes by proxy also do not shed much light on the nature of the relationship.158 So what does
this leave us with? One possibility is that there are other confounding factors at play that fall
outside of the scope of this study. The issue areas involved might matter in a way difficult to
measure here, or the particulars of specific cases might be relevant in a manner difficult to assess
through aggregate data analysis. These are ever-present challenges that can certainly not be ruled
out here. Another is that the Court, while considering itself deferential in the face of formal
adjudication, may simply be less willing to defer to such action than to rulemaking. Third, and
not entirely separate from the second explanation, is the possibility that the highest panel of

156

62 of 133 total.
39 of 71 total.
158
More traditional approaches to assessing the impact of attitudes are made difficult to employ due largely to the
dependent variable used in the model.
157
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judges in the nation might apply more scrutiny to the quasi-judicial activity of formal
adjudication than to the quasi-legislative activity of rulemaking. Fourth and finally, there is the
chance that the Court’s discussion in Mead of its criteria for deference amounts to hollow words,
though the significant impact of rulemaking makes this seem somewhat unlikely. For my part, I
am inclined to think that some mixture of possibilities two and three is the driving force of this
finding, but that is merely a hunch.
Next, there is the impact of the presence of Constitutional questions in a case. While I
was correct about the significance of this variable’s impact, I was wrong about the direction of
that impact. It appears that a Constitutional component in an administrative case actually makes
a government victory significantly more likely. I believe the problem with my hypothesis here is
a misframing of Constitutional issues inside of this particular context. While the justices can
generally be viewed as relatively unconstrained and more able to act on their policy preferences
in some Constitutional cases, this relationship is more prevalent in cases involving rights and
liberties. However, these cases, while addressing a number of issue areas, are different in nature
from what might generally be thought of when considering Constitutional cases. Questions of
Congress’s authority to make a given statute have been categorically excluded from the data
being examined. Instead, the fundamental question these cases pose is whether or not an agency
is faithfully and legally executing the responsibilities rightfully delegated to it by the elected
branches. While it might be expected that agency actions or rules might violate the Constitution
in some instances, if the statute that agency is acting under is itself Constitutional then it should
be relatively rare that an action taken within the bounds of that statute would itself be prohibited
by the Constitution. Thus, Constitutional questions have a significant, positive impact on the
likelihood of the government’s position to prevail for the cases used in this analysis
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The next hypothesis that failed to find support was the impact of civil liberties questions.
While the variable is indeed significant, the sign is in the opposite from expected direction. My
first suspicion is that what is observed here is an indicator of attitudinal influence in the justices’
decisions. A pro-government stance in civil rights and liberties is coded as a conservative
decision. As the Court can generally be viewed as conservative during the period being
examined, I should probably have expected the presence of civil liberties questions to increase
rather than decrease the likelihood of a government victory. While the area of civil rights and
liberties has been the Court’s domain since Brown v. Board (Pacelle, et al. 2011) if not earlier,
that does not mean the Rehnquist or Roberts Courts have taken the same approach to the area as
the Warren Court. As with the impact of Constitutional questions, the patterns of behavior that
would normally be expected from the Court will, I think, be altered here because of the nature of
the cases being examined
There is one other factor to consider, though. In Chapter 4, the impact of the inclusion of
criminal procedure cases on the larger set of administrative civil liberties cases was apparent.
Might a similar impact be felt here? Table 5.6 has been constructed to explore this possibility. It
mirrors the model from Table 5.2, but the cases identified by the Supreme Court Database
(Spaeth 2016) as criminal procedure cases have been dropped.
The results are much the same as in Table 5.2. Rulemaking, constitutional questions, and
congruity between the Solicitor General’s position and precedent all have significant and positive
impact on the odds of government success. High dissension still has a significant and negative
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Table 5.6 Likelihood of Government Position to Prevail, Criminal Procedure Omitted159

Government as Petitioner
Rulemaking Occurred
Formal Adjudication
High Dissension
Constitutional Question
Civil Liberty Question
SG/President Incongruity
SG/Court Congruity
SG/Precedent Congruity
Chevron Era
Constant
Chi-Squared
Log Likelihood
N
*p<.05, **p<.01

Model
.46
(.29)
1.01**
(.32)
.23
(.34)
-1.08**
(.29)
1.54**
(.60)
.59
(.36)
.62*
(.29)
.10
(.29)
.85**
(.28)
.30
(.29)
-.65
(.41)
.00
-156.49
302

159

Change in Probability
.08
.17
.04
-.19
.27
.10
.11
.02
.15
.06

The Pearson χ2 value for the overall model is 200.25, with a probability of .2251, indicating that the model fits the
data well. As a secondary check, evaluation of the model via Receiver Operator Characteristic curve returns a p
value of .7646, indicating that the model predicts observed outcomes reasonably well. Collinearity does not appear
to be an issue, with the VIF values for the independent variables ranging from 1.03 for Chevron Era to 1.18 for Civil
Liberty Question. A correlation matrix of the independent variables indicates that the most extreme values are .2916
Constitutional Question and Civil Liberty Question and -.2776 for Rulemaking Occurred and Formal Adjudication
Occurred. Using a predicted probability equal to or greater than 0.5 of the case being decided in the government’s
favor as the cutoff point, the model correctly predicts 74.83% of included observations.
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influence over those same odds. Two noticeable differences do exist, though. Incongruity
between the Solicitor General’s position and the expected position of the president given partisan
affiliation rises to significance while remaining positive as before.160 At the same time, civil
liberties questions remain positive but fall from significance. Once again, it appears that the
criminal procedure cases, decided in an overwhelmingly conservative manner, alter the nature of
the larger group of civil liberties cases in a significant manner.
Why, exactly, is this happening? Are these cases decided in a hyper-partisan manner, or
is some other factor or set of factors at play? A closer examination of these 16 cases161 seems to
be in order to answer these questions. As discussed in Chapter 3, 3 of these cases were decided
unanimously, 1 had a single dissent, 2 had 2 dissenting votes, 5 saw 3 justices disagree with the
majority, and 5 had 4 dissents. The justice centered data from the Supreme Court Database
(Spaeth 2016) indicates that, of the 12 cases with 2 or more dissenting votes, 6 cases exhibit
what might be described as a clear ideological split in voting using the relevant justices’ MartinQuinn scores. In these cases,162 the most conservative justices band together to form a majority,
sometimes along with one or some of the more moderate justices, in opposition to the liberal
ideological wing of the Court. I say mostly because in both INS v. Lopez-Mendoza (1984) and
Dow Chemical v. United States (1986), the median justice sided with the minority but the next
most conservative justice sided with the majority. However, in the other 6 cases with 2 or more
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This is important for a couple of reasons, but I will address these in a moment.
These are: Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc. (436 U.S.307).; United States v. LaSalle National Bank (437 U.S.298);
United States v. Euge (444 U.S.707); Dickerson v. New Banner Institute (460 U.S.103); Donovan v. Lone Steer
(464 U.S.408); INS v. Delgado (466 U.S.210); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza (468 U.S.1032) ; United States v. Von
Neumann (474 U.S.242); Dow Chemical v. United States(476 U.S.227); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’
Association (489 U.S.602); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab (489 U.S.656); Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Joseph Patrick Doherty (502 U.S.314); Neal v. United States (516 U.S.284); United States
v. Labonte, Hunnewell, and Dyer (520 U.S.751); Lopez v. Davis (531 U.S.230); and Rita v. United States (551
U.S.338).
162
U.S. v. Euge, INS v. both Delgado and Lopez-Mendoza, Dow v. U.S., Skinner v. Railway Executives, and U.S. v.
Labonte.
161
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dissents, more unusual ideological coalitions form on both sides of the question. The Court’s
most conservative member joined with the median justice and a center-left justice163 in dissent in
Marshall v. Barlow’s (1978). Three conservative justices and one of the more moderate
liberals164 oppose the majority in U. S. v. LaSalle National Bank (1978). In Dickerson v. New
Banner Institute (1983), Justice Marshall, the most liberal member of that Court, joins with the
Court’s ideological center to form a majority opposed to a 4-member minority made up of the
next 2 most liberal members and the 2 most conservative members.165 National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab (1988) sees Justices Marshall and Scalia both in dissent. Justices
Stevens, Scalia, and Souter166 provided the dissent in INS v. Doherty (1992). Lopez v. Davis
(2001) has the Court’s median justice in the form of Kennedy and the center-right Chief Justice
Rehnquist dissenting alongside the most liberal member of that Court, Justice Stevens.
All of this to say that the almost entirely conservative outcomes of criminal procedure
cases observed in this set do not appear to be solely the result of strict ideological voting. While
that is certainly a component of these outcomes, there are just as many cases where the expected
ideological coalitions do not form. The exact reasons for this are not immediately clear.167 There
is some evidence, though, that there is more at work in these 16 cases than purely ideological
action.168
Ideological incongruity between the Solicitor General and the president is the next
hypothesis that fails to find support in the original model, though the discussion of this variable’s
impact is changed somewhat by the preceding discussion. In the results presented in Table 5.2,
163

Justices Rehnquist, Blackmun, and Stevens, respectively.
Justices Rehnquist, Burger, Stewart, and Stevens.
165
Justices Brenna and Stevens from the liberal wing, Justices O’Connor and Rehnquist from the conservative wing.
166
The second most conservative justice, justice just left of median, and the most liberal justice of that Court,
respectively.
167
Though I suspect that the position of the SG and legal factors are likely to explain at least part of this.
168
It is important to be careful about drawing too broad a conclusion from voting patterns from a dozen cases,
though.
164
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the influence of incongruity is positive but not significant.169 However, when removing criminal
procedure cases from the data being examined, the impact of the variable is both positive and
significant, indicating that when the SG is arguing for a position that runs counter to the
expectations of partisan affiliation, the government’s position is more likely to prevail than
would otherwise be the case. Given that the model controls for attitudinal influences in these
decisions by including a measure of ideological congruity between the Court and Solicitor
General, it seems wise to interpret this variable’s influence primarily as a legal cue. When the
Office of the Solicitor General is seen as behaving in an apolitical manner, its arguments carry
more authority. If the variable is viewed in this way, the most reasonable manner to interpret
these results is, I think, that this is a potentially important legal cue, but less important than
conforming to relevant precedent. As such, congruity between the SG and relevant precedent is
significant both with and without criminal procedures included, but overshadows the similar
influence of SG/presidential incongruity in the confounding presence of criminal procedure
cases.
There is an important factor to consider along with this finding, however. This form of
incongruity occurs more commonly with Republican than Democratic presidents. The SG took a
liberal position in almost 54 percent170 of cases when a Republican was in the White House, but
took a conservative position in only 33 percent171 of cases under Democratic administrations. On
the one hand, this is perhaps not surprising since, in most issue areas, the liberal position is the
pro-government position. However, there are two ways in which this might prove to be a
complicating factor to the results in Table 5.6. The first is that the relationship observed between
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It is perhaps worth noting that the variable has been very close to significance in the original model and the
various permutations thereof presented up to this point.
170
108 of 201 cases.
171
39 of 117 cases.
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the incongruity and the government’s chances of victory could instead stand in for the impact of
the direction of the SG’s position. The second possibility is that, since the majority of the cases
were heard by the Court under Republican administrations and the Court was primarily
conservative during this time, the apparent impact of this incongruity is instead generated by the
importance of the president’s party. Further examination of the data seems to indicate that
neither of these is the case, however. Neither the ideological direction of the SG’s position nor
the president’s partisan affiliation is highly correlated with the SG/Presidential Incongruity
variable.172 Also, when examining versions of the model presented in Table 5.2 and 5.6 which
replace the SG/Presidential Incongruity variable with a variable accounting for the ideological
position of the SG’s argument or the party of the president, both substitute variables failed to
reach significance.173
Next is the impact of ideological congruence between the Supreme Court’s median
justice and the Solicitor General. I have argued that legal factors will be of high importance in
determining the outcomes of this set of cases. Other findings in this chapter and the previous one
have lent support to this idea. This apparent legal influence does not eliminate the possibility that
the Solicitor General and hence the government could not, from time to time, benefit from a
measure of ideological congruity with the Court controlling for a variety of other factors.
However, it appears that such potential benefits do not play a major part in the outcomes of this
set of cases. While the sign is in the correct direction, this form of congruence fails to exert
significant influence on the government’s chances of victory when controlling for other
172

The correlation between the SG’s position and SG/Presidential Incongruity is .28. The correlation between the
president’s party and SG/Presidential Incongruity is -.19.
173
SG Position data taken from Pacelle’s data, coded 0 for conservative and 1 for liberal. President’s party coded 0
for Republican, 1 for Democrat. SG Position result, original model: Coefficient .07, Standard Error .32. SG Position
result, no criminal procedure: Coefficient .15, Standard Error .32. President’s party result, original model:
Coefficient -.38, Standard Error .29. President’s party result, no criminal procedure: Coefficient -.41, Standard Error
.30. Other patterns of significance unchanged from original models.
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factors.174 Across the full dataset and controlling for a variety of other factors, the justices do not
seem to be more inclined to agree with a position simply because it matches their own ideology.
This could be because the justices do not have especially strong interest in the policy outcomes
of their decisions in these cases, because the importance of legal stability and predictability is so
important in these cases, or due to a combination of the two.
The impact of a case occurring during the Chevron era is the final hypothesis that fails to
find support.The standard of review set forth in Chevron is often described as more deferential to
agency action than the Skidmore standard that preceded it or the Mead standard that followed
it.175 For my part, I tend to agree with this assessment. Be that as it may, it appears that,
controlling for a number of other factors, an administrative case occurring during the Chevron
era does not exert significant influence on the government’s chances of success before the
Court.176 The reasons for this are not readily apparent from the data on display here, but four
potential reasons for this lack of significant effect do come to mind. First, there is the possibility
that any greater level of deference that existed under Chevron is simply bound up in the other
independent variables. If the account given in Mead is accepted, deference to administrative
action in the Chevron era was most typically done in the presence of rulemaking activity and/or
formal adjudication.
Fortunately, this possibility is relatively simple to test. Table 5.7 has been constructed to
174

As with the SG/President Incongruity variable, substituting the ideological direction of the SG’s position or the
president’s party for the SG/Court incongruity variable does not result in a rise to significance for the new variable
or changes in the old.
175
Again, see Chapter 2 for a more in-depth discussion.
176
Deference in this context is a matter of how much weight the Court gives to the relevant agency’s interpretation
of the statutory language in question. The standard of review set forth in Skidmore makes no particular assumptions
of correctness or fault in an agency’s reasoning, instead dealing with each question of interpretation on a highly
individualistic basis. The decision in Chevron describes a different, two-pronged approach. The Court first looks at
the statute to see whether or not the meaning of the language is clear. If so, that meaning is controlling. If not, the
agency’s interpretation is assumed to be acceptable so long as it is not clearly outside the boundaries that Congress
has established. If the move from Skidmore to Chevron represents an actual change in jurisprudence, I would expect
agencies to find success at a higher rate under Chevron’s reasoning.
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this end. The results recorded here are based on the same data and model reported in Table 5.2
with two exceptions: the variables controlling for the effects of rulemaking activity or formal
adjudication have been removed. If the variable for Chevron’s effects fails to reach significance
simply because the real effect is bound up in these two other variables, then it should rise to
significance in their joint absence. As can be seen, this is not the case. The results are largely
similar to those reported in Table 5.2 not only for the Chevron variable, but also for the rest. It
appears that if Chevron actually was an era of greater deference, inquiry would need to be made
elsewhere to find evidence of that fact.
The second of the possibilities discussed above is that the Court was already behaving in
a more deferential manner to cases where rulemaking activity and/or formal adjudication had
taken place prior to Chevron. In other words, Chevron was a formalization of an informal norm
already practiced by the Court rather than a radical shift in applied jurisprudence. While the data
used here do include several terms before the Chevron decision, the set may not go far enough
back in time to detect the shift in the justices’ thinking on administrative matters. The third
possibility is that whatever effect Chevron might have had is tied up in some combination of the
other variables here. I see no specific theoretically sound explanation for this, but neither can I
rule it out. Unfortunately, the data I have gathered here do not provide a means of testing these
possibilities directly, so for the moment I will have to settle for speculation.
Fourth and finally, there is the possibility that Chevron is merely a change on paper and
does not represent a real change in Court behavior. This is a possibility that the data I have will
allow me to explore to some extent. Table 5.8 presents two versions of the model from Table 5.2
with three modifications. I have removed the Chevron Era variable from both versions and have
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Table 5.7 Likelihood of Government Position to Prevail, Rulemaking and Formal
Adjudication Variables Omitted

Government as Petitioner
High Dissension
Constitutional Question
Civil Liberty Question
SG/President Incongruity
SG/Court Congruity
SG/Precedent Congruity
Chevron Era
Constant
Chi-Squared
Log Likelihood
N
*p<.05, **p<.01

Model
.44
(.27)
-1.05**
(.28)
1.18*
(.53)
.98**
(.34)
.52
(.27)
.04
(.27)
.82**
(.27)
.36
(.27)
-.18
(.27)
.00
-168.58
318
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Change in Probability
.08
-.19
.21
.17
.09
.01
.15
.06

restricted the data for each to those from a single jurisprudential period. I have also omitted the
Constitutional issue variable. This final modification is one of circumstance rather than
preference. When limiting the cases by jurisprudential era, there was no variation for this
variable in the Chevron era as the government won all such cases during that period.177 I was
thus presented with a choice between omitting the twenty-three Constitutional cases from the
analysis or dropping the Constitutional variable. Given the relatively low number of cases
available, I chose to maximize my number of observations and drop the variable.
The left column presents the results of the model for those cases that occurred during the
Skidmore era, while the right column contains the results for the Chevron era. My dataset
contains only forty-five cases from the Mead era, so I have excluded the cases from those
terms.178 The results for both eras are quite similar to one another and largely, though not
entirely, similar to those presented in the original model. The presence of rulemaking and civil
liberties questions both have significant and positive impacts on the likelihood of the
government’s position to prevail in both sets of cases while high dissension has a significant and
negative impact on the likelihood of government success in both. Somewhat interestingly, the
sign for the effects of the government acting as petitioner changes to be negative during the
Chevron era while remaining positive for the Skidmore cases. More interestingly, the
government acting as petitioner does reach significance if only the Skidmore era cases are
examined. Looking more closely at the data, this appears to be attributable to the difference in
the overall level of success enjoyed by the government during the Chevron era. The government

177

The Constitutional issue variable was positive but did not reach significance for the Skidmore era cases when
included.
178
2000-2007
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Table 5.8 Likelihood of Government Position to Prevail by Era, Constitutional Question
Variable Omitted
Skidmore Era
Chevron Era
Model
Change in
Model
Change in
Probability
Probability
1.23*
.18
-.28
-.05
Government as
(.57)
(.41)
Petitioner
.25
.92*
.15
Rulemaking Occurred 1.69*
(.68)
(.42)
.59
.09
.27
.04
Formal Adjudication
(.65)
(.46)
-1.31*
-.20
-.98*
-.16
High Dissension
(.57)
(.40)
.35
1.10*
.18
Civil Liberty Question 2.32**
(.90)
(.49)
.26
.04
.58
.10
SG/President
(.57)
(.46)
Incongruity
-.28
-.04
.48
.05
SG/Court Congruity
(.57)
(.46)
1.63**
.24
.61
.10
SG/Precedent
(.58)
(.39)
Congruity
-1.27
.61
Constant
(.76)
(.39)
.00
.01
Chi-Squared
-45.95
-86.91
Log Likelihood
101
172
N
*p<.05, **p<.01
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position prevailed more frequently during the Chevron years than those years under Skidmore.179
The success rate for the government is nearly identical across the two eras when acting as
petitioner.180 However, the government found more success as the respondent under Chevron
than Skidmore.181
Perhaps most interesting of all the differences on display here, congruence between the
Solicitor General’s position and the direction of precedent significantly influences the
government’s chances of victory during the Skidmore era while failing to reach significance
during the Chevron era. This is particularly surprising given the apparent importance of
precedent throughout almost every previous portion of the analysis in this and the previous
chapter. One possible explanation is that, if Chevron does represent a shift towards a greater
degree of deference shown to agencies, precedent might be expected to matter less than the
agency’s interpretation of relevant law in many cases.182
While the results in Table 5.8 do indicate some important similarities between the
jurisprudence of the Chevron era and the portion of the Skidmore era included in the data, they
also show some important differences. The fact the government also lost no cases involving
Constitutional questions under Chevron but did under Skidmore, while not directly examined
here, also seems to point to some level of substantive difference. So far as the treatment of
rulemaking specifically is concerned, the limited number of Skidmore terms included prevents
me from ruling out the possibility that Chevron is a formalization of a pre-existing norm for the
179

The government won 129 of 172 cases under Chevron, or 75 percent. It won 67 of 101 cases under Skidmore, or
66 percent.
180
The government won 87 of 117 cases as petitioner under Chevron, or 74.36 percent. It won 43 of 58 cases as
petitioner under Skidmore, or 74.14 percent.
181
The government won 42 of 55 cases as respondent under Chevron, or 76 percent. It won 24 of 43 cases as
respondent under Skidmore, or 56 percent.
182
The government found success at a higher rate when the SG’s position did not conform to precedent under
Chevron (55 of 79 cases, 69.6 percent) than Skidmore (21 of 40 cases, 52.5 percent). However, it also found success
at a higher rate when the SG’s position did conform to precedent under Chevron (73 of 93 cases, 79.5 percent) than
Skidmore (46 of 61 cases, 75.4 percent).
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evaluation of administrative cases. Further investigation of this particular point would, I believe,
require case data reaching farther back into the Skidmore period. Still, it appears that the
decisions reached in each era were the result of different mixes of influences, though these
differences were not sufficient to create a statistically significant difference between the Chevron
and other eras when controlling for a number of other factors.
Conclusion
Have I finally managed to address the question towards which the previous four chapters
have been building? While very few answers in the social sciences are definitive, and those
provided here are no exception, I do think that this might at least serve as a good start on the
matter.
Based on the findings here, it appears that whether or not an agency has engaged in
making rules that define the scope and methods of its activities appears to weigh heavily on the
Court’s decision to uphold those activities. The government also appears to be more likely to
prevail when the Solicitor General seems to be acting in a manner that is consistent with relevant
precedent. These are the sorts of outcomes that might be expected in an area of judicial activity
where legal factors play a prominent part.
The Court also seems to be generally unlikely to entertain claims of agency overreach
based on Constitutional grounds. This might be seen as primarily an oddity of the case selection
process employed in collecting the data used here, and I suspect that such arguments would be
more likely to be successfully pursued when challenging the statutes that empower agencies,
though that is a question for another day. However, this finding might also be taken as a form of
strategic consideration on the part of the Court. It might be that the justices primarily view the
elected branches as responsible for drawing the boundaries for agencies to work within and leave
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that task primarily to Congress and the president. In such an arrangement, the Court’s role would
likely be to police those boundaries and to fill in specific gaps as they arose. If defects of
government action rooted in Constitutional limits arise, the Court might view those as best dealt
with by directly addressing the statutes or executive actions that allowed or compelled them.183
This is admittedly a bit of a stretch. That being said, it is a possibility I think merits consideration
in the future.
What about the impact of attitudes? Unfortunately, there is not a straightforward way to
directly use common measures of attitudinal influence due to the dependent variable used in my
model.184 However, I have attempted to assess their impact on the likelihood of the government
to prevail before the Court through indirect means. To the extent that these proxies are in fact
connected to attitudes, it does not appear attitudinal factors are at the forefront of administrative
jurisprudence based on the evidence gathered here. If the justices primarily followed their sincere
preferences in deciding these cases, I would have expected to see that the government was
substantially more successful when the Solicitor General presented arguments that aligned with
those of the median justice. This was not the case. This may be because such congruity adds little
to the general levels of success enjoyed by the SG. However, making arguments that square with
relevant precedent certainly seems to add to the Solicitor General’s already high chances of
victory.
Incongruity between the expected ideological position of the president and the position
taken by the Solicitor General also seems to increase those chances even more, so long as
criminal procedure cases are not being examined.185 This incongruence is more common with
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To the extent that such cases are made available to them, of course.
This is, fortunately, not the case for the analysis performed in Chapter 4.
185
Ideological incongruity between the president and SG was more common under Republican presidents (108 of
201 cases, or 53.73 percent of all cases with a Republican president) than Democratic presidents (39 of 117 cases, or
184

161

Republican than Democratic presidents, though SGs serving Republican presidents still took a
higher proportion of conservative positions than their Democratic counterparts. I think that this
can be explained primarily by two factors. First, as ideological direction is coded, liberal
positions are typically pro-government positions. It should probably not be a surprise that the
lawyers representing the government typically took pro-government stances. The second is that,
as Bailey, Spriggs, and Maltzman (2008) theorized, this deviation from the expected ideological
position can serve as an indicator of a high-quality legal argument.
While attitudes may not be at the core of this area of the law, I do not think that I can
safely pronounce them entirely absent. If high dissension is, as I originally argued, a fit marker
of case salience,186 then the government appears to be significantly more likely to lose in less
salient than in more salient cases. The government being significantly more likely to win in cases
involving civil liberties is the sort of outcome that might be expected from a conservative Court
acting on its preferences. That is, of course, precisely the impact observed in this set of cases. At
the same time, when the criminal procedure cases are removed from the analytical mix, this
impact disappears. Furthermore, when examining those same criminal procedure cases,187 there
does not appear to be a clear and consistent ideological thread running through the voting
patterns in the entirety of the group, though such a thread is not wholly absent either. While these
findings, taken in combination with those previously discussed, certainly lend credence to the
idea that attitudes exert limited impact in administrative cases, it still seems that something more

33.33 percent of all cases with a Democratic president). I suspect that much of this variance is due to progovernment decisions more commonly being considered liberal decisions depending on the issue area and the
general presumption that the SG will take a pro-government position. It is worth noting, though, that simply
substituting the ideological position of the SG for the SG/President Incongruity variable results in the new variable
failing to reach significance even without including criminal procedure cases in the analysis.
186
There is also the alternative explanation that high dissension is, instead, an indicator of a legally difficult case in
this apparently legally-focused realm of law. This idea would require more study than it has received here to accept
or reject, but I do think that it is worth further consideration.
187
In an admittedly cursory manner.
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definitive is required to say that they do not matter at all.
This is far from being the definitive exploration of this area of the law. There are both
questions left unanswered and answers that raise more questions. I do hope, however, that this
can be the start of a larger conversation about this often overlooked but important section of the
Supreme Court’s docket.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Recommendations
The administrative agency is an essential part of modern life. The public expects far more
from government than our elected officials and appointed judiciary could ever hope to provide
on their own. In order to carry out the will of the people, the U.S. government must rely on a
veritable army of bureaucrats to serve as its eyes, ears, hands and feet. In addition to expanding
the president’s capacity to see that the laws of the U.S. are faithfully executed, administrative
personnel are also called on to interpret the law and, to an extent, to create it.
This arrangement is convenient and, in many ways, beneficial. After all, how many of us
really trust our Congressperson to grasp the intricacies of medical research fully? How many of
us trust the president to set safety and inspection standards for nuclear power plants? How many
of us trust the justices of the Supreme Court to hammer out the details of import and export
laws? For these and a host of other tasks that government endeavors to perform, area specialists
with deep wells of highly specific knowledge are virtually required in order to act with
something beginning to resemble competence. By expanding the number of actors that take part
in the process of writing, enacting, and interpreting the law, the amount of these things that can
be done is also expanded. Even were Congress to possess the requisite expertise to legislate
around the most technical aspects of modern life, it is an institution that moves at an often glacial
pace. Despite the capacity to act in a more decisive manner than Congress, the president is, of
course, merely a single person. By adding more workers, more work can be done. By having
these workers be experts in their respective fields, that additional work can hopefully also be
better work.
However advantageous, and probably necessary, this arrangement might be, it is not
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without cost. Popular sovereignty is one of the foundational principles188 of government in the
U.S. Placing a fusion of legislative, executive, and judicial power into the hands of unelected
officials that can be quite difficult to remove due to civil service protections189 runs a genuine
risk of running afoul of that principle. What assurance is there that administrators are acting in
accordance with the will of the people, or at least in their interest?
Fortunately, administrative agencies do not operate in a vacuum. These agencies are
created by Congress, directed by the president, and scrutinized by the judiciary. Congress sets
the tasks and the boundaries for agencies, holds hearings where agency officials are compelled to
testify and present records, and is responsible for appropriating the funds needed for the agencies
to function. The president can hire and fire top-level personnel, review and intervene in the
making of proposed rules, and manage agency direction through executive orders.
The tools at the disposal of each branch to manage the vast array of agencies that the
modern administrative state is composed of are flawed as all tools are quite likely to be when the
task at hand is of sufficient complexity. While the elected branches of the federal government
wield an impressive array of powers with which to manage agencies, it should be remembered
that time is limited, the volume of administrative activity that could potentially be reviewed is
gargantuan, and there is likely to be little in the way of electoral incentive for officials to engage
in significant levels of administrative oversight. Political oversight is possible and does seem to
occur to some extent. This oversight, however, has important limits.
In this way, the oversight of agencies provided by the judiciary has something in
common with that from the elected branches: limitations. Courts have to wait for cases to be
188

Though it is probably fair to say that this is aspirational rather than descriptive. Popular sovereignty is also
clearly not the sole foundational principal of U.S. government as evidenced by the Constitution itself in both word
and practice at the time of ratification.
189
Of course, the civil service system exists largely as a reaction to some of the unattractive costs of more complete
political control over administrators.
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brought to them rather than seeking them out actively. Engaging in litigation is often an
expensive and time-consuming process, potentially limiting the number of individuals or groups
that can or will engage in it. Judges will almost certainly be operating at an information
disadvantage relative to the agencies they are called on to examine. Some administrative cases
have been set beyond the review of Article III courts by Congress.
Despite these limitations, the judiciary also brings some unique advantages to the realm
of administrative oversight. Courts, filled as they are with unelected officials and bound by legal
procedure,190 might be able to respond to concerns that are unlikely to rise to the attention of
elected officials. While elected officials split their time between developing new policy
initiatives, oversight, and campaigning, judges are able to focus on dealing with the cases that are
brought to them. While it might be reasonable to expect elected officials who are chosen and
rechosen in no small part based on their partisan affiliation and ideological position to act
primarily based on those factors, there is some level of expectation that judges will act within the
constraints of existing case law.191
The way that courts evaluate agencies seems likely to be quite different from the way that
legislators or the president evaluate agencies. The distinctiveness of the courts’ role in
administrative oversight means that the manner in which they carry out that oversight is worthy
of scholarly attention. This study represents one small attempt to shed some light on this
important role of the federal judiciary.
This attempt, much like the oversight it seeks to investigate, carries with it a number of
important limitations. My focus here is exclusively on the Supreme Court. This focus is, I think,
justified by the importance of the Court in the larger context of the federal judiciary, the practical

190
191

The parallel with agencies in this set of arrangements is not lost on me.
The extent to which this expectation finds support in practice is an open question.
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limitations of large-scale data collection, and preliminary nature of the study. Still, the Court is
not the entirety of the judicial branch, and that must be remembered when considering the results
arrived at here. The study also focuses on a particular period in time. While this is once again
justifiable for practical reasons, the years examined cover neither the entirety of the era of the
modern administrative state nor the most recent years of it. Furthermore, the era being examined
was, for the Supreme Court, a largely conservative one. Finally, much of the work done here is
relatively novel. To the best of my knowledge, neither the case selection criteria discussed in
Chapter 3 nor the evaluative model presented in Chapter 5 have been employed before by other
researchers. While this novelty brings with it the potential for breaking new ground, it also
carries the cost of much of this study not being directly comparable with related literature.192
Despite these limitations, I would argue that valuable work has been done here. The
analysis in Chapter 5 provides some important insight into when a given agency’s actions might
or might not prevail before the Supreme Court. First and foremost, the results here indicate that
agencies that set down their statutory interpretations and operational procedures in rules
promulgated through the notice-and-comment process have a significantly higher chance of
success than those that do not, controlling for other factors. For agencies that are empowered to
make rules in this way, engaging in the notice-and-comment process should probably be viewed
as a way of protecting themselves from adverse outcomes stemming from potential review by the
Court.193
Of course, the notice-and-comment process is not without danger if it is assumed that the
agency’s goal194 is to enact some sort of most preferred policy within the scope of the authority
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The use of Pacelle, Curry, and Marshall’s (2011) integrated model of Supreme Court decision making in Chapter
4 is, among other things, an attempt to address this issue to an extent.
193
Assuming, that is, that the patterns observed in the data hold true at present.
194
Or perhaps the goal of those in leadership positions with a given agency.
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given to them. Going through this process provides other actors with both the time and
information needed to attempt to mount a response to proposed rules that they are opposed to in
some manner. The president might intervene through executive order or, if the financial impact
of the proposed regulation is sufficiently high, through Office of Management and Budget
review. He or she might also use the visibility of the office to mobilize public opinion in favor of
or against the proposed rule. Interest groups might mobilize members to submit comments for or
against the rule as well as generally raising public awareness of its potential impact. If the issue
is seen as important enough by a Congressional majority or public opinion is sufficiently
mobilized in one direction or another, there might even be a direct legislative response. None of
these forms of action are guaranteed,195 a fact which might diminish the potential risks to agency
preferred policies being accepted through the notice-and-comment process. However, engaging
in rulemaking does at least give a variety of other actors a greater opportunity to intervene than
might otherwise be the case.
The results also indicate that if agencies want their actions to be upheld by the Supreme
Court, they would be wise to act in accordance with relevant precedent. Chapter 4’s analysis
provides evidence that, controlling for other factors, the ideological direction of precedent exerts
significant influence on the ideological direction of the Courts decisions in the identified cases.
Chapter 5’s analysis similarly provides evidence that when the Solicitor General presents an
argument for the government’s position that is consistent with precedent, the government is
significantly more likely to find success when controlling for other factors. Taking these findings
together, it seems that wise administrators would consider existing case law when contemplating
future actions.

195

And given the volume of regulatory activity occurring in any given year, the likelihood of any particular
proposed rule receiving a high degree of attention should probably be viewed as relatively low.

168

Administrators should also, perhaps, not feel overly anxious when confronted by a
Constitutional challenge to their actions. Chapter 5 provides evidence that such cases are
significantly more likely to result in success for the agency in question when controlling for
other factors. There are some important caveats that come along with this, though. First, the
analysis does not address Constitutional challenges to an agency’s enabling statutes, so I cannot
say from these results whether or not the presence of a Constitutional issue should be a comfort
to administrators in all instances where they might arise. Second, as with the previous results,
more likely to win does not mean guaranteed to win.
Interpreting the application of some of the other findings is a somewhat less
straightforward process. In the first round of analysis performed in Chapter 5, the presence of a
question involving civil liberties was initially found to significantly increase the likelihood of the
government’s position prevailing when controlling for other factors. However, supplemental
analysis indicated that this influence was sensitive to, and in fact dependent on, the inclusion of
criminal procedure cases in the data.196 When filtering out criminal procedure cases, the presence
of a civil liberties question fell to insignificance, but ideological congruity between that expected
from the president based on party affiliation and the position taken by the Solicitor General rose
to significance. It might at least be the case that agencies dealing with criminal procedure matters
that do not directly involve criminal prosecutions197 might feel a relatively high degree of
confidence in their positions prevailing before the Court. As for ideological incongruence
between the president and Solicitor General, I am inclined to interpret the significance of this
variable as one indicating the strengths of a litigating position grounded in solid legal argument
196

These cases were decided in the government’s favor at an overwhelming rate, though the total number included
was somewhat limited. It appears that the inclusion of these cases simultaneously enhanced the apparent impact of
civil liberties questions and masked the effects of ideological incongruity between the president and Solicitor
General.
197
Which were excluded from the analyzed cases.
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rather than political preference.198 If this interpretation is accurate, then it might behoove
agencies not to hang their hopes on presidential influence to lead them to judicial success in the
absence of a sound legal foundation for their actions.
The impact of high dissension is perhaps the most puzzling of the results to find
significance here. The variable was included as a proxy for issue salience in an area of the law
that seems unlikely to be captured by traditional measures for the concept. While the significant
and negative impact of high dissension on the government’s chances of winning a given case
was expected, the exact explanation for this result is unclear. I originally hypothesized that, if
high dissension between the justices was a suitable stand-in for issue salience, then attitudinal
influence199 should become apparent when isolating cases with high levels of dissension for
analysis. This hypothesis failed to find support. There are a few ways that this could be
interpreted. The first and simplest is that high levels of dissension ultimately have no particular
relationship to issue salience200 but, through a quirk of statistical analysis, appear to here. While I
am unable to disprove this possibility, I also find it unconvincing. The second possibility is that
my initial hypothesis is accurate, but the relatively small number of cases of the type analyzed
here combined with the relatively high proportion of these cases decided unanimously mean that
traditional measures of ideological position do a poor job of capturing the justices’ preferences in
this particular body of cases. The third possibility is that there is a meaningful relationship
between high dissension and the government’s chances of success before the Court, but that the
nature of that relationship is not based on issue salience. While I still think that issue salience201
198

This aligns with the findings of several studies (e.g. Pacelle 2003; Bailey, et al. 2005; Wohlfarth 2009) and
claims made by various OSG attorneys that the office serves as the government’s lawyer rather than merely acting
as the president’s advocate before the Court.
199
Absent in the analyses in both Chapter 4 and 5.
200
Or at least no clear linear relationship.
201
Another factor to consider is that many of the cases examined here seem likely to be less salient than, for
instance, Constitutional cases addressing the national exercise of fundamental rights and liberties.
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makes the most theoretical sense for the impact of high levels of dissent, I have also considered
the notion that disagreement between the justices could be the result of a lack of legal clarity in
the case being examined. I cannot present evidence to either support or refute this particular
possibility, but it may be one worth considering in the future.
The results from the analytical chapters also indicate that quite a few factors that would,
on the face of things, appear important in the outcome of these cases do not exert significant
influence on that outcome when controlling for other factors. In Chapter 4, the ideological
preferences of the president, the House of Representatives, the Senate, and of the Court itself
failed to display significant impact on the ideological direction of case decisions. In Chapter 5,
the government acting as petitioner, the involvement of formal adjudication in the administrative
events leading up to the case, the presence of civil liberty questions when excluding criminal
procedure cases, ideological congruity between the median justice and the position taken by the
SG in a case, and the case occurring during the period when Chevron was controlling precedent
all failed to significantly increase the likelihood of government success before the Court.
To put these results into the context of the larger literature about Supreme Court decision
making, it seems that legal considerations might be the dominant factor in most of the cases
examined. Certainly, the influence of precedent on outcomes in the analysis in both Chapters 4
and 5 points in this direction. If the importance of ideological incongruity between the president
and the Solicitor General is, in fact, due to that incongruity being a marker for the quality of the
legal arguments being made, that finding also seems to lend weight to this idea. The importance
of engaging in notice-and-comment rulemaking is slightly harder to classify, though I lean
towards placing it into the legal consideration category as well. In the Mead era, it certainly
seems appropriate to consider it as such, but there are fewer cases from the Mead era included
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here than either the Skidmore or Chevron eras. In those earlier eras, there is no clear connection
to precedent.202 However, agencies engaging in a structured, statutorily created process that
allows for the input of multiple actors prior to finalizing a given rule might be seen as carrying
more legal weight than other, less formal means of agencies finalizing policy.
In addition to the presence of evidence for legal considerations influencing the outcomes
of the administrative cases examined here, the lack of clear evidence supporting either attitudinal
or strategic influence needs to be considered as well. In Chapter 4, the preferences of the elected
branches failed to exert influence on the ideological direction of the Court’s decisions, as did the
ideological preferences of the median justice. If strategic considerations were a key factor in
these cases, some combination of the president, House, and Senate should have risen to
significance. Similarly, if attitudes were of great importance in these outcomes, the preferences
of the median justice should have been significant and positively related to decision direction. In
Chapter 5, the government acting as petitioner failed to reach significance and ideological
incongruity between the president and Solicitor General had both a positive and significant effect
on the likelihood of the government’s position prevailing. If strategic considerations were once
again at the fore of this set of cases, it seems that the government acting as petitioner might rise
to significance. Similarly, the SG taking a position at odds with that expected from the president
should have been either insignificant or significant but negatively related to the chance of
government success. Finally, ideological congruence between the median justice and the
Solicitor General did not significantly influence case outcomes. If attitudes were a driving force
in these cases, it seems that the SG arguing in a manner consistent with the preferences of the
median justice should have had a significant and positive relationship with the dependent

202

I think that a fairly strong argument could be made for judicial deference to agency action being viewed through
a lens of inter-branch strategic considerations as well.
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variable.203
Of course, there are some counterarguments that could be made here as well. If the
significance of rulemaking is a point in favor of legal considerations, then the insignificance of
formal adjudication would seem to be a point against it. As a process, formal adjudication shares
the same statutory roots as notice-and-comment rulemaking and is mentioned alongside such
rulemaking in Mead as a likely sign of an agency’s authority to act with the force of law. Despite
this, it never seems to matter in a significant way. The failure of the government as petitioner to
reach significance could alternatively be read as a sign of strategic influence, especially since the
government wins more than it loses as both petitioner and respondent. If, as I have discussed as a
possibility elsewhere, measures of attitudes in this sector of the law are underdeveloped, it could
be that attitudes are a stronger factor than they appear to be.
I would stop short of saying that legal considerations are the only considerations that
matter in this body of cases. I would say, however, that legal considerations appear to be quite
important in this area of the law. If this is the case, I argue that it is primarily due to the
importance of legal stability as a practical factor influencing the ability of agencies to carry out
their appointed tasks.204
Future Directions
Something approaching a clear answer to the questions raised in this study will, of
course, require subsequent scholarly endeavors to expand on the work done here. There are a
number of ways to expand on the current analysis, some relatively simple and some more
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It may be that the lack of apparent attitudinal impact here is connected to the relatively low proportion of cases
examined that were decided by very close votes. Of course, the lack of such votes and the large proportion of
unanimous decisions also seems to stand in opposition, to some extent, to the idea that the justices are merely singleminded seekers of ideologically-driven policy outcomes.
204
Which could be argued to have value as either a particular kind of attitudinal orientation or, perhaps more likely,
as a matter of strategic importance.
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difficult. The first, simplest, and perhaps most immediately valuable approach would be to
expand the included observations both forwards and backwards in time. This would increase the
number of observations substantially, as well as allowing researchers to speak to questions such
as whether or not Skidmore has always been used in a manner that gives additional consideration
to actions backed by notice-and-comment rulemaking and whether or not the patterns observed
here extend in full into the present.205 Similarly, the incorporation of relevant cases that directly
addressed whether or not agency action was justified but that did not involve the government as a
party seems useful for, at the very least, determining whether or not the Court treats those cases
differently than the ones where the government is a party. While I think that limiting the cases to
those where the government was a party was both justifiable and, as a first attempt at addressing
these cases in this manner, desirable, casting the proverbial net a bit wider seems useful for
future research. I also think that a deep dive into the substance of the cases included here that
exhibit high levels of dissension between the justices with an eye towards what might be driving
that dissension would be a worthwhile endeavor. While this is conceptually straightforward, I
suspect that a close examination of these cases would represent a significant time investment. It
seems the only way to determine what the real importance, if any, of the variable is, though.
Other potential expansions might prove somewhat more difficult than those already
discussed but could prove fruitful all the same. Further exploration of the influence of both
Congress and the president in this area still seems theoretically warranted. For Congress, it seems
possible that examining either the ideological preferences of Congressional committees that
oversee the agency involved in a case or the ideology of Congress at the time that the enabling
statute in question was passed might be a useful avenue of exploration. For the President,
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The 1944 term, when Skidmore was decided, seems like the ideal point to stop looking further back into the
Court’s history.
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looking into the potential impact of OMB review of a rule and subsequent actions could provide
evidence of greater presidential influence in the process.
I have saved the recommendations that seem most difficult to implement, but potentially
most important for a comprehensive understanding of the interactions between the judiciary and
the bureaucracy, for last. The first of these is to look beyond the decision stage of the Court’s
process and examine which cases do and do not reach the Court. The Solicitor General would be
a key player in this endeavor and could be incorporated in one of two ways. The first would be to
examine the administrative cases that the SG requests cert for and see which ones the Court
accepts. The second is to look beyond206 the Supreme Court and to explore the various
administrative cases available to the Solicitor General to bring to the Court in the first place and
then to see for which the Office actually does apply. Such studies could provide valuable
information about what ends up on the cutting room floor, so to speak.
My final and most difficult recommendation for future work is this: leave the Supreme
Court behind entirely and focus on how the circuits handle administrative cases. The circuits are
the courts of last resort for an enormous volume of cases that involve a growing number of
issues. This has been done in some small ways already, but I am currently aware of no
comprehensive study in the vein of the work presented here that focuses on the intermediate
appellate courts. While the Supreme Court is undoubtedly an important player in the process of
administrative oversight, the sheer volume of cases handled by the circuits207 means that they
matter as well. An examination of the D.C. Circuit would be a reasonable place to start given the
primarily administrative nature of the circuit’s docket. Ideally, though, comprehensive, cross-
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Or perhaps below would be more appropriate.
The different approaches to similar legal issues taken by the various circuits is also an important factor for
understanding the Supreme Court’s activity as the presence of intercircuit conflict is often an indicator of cert being
granted.
207
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circuit comparisons of administrative jurisprudence could eventually be compiled.
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